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Abstract
Knowledge rests not upon truth alone, but upon
error also.
Carl G. Jung
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics used to analyze situation where two or more
agents are interacting. Originally it was developed as a model for conflicts and collaborations
between rational and intelligent individuals. Now it finds applications in social sciences, eco-
nomics, biology (particularly evolutionary biology and ecology), engineering, political science,
international relations, computer science, and philosophy.
Networks are an abstract representation of interactions, dependencies or relationships. Net-
works are extensively used in all the fields mentioned above and in many more. Many useful
informations about a system can be discovered by analyzing the current state of a network
representation of such system.
In this work we will apply some of the methods of game theory to populations of agents that
are interconnected. A population is in fact represented by a network of players where one can
only interact with another if there is a connection between them.
In the first part of this work we will show that the structure of the underlying network has a
strong influence on the strategies that the players will decide to adopt to maximize their utility.
We will then introduce a supplementary degree of freedom by allowing the structure of the
population to be modified along the simulations. This modification allows the players to modify
the structure of their environment to optimize the utility that they can obtain.
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Sommario
La conoscenza poggia non solo sulla verita`, bens´ı
anche sull’errore.
Carl G. Jung
La teoria dei giochi e` una branca della matematica applicata utilizzata per analizzare la
situazione in cui due o piu` agenti stanno interagendo. E` stata originariamente sviluppata come
un modello per i conflitti e le collaborazioni tra persone razionali e intelligenti; ora trova appli-
cazioni in scienze sociali, economia, biologia (in particolare biologia evoluzionistica ed ecologia),
ingegneria, scienze politiche, relazioni internazionali, informatica e filosofia.
Le reti sono una rappresentazione astratta di interazioni, dipendenze o relazioni e sono ampia-
mente utilizzate in tutti i settori di cui sopra e in molti altri ancora. Molte informazioni utili
su un sistema possono essere carpite analizzando lo stato attuale della rappresentazione sotto
forma di rete di tale sistema.
In questo lavoro applicheremo alcuni dei metodi della teoria dei giochi a una popolazione di
agenti interconnessi, rappresentata da una rete di giocatori dove ognuno puo` interagire con un
altro agente solo se esiste un collegamento tra di essi.
Nella prima parte di questo lavoro mostreremo che la struttura della rete ha una forte influenza
sulle strategie che i giocatori adottano per massimizzare il loro guadagno.
In seguito introdurremo un ulteriore grado di liberta` consentendo alla struttura della popolazione
di essere modificata nel corso delle simulazioni; questo permettera` ai giocatori di agire sulla
struttura del loro ambiente in modo da ottimizzare il guadagno che possono ottenere.
xvii
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Synopsis
La connaissance repose non seulement sur la
ve´rite´ mais aussi sur l’erreur.
Carl G. Jung
La the´orie des jeux est une branche des mathe´matiques applique´es utilise´e pour analyser des
situations ou` deux ou plusieurs agents interagissent. A` l’origine elle a e´te´ de´veloppe´e comme
un mode`le pour les conflits et les collaborations entre des individus rationnels et intelligents.
Maintenant elle trouve des applications dans les sciences sociales, l’e´conomie, la biologie (en
particulier la biologie e´volutive et l’e´cologie), l’inge´nierie, les sciences politiques, les relations
internationales, l’informatique et la philosophie.
Les re´seaux sont une repre´sentation abstraite d’interactions, de´pendances ou relations. Ils sont
largement utilise´s dans tous les domaines mentionne´s ci-dessus et dans bien d’autres encore.
Beaucoup d’informations utiles peuvent eˆtre de´couvertes par l’analyse de l’e´tat actuel d’une
repre´sentation sous la forme d’un re´seau d’un tel syste`me.
Dans ce travail, nous allons appliquer certaines des me´thodes de la the´orie des jeux a` des
populations d’agents interconnecte´s. Une population est repre´sente´e par un re´seau d’acteurs ou`
un ne peut interagir avec un autre que s’ils sont connecte´s entre eux.
Dans la premie`re partie de ce travail nous allons montrer que la structure du re´seau sous-jacent
a une forte influence sur les strate´gies que les joueurs de´cident d’adopter pour maximiser leur
be´ne´fice.
Nous allons ensuite introduire un degre´ supple´mentaire de liberte´ en permettant a` la structure
de la population d’eˆtre modifie´e pendant les simulations. Cette modification permet aux joueurs
d’agir sur la structure de leur environnement afin d’optimiser le be´ne´fice qu’ils peuvent obtenir.
xix
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Overview of the Thesis
It may be that all games are silly. But then, so
are humans.
Robert Wilson Lynd
This Ph.D. thesis is organized in the form of a collection of articles. Parts II, III, and IV of
this manuscript include seven peer-reviewed articles that have been published in international
specialized journals. All these articles have not been edited, apart for the obvious formatting.
Due to this there is some overlap between some articles and between articles and introductory
parts. Also, for the same reasons, the style of figures and tables, and sometimes some notations
are not coherent over the whole manuscript.
This work consists mainly in an empirical analysis of results obtained through computer
simulations. These results are only presented and commented inside the articles. However,
even if redundant with respect to the articles, an introduction to the methods used in the
articles included in the three parts can be found in chapter 4 at the end of the first part of this
manuscript. This has been done with the purpose of facilitating the reading of the thesis. The
bibliography has been compiled in a unique section at the end of the manuscript, and contains
all the publications cited in this work.
Now for a description of the structure of this work:
• Part I presents the motivations for this work as well as its background and theoretical
foundations. Also, at the end of this part, there is an introduction to the methods used in
the following parts of the dissertation.
• Parts II, III, and IV include the articles presenting the results obtained in these years.
• Finally, in part V general conclusion are drawn and some hints are given on possible
directions for future works.
xxiii
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Part I
Background & Definitions
1

Chapter 1
Motivation
I was gratified to be able to answer promptly,
and I did. I said I didn’t know.
Mark Twain
Game theory aims at resolving conflicting situations that appear commonly in socio-economic
settings. However, standard game theory, being based on perfectly rational, payoff-maximizing
agents, has to face agent’s real-world limitations such as bounded rationality and limited com-
putational capabilities.
A first step toward a more realistic model for social interaction using game theory has been
the introduction of Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) that uses populations of players that
individually have limited capabilities. This assumption and an evolution model inspired by
biological evolution has allowed a great improvement.
More recently, in 1992, Martin Nowak and Robert May [84], made another fundamental
improvement when they introduced an underling structure, a network, to represent the relation-
ships between the players.
In this work we try to understand the role played by characteristics of several kind of networks
in sustaining (or not) the cooperation of agents in a population.
Other than exploring the benefits of the population structure we also take a closer look at
some mechanics that can modify the behavior of the agents and thus change the stable state of
the system and the solutions to the problem.
Here we enumerate the aspects that are covered in this manuscript and our hypothesis about
their effect on the dynamical system we use in this work.
I. We analyzed the effects of different updates rules, the changes introduced by using different
methods to calculate the utility of an agent, and the effects of the timing of the operations.
In our opinion all of these mechanics have a great influence on the amount of cooperation
that can be established and maintained in a population.
II. When deciding on their next strategy, agents often use their wellness and the apparent
wellness of other individuals and try to adapt their strategy to that of the fittest. However
3
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that is not always the case. In some situations other techniques are used by the agents to
improve their place in the society and one of these techniques is conformity, the tendency
of humans to imitate locally common behaviors.
In this work we looked at the effects that the introduction of small amounts of conformism
has on the evolution of a networked society.
III. The structure of the network also plays an important role in the emergence of social norms.
By using several kind of networks, from simple networks to complex social networks, we
hope to discover the role played by the characteristic of the structure on the strategies of the
agents. We believe that the structure of social networks, and in particular the existence of
social groups and communities have a great impact on the quality of the social interactions
in the population.
IV. Finally the network of a social group is, in reality, an evolving complex system. We
hypothesize that the behavior of players can push the structure of dynamical networked
population to evolve from a regular or random topology to a more functional structure to
optimize the wellness of the whole population.
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Chapter 2
Game theory
God does not play dice with the universe; He
plays an ineffable game of His own devising,
which might be compared, from the perspective
of any of the other players, to being involved in
an obscure and complex version of poker in a
pitch-dark room, with blank cards, for infinite
stakes, with a Dealer who won’t tell you the
rules, and who smiles all the time.
Terry Pratchett
Game theory is a mathematical framework for the analysis of models of conflict and cooper-
ation between rational and intelligent individuals. It provides tools for the analysis of situations
involving two or more agents, where each agent’s actions will influence the welfare of the others.
This field was founded in 1944 with the publication of the book “Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior” by von Neumann and Morgenstern [124]. It was initially developed to analyze situa-
tions where the success of an agent implied the failure of another, also known as zero sum games.
However now “game theory is a sort of umbrella or ’unified field’ theory for the rational side
of social science, where ’social’ is interpreted broadly, to include human as well as non-human
players (computers, animals, plants)” [5]. The development of game theory was extensive during
the 1950s thanks to the contributions of several scholars. In the 1970s the theory was explicitly
applied to biology and its now a recognized and important tool in many fields to the point that
eight games theorists have won the Nobel Prize in Economics.
Many situations where decisions have to be taken in interaction with other parties or in
conflicting situation can be found in everyday life and can be interpreted as “games” using the
tools provided by game theory. Some examples of such situations can be: animals competing
for some resources, driving, paying taxes, playing chess, etc. Clearly the representation used in
game theory does not include all the details and the complexity that many situations involve.
Sometimes the solution proposed by the theory does not correspond to the one suggested by
common-sense. For example when taking a train, one have to chose whether to buy a ticket or
5
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not. If the control is absent (or rare enough) the best solution is to take a free ride. Rationality
is the key to the interpretation of this solution. Rationality that has to be interpreted in the
homo economicus sense, i.e. an individual with very specific goals trying to maximize his utility
at the least possible cost. The english term economic man goes back to John Stuart Mill, in
1836 he defined the economic man as someone who “is concerned with him solely as a being
who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means
for obtaining that end.” [68]. The latin name is probably due to Pareto [87]. This concept has
been used by Savage, and von Neumann and Morgenstern [105, 124]. According to game theory
all the agents are rationals and intelligent which means that:
• they know the possible choices in a given situation
• they can associate a utility to each choice and to its consequences
• they take decisions aimed to maximise the utility
• they know that every agent is also rational and intelligent (common knowledge of ratio-
nality).
The utility is a numerical value that represents the value of the outcome of every possible
decision, this utility is also often called payoff. As said, a rational agent tries to maximize this
utility, every time an individual is confronted with a decision he choses the strategy that will
lead to the highest possible outcome. If there is uncertainty or incomplete knowledge, the agent
chooses the maximum expected payoff. It’s important to point out that the actual numerical
values are not important, only the ordering of the payoff of the different strategies is taken into
account. Many criticisms have been directed to this approach and to the assumption that an
agent has unbounded rationality: this is obviously not possible in the real world and others
models where players have limited rationality have been proposed, however the standard models
allows the use of exact mathematical formalizations.
All the works included in this manuscript make use of non-cooperative game theory, i.e. the
agents aim is totally selfish and they try to maximize their own utility no matter what. In
the cooperative game theory players are allowed to form coalitions, this has not been taken into
account in these works.
Also the games used here are all one-shot games. Which means that even when two player
have to play together for a second time, they will have no memory of their previous encounters.
When considering iterated or repeated games, players may develop more complex strategies. Both
situations are very common in society; however, we focused our attention on the former.
2.1 Representation of games
Game theory is a mathematical theory, and the games studied are also well-defined mathematical
objects. A finite game Γ has a finite number of players N , a finite set of strategies Si for each
player i ∈ N and utility functions ui :×j∈N Sj → R for all the players j ∈ N .
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Two forms are used to represent non-cooperative games: the Extensive form and the Strategic
form.
2.1.1 Extensive form
The extensive form is particularly useful when the ordering of the action of the players is
important. The representation of a game in its extensive form requires:
• The set of players N = {0, 1, ..., n} where 0 usually represent Nature.
• For every player, the set of moments in the game where this player has to take an action.
• The possible actions for each player at each choice point she has.
• The information set for each player at each choice point.
• The payoff for each possible outcome, i.e. for each possible combination of moves of the
players.
In this form games can be presented as trees where each vertex is a choice to one of the
players and each branch corresponds to the consequences of that choice. At each leaf of the
tree, where the game ends, there are the corresponding payoff values for each player. Let take
an easy game for an example. In this two-players game, player one will choose first between
two strategies top (T) and bottom (B). After that, player 2 will choose between right (R) and
left (L) without knowing the action of player 1. The extensive form of this game is shown in
figure 2.1.
T
B
L
R
L
R
1
2 2,2
4,0
1,0
3,1
Figure 2.1: Extensive form for the first version of the game. The dashed line around the two
choice points for player 2 represent his unawareness of the situation when is called to chose his
strategy.
The dashed lines represent the information a player has when it is her turn to decide, this is
called information set. Player 1 information set contains only one state because the game is just
beginning and there is only one possible state. On the other hand, as player 2 does not know
the strategy of player 1, she cannot distinguish between the two possible state of the game,
therefor these states are in the same information set. The fact that player 2 cannot distinguish
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in which state the game is can be interpreted as a missing information, in this case we will be
describing a game with imperfect information [71], or also the situation where player’s 2 move
is simultaneous to player’s 1. In this situation, player 1 is better off choosing T as she will
be better off whatever player 2 decide. Player 2, knowing the options for player one, has to
choose L in order to obtain a better payoff. When we modify the game by introducing perfect
information the situation changes, as shown in figure 2.2.
T
B
L
R
l
r
1
2t 2,2
4,0
1,0
3,1
2b
Figure 2.2: Extensive form for the second version of the game. In this case player two knows
the action of player 1, so she can distinguish between the two choice points.
In this case player 2 knows what player 1 has done. This is represented by the two different
information sets (2t) and (2b) near the choices for player 2. This development will also change
the strategy for player 1, as she now knows that if she plays B, player 2 will play r to obtain a
better payoff.
This kind of representation can also be used for complex games like chess. Clearly in that
case each player will have a plethora of choices and the tree will practically not be drawable.
2.1.2 Strategic form
The strategic form, also called Normal form, represents a game using fewer elements compared
to the previous form.
Formally a finite game Γ with complete information in the normal form can be specified as
follows:
Γ = (N,Si, ui) ∀i ∈ N.
In this case each strategy includes all the actions a player will take at every choice point she has.
The normal form can be represented as the matrix of the payoffs associated with every possible
combination of strategies. Clearly if more than two players are involved in the game the matrix
representation is not adapted. The normal form is used when the actions are simultaneous or
when players decide their strategy without knowing the action of the others. Otherwise the
extensive form is generally used. The representation of the first of the two games presented in
section 2.1.1, is shown in table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: The normal form for the first version of the game game presented in section 2.1.1.
The two players decide their strategy without knowing what the other will do.
Player 2
L R
P
la
ye
r
1 T (2, 2) (4, 0)
B (1, 0) (3, 1)
Also the second version of this game can be represented in this form. However in this case
the possible strategies for player 2 are not only {L,R}. The strategy set is modified to take into
account the two possible information sets, in this way player 2 will be able to decide his strategy
before knowing the choice of player 1. The new strategy set will be {Ll, Lr,Rl,Rr}, where for
each pair, the first action correspond to the reply for player 1 playing T and the second for her
playing B. The corresponding strategic form representation is in table 2.2.
Table 2.2: The normal form for the second version of the game game presented in section 2.1.1.
Here too the two players decide their strategy without knowing what the other will do, but the
strategy for player 2 includes the reply for each one of the moves for player 1.
Player 2
Ll Lr Rl Rr
P
la
ye
r
1 T (2, 2) (2, 2) (4, 0) (4, 0)
B (1, 0) (3, 1) (1, 0) (3, 1)
2.2 Equilibrium
The equilibria represent the most common solution concept used in game theory. A solution
concept is a formal rule for predicting how the game will be played. The predictions are called
solutions and describe what strategy will be selected by each player that takes part in the game.
A pure strategy si for player i is a complete plan of action that describes what a player will do
every time he can chose between multiple options. The strategy set Si of a player i is the set of
all possible pure strategies that this player can use.
Solution concepts, in most games, will find more than one possible solution. Some of these
solutions use pure strategies, some of them use mixed strategies.
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2.2.1 Mixed strategy
A mixed strategy σi for a player i is a set of probabilities ∆(Si) assigned to each pure strategy
si ∈ Si available to that player. Any strategy si will be selected with a nonnegative probability
σ(si). This allows a player to randomly select one pure strategy. The set of mixed strategies
available to a player is infinite, assuming that that player has at least two possible pure strategies.
The sum of the probabilities in a mixed strategy must be exactly 1:∑
si∈Si
σ(si) = 1.
The probability set of a mixed strategy can be represented as a vector in Rmi where mi is the
cardinality of the set Si. As the sum of the elements of these vectors is one, the set of all
possible vectors can be represented as a simplex, the simplexes for mi = 2 and mi = 3 are shown
in figure 2.3.
mi = 2 mi = 3
Figure 2.3: Unit simplex for mi = 2 and m1 = 3.
Clearly pure strategies are also part of the simplex. A pure strategy sk is a particular case
where σ(sk) = 1 and σ(sj) = 0 ∀j 6= k, i.e. a vertex of the simplex. A strategy profile is a set of
strategies containing one strategy for every player in the game. A strategy profile is a complete
specification of all action of the game. When the strategies are mixed, this profile σ is called
randomized strategy profile.
σ = (σ1, ..., σn), σ ∈ ×
i∈N
,∆(Si)
is a vector of mixed strategies for all players i ∈ N where n is the size of N .
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2.2.2 Nash Equilibrium
The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the most famous and widely used equilibrium concept. This
solution concept has been proposed by John Forbes Nash in [72].
In order to explain the NE a few more concepts have to be introduced. Let’s define as ui(σ) the
expected payoff of player i when all players choose their strategies independently according to
a strategy profile σ. Let’s also denote with (σ−i, τi) the randomized strategy equal to σ except
for player i that will use strategy τi.
A Nash Equilibrium is a randomized strategy profile σ∗ that verifies:
ui(σ
∗) ≥ ui(σ−i, τi),∀i ∈ N, ∀τi ∈ ∆(Si)
Which means that σ∗ is a Nash Equilibria iff no player could expect an higher payoff with an
unilateral deviation from this profile. J. Nash proved that such an equilibrium exist for every
finite game Γ. The proof of this theorem can be found in [71], page 138, and in [122], page 51.
If we go back to the two variants of the game presented in section 2.1.1, in the first version,
without complete information, the NE is (T, L) with payoff (2, 2). Any deviation from this will
lower the payoff of the the player that changes strategy. In the second version of the game the
NE is (B,Lr) with a payoff of (3, 1). In this case player 2 excludes strategies Rl, Rr and also
Ll because they are less interesting. Knowing that player 2 strategy should be Lr player 1 will
play B to get an higher payoff.
2.2.3 Pareto efficiency
The Pareto efficiency (or Pareto optimality) is an economic concept that finds applications in
other fields. When different possibilities exist for allocating benefits, a change in the allocations
that improves the benefit of one individual without worsening the situation for the others, is
called a Pareto-optimal move, or a Pareto improvement. An allocation is defined as Pareto
efficient when no Pareto improvement is possible anymore, i.e. it is not possible to improve
the payoff of an individual without putting another in a less desirable position. The concept of
Pareto optimality does not take into account the desirability of an allocation.
2.3 Some games
Let’s now illustrate some simple games that have been used in this work. All these two-person,
two strategies games are symmetric, which means that each player has the same strategy set.
The payoff matrix for these games is shown in table 2.3.
2.3.1 Coordination and cooperation
In the games presented in the following sections two concepts will be used: Cooperation and
Coordination. Cooperation is used to identify the action of an agent that is taking some risks
Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks Enea Pestelacci
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Table 2.3: The normal form of a generic two-person, two-strategies, symmetric game.
s1 s2
s1 (u1, u1) (u2, u3)
s2 (u3, u2) (u4, u4)
and sacrificing the possibility of an higher (or guaranteed) benefit to help his partner(s). Coor-
dination is merely the results of two agents applying the same action at the same type. In some
games, coordination is preferred, as it provides the highest benefits to all agents involved, but
this is not always the case.
In the case of Prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation can be seen, as said previously, as the action of
a altruist player trying to help his opponent and exposing himself to the worse possible outcome.
Coordinating on the cooperative strategy is unstable because both players are tempted by the
highest payoff that could be obtained by defecting and are also “scared” to be betrayed by the
opponent. Coordination on the (s2, s2) is the only stable equilibria because in this way the
player are protected from the betrayal.
In the Stag hunt game, cooperation also means being exposed to the betrayal of the partner,
but in this case the act of cooperation is also enforced by the attempt to obtain the highest
possible benefit. In this game coordination is stable in both cases, however coordination on the
cooperative strategy is Pareto-dominant and thus preferred.
In the Hawk-doves game, cooperation simply means sharing resources with the opponent.
By coordinating on the cooperative strategy both players would obtain a good payoff, however
the possibility of higher gains tends to push the players to bully the opponent.
Finally, on the pure coordination case, the only way for players to obtain a benefit is to
coordinate. There is no possibility of higher gain in deviating from any of the coordination
points and cooperation does have almost any relevance in this setting.
Although coordination and cooperation are close but distinct concepts, in the literature often
the term cooperation is used to mean both; for example in the Stag Hunt game. This is also
the case of the articles appearing in this thesis.
2.3.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma
The prisoner’s dilemma is one of the fundamental problems in game theory and demonstrate
why two personas may not be interested in cooperation even if it’s in their best interest to do
so. A classic example of the prisoner’s dilemma (hereafter PD) is the following:
Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a conviction, and, having
separated the prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same deal. If one testifies for the prosecution
against the other (defects) and the other remains silent (cooperates), the defector goes free and the silent
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accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only
six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence. Each
prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent. Each one is assured that the other would
not know about the betrayal before the end of the investigation. How should the prisoners act?
The payoff matrix for this game is in table 2.4.
Table 2.4: A payoff matrix for the prisoner’s dilemma. The payoff represents the years of
jail-time, C stands for “Cooperate” and D stands for “Defect”.
C D
C (−0.5,−0.5) (−10, 0)
D (0,−10) (−5,−5)
It is in the best interest of both players to cooperate, and get only 6 months of jail-time. However
both player will be tempted to betray the partner and try to go free. The only NE is exactly
(D,D). Each player defects, and they both obtain a bad payoff. A game where the payoff
respect the same ordering u3 > u1 > u4 > u2 is also an example of PD and shares the same
properties.
Many examples of prisoner’s dilemma can be found in real-life. Its wide applicability is the
reason of the interest in this game.
Sports: This dilemma applies to the use or not of performance enhancing drugs. Each athlete
will obtain approximately the same benefit from drugs. So it’s an advantage to everyone that
no athlete take drugs, because drugs have side effects. However if an athlete takes the drugs, he
will gain an advantage over the others, unless all the athletes do the same. When all take the
drugs the advantage is cancelled, but everyone is affected by the side-effects.
Climate change: All countries would benefit from a stable climate, but any country is often
hesitant in enforcing the reduction of the emissions of CO2. The benefit to one country of
maintaining the current behavior is greater than the benefit to everyone if all countries comply
and modify their behavior.
Politics: The arms race between two states can be seen as an example of prisoner’s dilemma.
Both states can agree in reducing weapons or invest in the army. Both states will profit from
increasing the military expenses, no matter what the other does. So both states rationally decide
to invest more in the army, even if the result is apparently irrational.
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2.3.3 Chicken
This game is also often called “Hawks and Doves” or “Snowdrift”. It is another well known
metaphor for conflict that captures some important features of social and geopolitical interaction.
The principle of this game, is that if a player yields to the other he gets an inferior payoff.
However, if neither player yield the outcome is worse for everyone. The game can be described
as follows: two drivers, in two cars, both headed towards a bridge. The first drivers who stops
or swerves leaves the bridge to the other and loses, he is the “chicken”. If neither one yields,
they will both potentially end up in a fatal head-on collision. Theoretically the best thing for
both players is to wait for the other player to yield. The crash is the worse possible outcome
for both players, not yielding when the opponent does is the best outcome. This leads to a
situation where each players try to reach the best possible outcome while risking the worst.
This game has also been compared with nuclear brinkmanship [98]. Two parties engage in a
showdown with nothing to gain, while an uncontrollable risk can lead to a potential disaster.
For this reason this game has been used to describe the mutual assured destruction involved
in the Cuban Missile Crisis [94]. In the Hawks and Doves version it represents two animals,
competing for some resource. If they agree in sharing the good (doves) they obtain a good
outcome. However the best possible payoff is obtained by being a bully (hawk) and scaring the
other (dove). The worst case scenario happens when both animals decide to compete for the
resource and they end up injuring them selves for more than the value of the good itself.
The payoff matrix for this game is in table 2.5.
Table 2.5: A payoff matrix for the Hawks Doves Game.
dove hawk
dove (2, 2) (0, 4)
hawk (4, 0) (−1,−1)
When we formally analyze this game we find three equilibria: (dove, hawk) and (hawk,dove)
are two pure strategy NE, the third equilibrium is a mixed strategy. The mixed strategy equi-
librium can be found in the following way. Let’s suppose that player 2 will play dove with
probability p and hawk with probability 1 − p. In this case the expected payoff for player 1 if
he plays dove will be:
E1[dove] = 2p
and if he plays hawk his payoff will be:
E1[hawk] = 4p− (1− p)
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Player one will be indifferent in playing dove or hawk when E1[dove] = E1[hawk]. Which
means 2p = 4p− (1− p)⇒ 3p = 1⇒ p = 1/3. Assuming that also player 1 also plays dove with
probability q, player 2 will go through the same reasoning and conclude that q = p = 1/3. Thus
the NE for this game is σ∗ = (1/3, 2/3) for both players. This kind of game is also called an
anti-coordination game as it is mutually beneficial for both players to play different strategies.
2.3.4 Stag Hunt
This game describes the conflict between social cooperation and safety. It’s origin is probably
J.J.Rousseau ’Discourse on inequality’. The story is about two hunters, they can try to hunt a
stag (strategy S), which could feed them and their families for several days, but they have to
cooperate to catch one. Or they can hunt for rabbits (strategy R), which is an easier pray and
can be caught by one hunter alone, but provides food for only one day. Clearly if one hunter
decides to go for rabbits and one hunts for a stag the first one will catch something and the
second one will be back empty handed.
The payoff matrix for this game showed is in table 2.6.
Table 2.6: A payoff matrix for the Stag Hunt Game.
S R
S (3, 3) (0, 2)
R (2, 0) (1, 1)
In this game mutual cooperation (S, S) is the best outcome and it’s a NE. This equilibrium
is also Pareto-efficient because the payoff is optimal for both players. (R,R) is also a NE of
the game, this equilibrium is inferior to the other one but it’s risk-dominant as a player is not
exposed to the risk of the other player playing the other strategy. In between these two pure
strategy equilibria, there is a third one in mixed strategy. With the current payoff matrix the
probability to play S is pS = 1/2 for both players. The dilemma lays here in the “fear” that
may lead the players to miss the optimal equilibrium to protect themselves from the other player
selfish behavior.
2.3.5 Pure Coordination
This class of games model many common situations in society. The idea is that cooperating on
a problem will help all parties in realizing a mutual gain. But only making mutually consistent
decisions. A common example is the choice of technological standards.
A common example of the payoff matrix for this class of games, for two-players and two-strategies
is shown in table ??. This table can easily be generalized for the case with n−strategies for each
player by using an n× n payoff matrix with positive values only on its main diagonal.
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Table 2.7: A payoff matrix for a pure coordination game.
1 2
1 (u1, u1) (0, 0)
2 (0, 0) (u2, u2)
A simple example of pure coordination game is the driving game. Roads have two sides, in
some parts of the world people drive on the left side, on some other places they drive on the
right side. Both situations are stable and perfectly fine. There is no reason to prefer one or the
other and some countries got accustomed to drive on one side of the road, and some others on
the other side.
Usually such conventions are stabilized over times, but sometimes are introduced overnight
for some other reason. For example recently, in september 2009, the Samoa government decided
to change to driving on the left side of the road to reduce the price of the cars. As left-hand drives
had to be imported from the Americas while right-hand drives could be cheaply imported from
the closer countries. Moreover the government suggested that samoan expatriates in Australia
and New Zealand could send used and cheapest cars to their relatives in Samoa.
Another famous example is the overnight change to right side driving imposted by the
Swedish government in 1963, against the decision of a 1955 referendum where 83% of the swedish
voted to keep the driving on the left.
It is easily seen that apart from the two pure strategies equilibria, a third NE exist in mixed
strategy. The probabilities depends on the actual payoff matrix, for example p = 1/2 for the
driving game.
Bargaining problems like selling and buying goods are also a coordination game. There
certainly are conflicting interest in play but in final there should be coordination to conclude
the sale.
2.4 Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) introduces a dynamical concept in game theory. In real world
agents can observe their behavior and sometimes also have a perception of the behavior of other
players, and can adapt their strategy to improve their payoffs. Real agents will adapt to their
increasing knowledge of the game and the environment. EGT has originated from the work of
Maynard Smith and Price in 1973 [65, 64], as an application to the mathematical framework of
game theory to biological problems. EGT now has cought the interest of sociologists, anthro-
pologists, philosofers, and economists. Biological evolution, the inspiration for EGT, submit a
population of individuals to a source of variation that should provide diversity and applies a
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selection mechanism to favor fitter variant over individuals who are less adapted to the current
environment. EGT translates these concept in the following elements:
• It uses a large population of players, each player uses a fixed strategy when engaged in a
two-person game.
• Pair of anonymous players are randomly extracted from the population to play the game
and receive the corresponding payoff.
• A selection mechanism ensures that the diffusion on the population of best performing
strategies is increased.
• Players are not rational in the sense proposed in the previous sections. Here they only
need to apply their built-in strategy.
These elements have been formalized in a selection mechanism called replicator dynamics.
2.4.1 Replicator Dynamics
For mathematical convenience replicator dynamics (RD) is applied to an infinite population.
At each time t the population is in a state that corresponds to a vector of n pure strategies
x(t) = (x1(t), ..., xn(t)) where xi(t) is the fraction of the population using strategy i. This
polymorphic population state can also be interpreted as a whole population of players playing
the corresponding mixed strategy. Pairs of agents are randomly selected from the population to
play the game. u(ei, x) is the payoff of the pure strategy i in state x, and u(x, x) is the average
payoff of the population defined as : u(x, x) =
∑n
i=1 xiu(ei, x).
If the payoffs are considered like fitness in biology, i.e. they reflect the amount of offspring
that will inherit the same trait, the frequency of change of a strategy in the population is
proportional to the difference between the average payoff of that strategy and the average payoff
of the whole population. We can write the following equation:
dxi
dt
= x˙i = xi[u(ei, x)− u(x, x)] = xi(ui − u¯), i = 1, ..., n
where u¯ is the average payoff of the population and ui = u(ei, x). This system of differential
equations represents the replicator dynamics. From these equations it’s easily seen that a strat-
egy that does better than average will end up reinforcing its presence in the population. It’s also
clear however that a strategy that is absent in the population, cannot appear as basic replicator
dynamics does not include the concept of mutation.
The next step will be to find if this selection mechanism allows the emergence of stable states
in the population state and the differences between these states and the NE found by means
of classic game theory. The general result is that, among the stationary states of the dynamics
one usually finds the Nash equilibria of the corresponding static game. For details the reader is
referred to [122].
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2.4.2 Evolutionary stable strategy
Evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) have been introduces by Maynard Smith and Price in
1973 [65, 64]. A strategy x is an ESS in a population if a small number of individuals playing an
alternative strategy y are unable to invade the population and eventually replace x. This notion
is simple yet elegant and it is also very close to the concept of the NE. More formally, let’s
say that all the individuals of a population act according to strategy x and a second strategy
y ∈ ∆(Si) is used by the few invaders. The payoff for strategy x when played against y as
u(x, y). Let’s also define  ∈ (0, 1) as the share of mutants in the population. As the pairs
of players are drawn uniformly from the population the probability that an y player will be
engaged in a match is , the corresponding probability for an x player is 1− . This is equivalent
in playing the mixed strategy w = y + (1− )x. The payoff of the “old” strategy x against the
new strategy w is thus u(x,w) and the payoff of the mutant strategy y is u(y, w). Strategy x is
an ESS if:
u[x, y + (1− )x] > u[y, y + (1− )x],∀y ∈ (Si), x 6= y,
and the share  of mutants is small enough.
A second formulation for this same concept can highlight its relationship with the NE;
strategy x is an ESS if:
u(x, x) ≥ u(y, x) ∀y,
or if
u(x, x) = u(y, x)⇒ u(x, y) > u(y, y) ∀y 6= x
The first condition is equivalent to the NE for the underlying game. The second condition
refines this formulation by stating that an ESS is not only at least as good against itself then
any other invading strategy, but that the original strategy performs better against the invader
than the mutant strategy performs against other mutants. Finally the ESS concept can be seen
as a refinement of the NE and ∆ESS ⊂ ∆NE , which means that some NE are not ESS, this
concept can thus help reduce the number of solutions of a given game. For further details the
reader is again referred to [122].
As an example we can look at the Hawks-Dove game presented in section 2.3.3. Let’s
assume a population of only Hawks. If a few Doves appear in the population, as the result of a
mutation or an error, the invaders will perform well against the original players, and in the rare
encounters with other doves. Given that the ratio  of doves is small, encounters between doves
are really rare. However as u(D,H) ≥ u(H,H) the ratio of doves will increase in the population.
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consequently (H,H) is not an ESS. The same reasoning can be applied to a population of only
doves with a few mutant haws. The outcome will be that also (D,D) is evolutionary unstable.
With this process we discarded two NE as not evolutionary stable. The third mixed strategy
equilibrium is thus the only NE that can be “translated” in a ESS. The stable state is reached
when the proportion p of doves in the population is equal to the probability to play D in the
mixed strategy NE for the corresponding payoff matrix.
2.5 Structured populations
Standard game theory is about a limited number of players, engaged in an instance of a game.
It predicts what a completely rational individual will do to maximize his benefit at the end of
the game.
Evolutionary game theory extends this to an infinite number of players, randomly matched
to play infinite matches of a game always against a new random opponent. In this case we
apply the biological concept of natural selection to refine the solutions found using standard GT
and remove those that are unstable. Despite it’s advantages, EGT fails to explain the levels of
cooperation found on populations of living creatures.
Let’s look at the assumptions made by these two theories and compare them to real societies:
more specifically, in reality, individuals are not completely rational, their knowledge is limited,
population size is limited, and encounters are not random. The first two observations have
been addressed with EGT as, in that case agents act on the basis of their traits and not their
rationality.
To have a more realistic population, in term of size and possible interactions, in 1992 Nowak
and May [84] introduced the use of networks as the underlying structure for the population. In
their pioneering work they empirically showed that in a population of PD players placed in the
nodes of a regular two-dimensional lattice and only interacting with their Moore neighborhood
(the eight closest neighbors, see figure 2.4) cooperation can be maintained.
Although this structure is a quite simple one, the structure and the absence of random
mixing seems to enable the formation of clusters of cooperators. The presence of such clusters
help the cooperators to improve their wellness as encounters with exploiting defectors are less
likely, and also help the cooperative strategy to be spread trough imitation to the agents close
to the cluster as they are able to perceive the better performance of that strategy and they
are thus pushed by selection to change strategy. These first results on structured population
were really promising, however to acquire a better understanding of the role of the population
structure, more complex structures such as complex networks have to be studied. As networks
will be used to represent and analyze the structure of the populations used in this work, the
next chapter will introduce some aspect of networks and their characteristics.
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Figure 2.4: In a two-dimentional lattice sigh as the one pictured here, the Moore neighborhood
of the central black node, correspond to the eight white nodes around him.
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Networks
i have a friend request from some stranger on
facebook and i delete it without looking at the
profile because that doesn’t seem natural. ’cause
friendship should not be as easy as that. it’s like
people believe all you need to do is like the same
bands in order to be soulmates. or books. omg...
U like the outsiders 2... it’s like we’re the same
person! no we’re not. it’s like we have the same
english teacher. there’s a difference.
David Levithan
Networks can be found everywhere. Some networks are well apparent, like roads or power
lines. In some other cases networks are just an abstract representation of relationships or
dependancies: for example we can build the network of the commercial exchanges between
nations or the network of the interaction between a community of chimpanzees. Many objects
in many fields like social sciences, physics, and biology can be represented using a network.
These networks can provide useful information about the system they represent and allow the
study of the system itself and its dynamics.
In mathematics, a graph is an abstract representation of a set of vertices or nodes that are
connected by edges or links (Figure 3.1(a)). A network is special case of a graph where links
represents relationships and nodes represents “personas”. In this work both terms network and
graph will be used to indicate the same concept of interconnected system of things. The links in
a network can be undirected when the relationship is reciprocal or directed, to represent one-way
relations (Figure 3.1(b)). A network composed by directed edges is a directed network, one with
undirected links is an undirected network.
When a graph is used to represent a real system, this representation generally require a great
simplification as many details that characterize the real system will be lost in the process. In the
end, even if so much information disappears, what’s left often allows the discovery or a better
understanding of several phenomena.
As a relatively new science, Network Science, is recently gathering much interest. This field
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is aimed to the discovery of the common phenomena than characterize the behavior of networks
and is defined by the National Research Council as ”the study of network representations of
physical, biological, and social phenomena leading to predictive models of these phenomena.”
The first known study about networks is ”Seven Bridges of Ko¨nigsberg” written by Leonhard
Euler in 1736; in this writing Euler present his solution for crossing every bridge that links
the islands of the city of Ko¨nigsberg representing the island as nodes and the bridges as edges.
The definitions and analysis of the swiss mathematician are the foundation of graph theory and
lead to the introduction of the concept of topology. In this work the concepts of structure and
topology referred to networks are used with the same meaning, however in their mathematical
sense they represent two different concepts.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: Example of undirected (a) and directed (b) networks.
As a example of a network of social interactions we can look at Facebook. In this case each
link represents a friendship relationship, both users have to agree to create one link, therefore
Facebook is an undirected network. This network represents a notable simplification in regard to
a real acquaintance network. It’s obvious that, in real-life, someone cannot have an interaction
with another person if this second person does not also have an interaction with the first one.
However there directed interactions can have a different intensity. This difference can be included
in the model as a numerical value attached to the link, in which case we will say that the edge
is weighted. This weight (or strength) can be an abstract representation of the importance
of a friendship or the number of times this relation has been exploited. If we want to add
another degree of complexity we can use inhomogeneous networks. A network is labeled as
inhomogeneous when links and/or nodes represent different kind of relationship respectively
personas. For example a model for geographic localization of acquaintances will include two
kind of nodes: locations and people; and several kind of relationships between these entities like:
“friendship” undirected, between people; “knowing someone” directed between people; “home
address” between people and locations; and “road” between two locations, etc.
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3.1 Definitions
In the previous section we briefly presented the basic concepts that define a network. Now
we will introduce a few mathematical tools that will allow a characterization of such networks
and a better understanding of the properties, the similarities, and the differences of different
topologies. A more extensive presentation of graph properties can be found in the book of
Newman [78].
3.1.1 Graph
A graph G is an ordered pair G(V,E) where V is a set of N vertices and E is a set of binary
relationships between two elements of V . If G is an undirected, respectively directed, graph any
pair of vertex i and j elements of E is an unordered, respectively ordered, pair. When an edge
(i, j) exist in the graph, the vertices connected by this links are called neighbors.
A path between two vertices i and j is a sequence of links that should be traversed to reach
j when starting from i with no edge traversed more than once. The length of such path is the
number of edges in it. The shortest path between i and j is the shortest possible sequence and
the distance between i and j is the number of edges in the shortest path between i and j. The
characteristic path length L of a network is the average of the shortest distances between the
nodes of the network.
A graph is connected when a path exist between each pair of nodes i, j ∈ V . An undirected
graph is completely connected when ∀i, j ∈ V,∃(i, j) ∈ E. The total number of nodes of a
complete graph is |E| = N(N − 1)/2. A sparse graph is a graph where |E|  N(N − 1)/2. A
completely connected subgraph with M < N vertices is called an M -clique.
The neighborhood of a node i in graph G is normally denoted as NG(i) (or simply N (i)) and
represents all the nodes that are connected to i with a link: NG(i) = {j ∈ V |(i, j) ∈ E}. That
is also the set of nodes that are at distance one from i.
The degree k of a node i is the number of edges departing from this node; it’s equivalent
to the number of neighbors of i. In the case of a directed graph every node has two distinct
degrees: kin and kout that represent the number of links arriving, respectively departing, from
that node. The average degree k¯ (or 〈k〉) is the mean value of all the vertex degree of a graph
G. In the case of a directed graph note that k¯ = k¯in = k¯out
A regular graph is a graph where all the nodes share the same degree k. In this case the
average degree k¯ of the graph is equal to the degree k of every node and is often simply noted
degree of the graph K = k¯.
The degree distribution of a graph is the probability distribution of the degrees P (k) of the
whole network. It represents the probability for a vertex i to have a particular degree k. The
cumulative degree distribution represent instead the probability for a node k to have at least a
degree k.
The assortativity represents the preference for the nodes of a networks to be attached to
other nodes that are similar (or different) in some way. Usually, assortativity in networks is
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mesured through neighbors degree, in this case the assortativity will represent the correlation
between the degree of the nodes. A networks is assortative when the highly connected nodes
tend to be connected to other high degree nodes or disassortative when highly connected nodes
are mainly linked low degree nodes [74, 78].
3.1.2 Clustering Coefficient
The clustering coefficient is a measure of how much the nodes of the graph are clustered together.
In other words it represent the probability of two neighbors of a node u to be connected. The
clustering coefficient Ci of a single node i is defined as the ratio of existing edges Ei between the
neighbors of i and the total number of edges that could exist:
Ci = 2Ei
k(k − 1)
because in an undirected graph, k(k− 1)/2 links can exist between the neighbors of a node with
degree k.
The clustering coefficient of a graph, often simply called clustering coefficient, is the average
value of Ci for all the nodes i ∈ V :
C =
∑N
i=1 Ci
N
The value of the clustering coefficient is in general quite high in real world network and especially
social networks because “the friends of someone tend to also be friends”.
3.1.3 Communities
Another characteristic of a network can be the existence of a community structure. A community
is a subgraph G′ within G with an high density of links between the nodes of G′ and only few
links between the elements of G′ and the rest of the graph. It’s not possible to find a community
structure in all networks, but many real-world network have one.
The interest in communities stems from the fact that knowing the community structure of
a given network can provide useful insight about the functioning of the network and how the
topology influences it. For example, the community structure that can be found on Zachary’s
“karate club” network [130](Fig. 3.2), predicts almost exactly the communities formed by the
members of the club after part of them left the original club to found a second one.
Finding communities within an arbitrary network is a quite difficult task because the number
and size of the communities cannot be know in advance. Moreover, the size of the communities
of a network is often very different and these communities present a different density.
Modularity is a measure of the quality of a division of a network into communities [77], the
value of the modularity Q ∈ [−1, 1]. The higher this value the better is the division. A value of
Q > 0 qualifies a structure where the number of edges between the nodes of a group is greater
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Figure 3.2: The communities on Zachary’s Karate Club graph.
than the number expected on the basis of chance.
3.2 Network Topologies
3.2.1 Regular networks
Regular networks have a constant degree K for all the nodes, and, in the case of lattices, an high
characteristic path length. Community structure is absent but the clustering coefficient can be
high. The most common regular networks are probably one-dimensional and two-dimensional
lattices, commonly known as rings and grids respectively. A ring can have different values of
connectivity, in figure 3.3 an example with of K = 2 and K = 4 is shown. Grids can also have
different degrees K the most common are 4 and 8.
In order to have a completely regular grid, the structure should be wrapped around on itself
to form a three-dimensional ring, called torus. In practice the nodes on the first row have to be
connected to the nodes on the last row, and the nodes on the first column should be connected
to the nodes on the last column (see figure 3.4).
This kind of network is commonly used in mathematical models because of their regular
properties. However real world networks often present structures that are not of a regular type.
3.2.2 Random graph
Another common structure is the Random graph. In this networks pairs of edges are connected
at random. The most common model for these networks is the one created by Erdo¨s-Re´nyi [27].
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.3: One-dimensional lattices with K = 2 (a), and K = 4 (b) respectively.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3.4: Two-dimensional lattices with K = 4. In (a) the degree is not constant. To have a
homogeneous degree the links in (b) should be added. A three-dimensional representation of a
two-dimensional lattice is a torus like the one in figure (c).
In this model the probability p of creating a link between each possible pair of node is given.
A family of graphs G with N nodes and probability p is defined as G(N, p); this graph has
|E| = p(N(N − 1)/2) links. A second variation of this model also exist. In this second version
instead of defining the probability of a link we decide how many links in total will be present in
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the network. This model is defined as G(N,m), where m is the total number of links. As m = |E|
it’s easy do calculate the probability p for this graph. This second variation is especially useful
when generating small graphs when the stochastic of the process generate a variable number of
links at each try. The clustering coefficient of a random network is close to p. The average path
length is short compared to that of regular networks.
degree
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: (a) A random graph and an example of binomial distribution (b).
The degree distribution of a random graph is a binomial distribution with the average degree
k¯ = p(N − 1) of the graph as the center of the characteristic bell.
Another variant of random graph are regular random graphs. These graphs have a constant
degree K but the the neighborhood is random. These structures maintain the clustering coef-
ficient C = p, and a short average path length like the other random graphs, but the degree of
the nodes is now constant like in more regular networks.
3.2.3 Complex networks
When looking at real networks in several fields like economy, biology, engineering, sociology, etc.
one can see that these networks are not regular nor random. The study of complex networks is
still young and its largely inspired by the increasing amount of empirical data on technological
and social networks.
Complex networks display non-trivial properties that are not found in regular or in random
graphs. These properties are for example, a community structure, high clustering coefficient,
fat-tailed degree distribution, (dis)assortativity, etc.
It’s a Small-World: In a short story published in the 1929, Frigyes Karinthy, an hungarian
author, proposed the concept of the six-degrees of separation. The idea is that everyone can
reach any other person in the world through a chain of friends of friends of maximal length 6.
This concept was at the base of an experiment conducted by the american social psychologist
Stanley Milgram, an published in 1967 [67]. Milgram’s experiment consisted in confiding to
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randomly chosen persons, a letter addressed to someone in a distant social and geographical
situation. The letter could only be given to a known person in the aim of approaching the
selected target. Most of the chains where interrupted but the average length of the chains that
arrived at destination was 5.5. This result was a probably the first demonstration of the small
world problem, i.e. that even in a large network such as the US citizenes, short path existed
between complete and distant strangers.
Small-world networks are networks that mimic this property: the average path length is
relatively short. Watts and Strogatz proposed a simple procedure to a particular class of small-
world networks in [127]. These networks are constructed starting with a regular one-dimensional
lattice and then replacing with a probability pr a current link with a new one between one of
the two old nodes and a new random one.
This algorithm allows a transition between a regular lattice with pr = 0 and a random graph
when pr = 1. When 0 < pr < 1, or more precisely for a small interval of values of pr between
0 and 1, the rewiring process allows the creation of graphs that have at the same time a small
average path length and an high clustering coefficient (see figure 3.6).
pr = 0 0 < pr < 1 pr = 1
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.6: The regular lattice (a) and the random graph (c) are the extreme cases for a Watts-
Strogatz small-world graph. A regular small-world graph with the typical short-paths (b).
Scale-free networks: A scale-free network is characterized by it’s degree distribution. The
networks of this class have a non-negligible number of highly connected nodes, called hubs
and many nodes with a low degree. The resulting degree distribution P (k) has a heavy tail
and follows a power-law distribution: P (k) ∼ k−γ , normally the constant γ ∈ [2, 3] but it is
sometimes outside these bounds. This class of complex networks is important because many
real world networks have a fat-tailed distribution including protein networks, citation networks,
neural networks, and some social networks. The interest in scale-free networks emerged in 1999
when Baraba´si et al. [2] mapped a portion of the Web and showed that a small portion of the
pages, the hubs, have many more connections than the rest and the degree distribution follows
a power-law. Baraba´si et al. [3] proposed an interesting mechanism to explain the emergence of
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networks with a power-law distribution called preferential attachment. The idea is inspired by
the evolution of the World Wide Web and lays on the idea that when new pages is created this
pages will, with high probability, have links to well know, and thus well connected, pages.
The Baraba´si-Albert’s algorithm progressively builds a graph starting from a clique with
m  N nodes, and then adding one-by-one the other N −m nodes. When a node is inserted
in the networks m new links are created starting from this new nodes and are attached to m
existing nodes selected with a probability proportional to the degree they already have. This
model allows the creation of networks with an exponent γ ≈ 3. An example of a small network
build using this algorithm can be seen in figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: An example of a small scale-free graph. The size of the nodes is proportional to the
degree: the big vertices are the hubs of this network.
Another popular way to build scale-free networks is the configuration model. In this case
the distribution is decided and the degree assigned to the node before creating any link. Then
the algorithm matches the nodes in order to create the links, while avoiding self-loops, and
multiple-links between the same nodes. With this method one can create scale-free graphs with
exponent γ 6= 3.The configuration model has the advantage of avoiding the correlations between
the nodes degrees introduced by the Baraba´si–Albert model, however establishing the links and
avoid the deadlock is often too time consuming.
Social networks: Social network are not characterized by a precise mathematical property or
a precise set of properties. They are simply structures where the nodes are individuals and the
ties represents a relationship such as kinship, friendship, common interest, sexual relationship,
economic exchange, scientific co-authorship, and so on. The first example of such networks have
been constructed ”on the field” by direct observation, like the karate club network in figure
3.2; by mean of interviews and questionnaires; or using archives or third-party records, like the
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co-autorship network shown in figure 3.8.
Social networks are indeed very varied: both by simple networks characteristics like size,
average degree, etc. but also by the kind of social structure they represent. Despite all their
differences these networks have also many similarities from a statistical point of vie: like the
small-world property; a fat-tailed degree distribution, even if often this distribution is not power-
law but rather an exponentially truncated or stretched exponential; they also present a high
clustering coefficient and a strong community structure. Moreover they often show positive
assortativity, which means that highly connected agents tend to associate with other highly
connected individuals. A famous example of social network is the Zachary’s “karate club” [130],
this network is pictured in figure 3.2. This network was constructed by direct observation
and represents the pattern of friendship between the members of a karate club in an american
university. It’s a small structure with 34 agents but gathering the data by direct observation took
about two years of work. The network in figure 3.8 [117] represents the scientific collaboration in
the relatively young community of the scientists working on Genetic Programming. The image
represents the giant component of the network and include ∼ 1000 authors. Nowadays online
services like Facebook can provide data on huge networks with thousands of agents.
Model social networks: Social networks are, as said in the previous paragraph, representa-
tion of the social interaction of individuals. In this thesis, we also make use of “model social
networks”, the nature of which we explain as follows. Model social networks are networks gener-
ated by means of an algorithm, that display characteristics close to social networks collected by
empirical study. To differentiate these two classes of networks we often use the terms “real social
networks” and “model social networks”. An example of a model for creating social networks is
presented in the next chapter, in section 4.5.
3.2.4 Dynamic networks
Networks exist all around us, however these networks are not frozen, they are in constant
evolution. Agents may join or leave a networks, new bonds can be established and old ones
can disappear, the strength of a link may change, etc. When we analyze a real network we
in fact take a picture of this network and use this static image. This kind of procedure will
lead to accurate results especially if the network evolution is rather slow, as is the case for a
network of scientific co-authorship or for the air transportation network. For an example we
can look at the evolution over 20 years of the GP co-authorship network [115] (in figure 3.9).
The changes are pretty obvious, and in particular in the time frame between 1991 and 1997 the
network undergoes profound transformations due to the increasing interest in the topic and a
snapshot of the network in this specific time frame will not be representative of the previous and
successive state of the network. However the current characteristics of the network are evolving
slowly and for this reason working with a snap shot can provide useful insight on the properties
of this graph.
Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks Enea Pestelacci
3.2. NETWORK TOPOLOGIES 31
Figure 3.8: An example of a social network: the co-authorship network of the Genetic Program-
ming community in 2007 (W.B.Langdon, http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/∼wbl/biblio/).
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Figure 3.9: The evolution of the network of co-authorship of the Genetic Programming com-
munity (W.B.Langdon, http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/∼wbl/biblio/). (a) shows the number of
authors and collaborations within the community, (b) represent the evolution of the average
degree of the nodes of the network. (c) reports the values for the average clustering coefficient
and (d) shows the average path length of the network.
On the other hand, networks for other phenomena show a faster evolution. For example the
analysis by Kossinets and Watts in [54] of the network of e-mail exchanges within the ∼ 40000
members of the community of a large US university, shows that the properties of this kind of
structure are highly variable.
Because of the importance of the dynamics of the network, we included this aspect in the
second part of this work.
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Figure 3.10: The evolving characteristics of the networks of email exchanges analyzed in [54].
The dashed line represent a smoothing window of τ = 30 days, for the continuos line τ = 60 days
and for the dotted line τ = 90 days. Image (A) represent the average degree of the network, (B)
the fractional size of the largest component, (C) the average path length in the giant component,
and (D) the clustering coefficient. This image has been redrawn from [54].
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Chapter 4
Games on networks
Today the network of relationships linking the
human race to itself and to the rest of the
biosphere is so complex that all aspects affect all
others to an extraordinary degree. Someone
should be studying the whole system, however
crudely that has to be done, because no gluing
together of partial studies of a complex nonlinear
system can give a good idea of the behavior of
the whole.
Murray Gell-Mann
In part II, III, and IV of this manuscript we will present part of the results we obtained in
the last few years in the form of the articles published in some specialized international journals.
In the three articles included in part II we will deal with several kinds of static networks
and see how the topology of these networks and some different update mechanism effects the
cooperation between the agents.
In the two articles included in part III we will look at the behavior of the agents when they
can not only adapt their strategy to their neighbors, but also modify their neighborhood.
In the last two articles, in part IV we will deal with a particular family of games: coordination
games, both from the static and the dynamic points of view, in this case there is no social pressure
to prefer one strategy to the other but where only coordination leads to a positive benefit.
4.1 How simulations work
It can be useful to introduce some additional nomenclature and definitions and to explain how
the simulations used to collect the empirical datas in this works are made. To simulate the
evolution of a strategy in a population we run a computer program that requires a few elements.
First of all a population of players is represented by an undirected graph G(V,E), where the set V
of vertices represents the agents, and the set E of edges, represent their undirected interaction
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between pair of agents ∈ V . We also recall that the neighbors of a player i ∈ V is a set
N (i) = {j ∈ V,∃ (i, j) ∈ E} (see Section 3.1).
The payoff of an agent i is noted Πi and it is obtained by combining the individual utilities u
obtained by i when interacting with his neighbors N (i).
An algorithm to generate the network topology: this can generate a model network,
like a Bara´basi-Albert scale-free network using a few parameters, or simply read a file containing
a pre-defined, precise topology.
A game: which is defined by its payoff matrix. In this work we use two-person, two-strategies
symmetric games, thus to define a game we have to define four payoff values.
An update rule: that will be used by the agents to decide how to update their strategy when
a decision to update has been taken.
The initial strategy of every player in the network is also to be defined before starting a
simulation. Generally half of the agents are randomly selected to use strategy 1 and the other
half will use strategy 2, but to analyze the performance of a strategy in a particular situation
sometimes the initial ratio is different.
The timing of the interactions between players is also an important aspect in these simula-
tions. In section 4.4 we explain this factor in more detail.
Once that these elements have been defined, the simulation proceeds to generate a network,
initialize the strategy of the players in the network, and then allow the agents to interact (play the
game) with their neighbors and update their strategy using the update rule. This process goes
on until the population reaches a pseudo-equilibrium. We use the notion of pseudo-equilibria
to indicate a situation where the population is not completely frozen but small fluctuations
continue to occur with no effect on the global trend of the population in the long-term.
To obtain usable statistical measures of the behavior of the agents these simulations are
repeated many times using the same or different parameters and generally for several different
payoff values.
In the following sections there is a brief description of the update rules used in this part of
the manuscript.
4.1.1 Limitations
It is clear that this kind of model is not able to completely capture the complexity of a real social
system. On the other hand, a simplification may help the isolation of important factors and key
mechanisms that allow cooperation to be sustained and also to grow in certain situations.
For example, the assumption that an individual is using only one strategy for all his inter-
actions in a given time step, represents a great limitation when compared to reality, where for
every interaction an agent can use a different strategy in order to improve to a maximum his
benefit. By using this simplification we of course loose some details, but we simplify the model,
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which is important both from an analytical and from a computational point of view. Moreover,
we are interested in phenomena that allows cooperation to be sustained in the whole population,
and not to maximizing the benefit of single players.
Another limitation of the present model is the fact that the global behavior is seen as the
sum of pairwise interactions between players. This is a common approximation and most work
in the field uses it [113, 101, 96, 32]. However, there is also a lot of interest in n−person games,
especially in studies about the provision of public good games [122, 40, 18]. In this thesis we
have limited ourselves to two-person games only.
4.2 Update rules
An update rule allows an agent to select her new strategy by looking at some feature of the
current population. Most of the update rules used here are based on the utility of the agents.
Local replicator dynamics: This update rule has already been explained in section 2.4.1,
but the algorithm used in the local version is slightly different. In a networked population the
agent i will randomly choose one of her neighbors j and compare her fitness Πi with the fitness
of this neighbor Πj . Player i will keep her current strategy if Πi ≥ Πj otherwise she will adopt
the strategy of player j with a probability pj→i = Φ(Πj − Πi)/N , where N is a normalization
factor and Φ is a monotone increasing function. In practice i can only imitate the strategy of a
fittest player, moreover the better this player is, the more probable it will be for i to adopt her
strategy.
The normalization factor N depends on the function used to calculate the utility of a player,
and is needed in order to obtain a probability pj→i ∈ [0, 1].
Imitate the best: This update rule is simpler. When it is used an agent i will select her fittest
neighbor j and adopt j’s strategy if Πj > Πi. When this update rule is applied the decisions
taken by an agent are completely deterministic. In case of a tie, eighter the agent retains her
strategy or will switch with probability equal to 0.5.
Conformism: This update rule has been used in the third paper of this collection (article C)
and does not take into account the utility of players. In this case a player i simply takes one of
her’s neighbors as a cultural model and adopts the strategy of this neighbor if this is the same
strategy used by the majority of i neighbors. This update rule has been introduced because
humans do not only tend to imitate the fittest individual, but they also have a tendency to
comply to the behavior of the majority [16].
Myopic best-response: When this rule is applied, a player is able to decide wether her
current strategy is optimal or not. If the strategy is not optimal the player, with a probability
p, will decide the optimal strategy for her next move on the basis of how her neighbors have
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acted on the last interaction. This rule has been used in the last two articles of this collection.
If the strategy has to be updated, agent i choses the strategy si that will maximize her payoff
Πi, under the assumption the the neighbors will not change their strategy. This rules assumes
that players are able to decide if their strategy is optimal and also that they have the cognitive
abilities needed to select the best strategy amongst the possible ones. This rule also allows the
emergence of strategies that are possible but not present in the population as the evolution does
not rely on imitation.
The rule is myopic as the agent do not consider the effect of her eventual change of strategy on
the evolution of the game.
Other update rules: Other updates rule are for example the Fermi rule [113] and the Death-
Birth rule [81].
Under the Death-Birth rule a player imitate the strategy of one of her neighbors (or her strategy)
with a probability proportional to the payoff; when this rule is used a player i can imitate an
agent that is currently obtaining a payoff lower then i herself.
The Fermi rule is based on the Fermi distribution. With this rule, a neighbor j is randomly
selected and player i will imitate his with a probability depending on the difference between j
and i payoffs and on a fixed parameter β that controls the intensity of selection. The probability
for player i to imitate the strategy of j on the next activation is:
pj→i =
1
1 + exp(−β(Πj −Πi)) .
These last rules have not been analyzed in the works presented here.
4.3 Utility calculation
The utility calculation also has an important role in the success of a strategy. Two particular
examples are accumulated payoff and average payoff. The former consists in summing all the
payoffs obtained by agent i in the encounters with all her neighbors, in this case the payoff of a
player i would be:
ΠACCi =
∑
j∈Ni
piij ,
where j is a neighbor of i and piij is the payoff obtained by i when playing with j. The
average payoff instead is the average value of the payoffs obtained by i when interacting with
her neighbors:
ΠAVi =
∑
j∈Ni piij
ki
,
where ki is the degree of i, i.e. the number of neighbors |Ni|.
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Using a different way to calculate the utility of an agent may introduce several changes in
the behavior of the players. For an example, when considering degree heterogenous networks, a
lousy player with many neighbors may have a greater accumulated payoff than a more efficient
player with only a few neighbors. In the opposite case, when using average payoff, there is almost
no difference in having few or many neighbors; on the contrary, having few good neighbors is
probably better than to have many average neighbors. As some strategy update rules rely on
the utility of the players to decide who to imitate and whether to switch to another strategy,
the way this utility is calculated can introduce great differences in the system.
In article A we look at the different results obtained when these two utility calculation
function are used and we also try to combine them. Moreover we show that when using the
accumulated payoff, the behavior of the agents is no longer only dependent on the order of
the payoff values since an affine transformation of the payoff matrix can completely change the
quasi-stable states of a game (when using replicator dynamics).
In [61] we fully analyze this behavior and propose a different utility calculation function that
preserve the invariance of a game under affine transformation of its payoff matrix and retain
part of the advantages of the accumulated payoff (when replicator dynamics is used).
4.4 Timing
Basically, two different timing policies can be used. In the synchronous case, the interaction and
the update of the behavior of the players are synchronized, and all (virtually) happens at the
same time. This assumption insures that every agent is treated equally in term of number of
times she is able to revise her strategy.
The opposite update timing is the fully asynchronous update. In this case, at each time step an
agent is randomly chosen with uniform probability, she will then interact with her neighbors,
collect a utility, apply her strategy update and decide if she wants to revise her strategy or not.
A third update mode, called semi-synchronous, is used in the articles of part III and consist in
randomly choosing m agents in the population, where m  N , and updating this agents in a
synchronous way. Obviously when m = N we recover the fully synchronous case, while when
m = 1 we are back to the fully asynchronous one.
4.5 Network topologies
In these simulations we used several network topologies. Random graphs, regular lattices, and
Bara´basi-Albert scale-free networks have already been presented in chapter 3, we also used the
real social network of the GP coauthors, also presented in chapter 3.
However to better compare the results obtained on these populations with what could be
expected from a real society we also used a model to generate social-like networks proposed by
Toivonen et al. in 2006 [114].
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Toivonen model
This model has been conceived to generate a graph with most of the features of a real social
network. The generated networks are assortative, have an high clustering coefficient and also
have community structure. The degree distribution is also long-tailed and presents a finite cutoff.
This algorithm incrementally grows a network, starting from a seed of m0 randomly con-
nected nodes. This is how the topology evolves at each successive time step:
• On average mr ≥ 1 are choosed to be initial contacts
• On average ms ≥ 0 of each initial contact are selected to be secondary contacts.
• A new vertex v is added to the network and connected to all the initial and secondary
contacts determined in the previous steps.
This process is repeated until the network reaches the desired size.
The network growing process is completed before the simulation begins, thus the network used
in the actual simulation is static.
4.6 Dynamic networks
In part III and in the second article of part IV, we introduce and use dynamic networks to try
to better understand how the profit and the behavior of agents may influence the evolution of
the structure of the population.
This new aspect has been introduced because in reality, networks structures are not static but
evolve over time and are indeed influenced by their environment, as explained in Section 3.2.4.
4.6.1 Our dynamic network model
This model used has been developed with an eye on how social interactions work. Here we
report a brief description of this model, a more detailed explanation can be found in section D.3
of the first article in part III.
Underground network structure: In this model the original undirected graph G′ that
defines who interacts with whom, is coupled with a directed graph G. All undirected links in G′
(figure 4.1(a)) are projected in G’s into pairs of directed and weighted links (figure 4.1(b)). In
this new graph the weights or forces fij and fji represent respectively the “trust” player i has
in j and the trust player j has in i. These forces are represented by numerical values ∈ [0, 1],
they have a value of 0.5 at the beginning of the simulation, and they evolve independently based
on the quality on the interactions between i and j, each agent here modifies the trust of her
outgoing links based only on her perceptions, thus the forces model her subjective view of her
neighbors.
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Figure 4.1: The link between i and j in the undirected graph G′ (a) and the same link once
projected in the directed graph G (b).
When the players interact and update their strategy they only use the information embedded
in the undirected network G′. Each encounter has the same value for an agent and each neighbor
has the same influence when a player is looking to update her strategy.
Updating the trusts: The interactions influence the trust the players have in each other.
The trusts between two agents i and j, represented by fij and fji are modified to represent the
perception of each agent of the interaction that just happened. To update this trust a player
considers the difference between the payoff piij he just obtained and the payoff p¯iij she could
have obtained if player j had played the opposite strategy, this value is normalized by taking in
to account the maximal and minimal utility an agent cam obtain from a single interaction and
the number of neighbors agent i has. The formula for thus trust update is the following:
fij(t+ 1) = fij(t) +
piij − p¯iij
ki(pimax − pimin) .
Given that fij have to be ∈ [0, 1] if the updated value is outside this range, the final updated
trust is set at the closest bound of the interval. The number of neighbors of an agent has an
impact on the speed at which the trust varies: the higher the number of neighbors and the slower
is the trust variation. We chose this option to represent the attention an agent is capable to
pay to her relationships. When there is only few neighbors, it’s of great importance to be more
selective, maintain the good partners and try to replace the bad ones as soon as possible. On
the other hand, when an agent has many ties, it’s more difficult to invest the necessary energy
in every relationship, for this reason they are condemned to evolve more slowly.
Updating agent behavior: When a player is called to update her behavior she can either
decide to update her strategy or to try to replace a bad relationship with a better one. The
choice between these two possibilities is regulated by a parameter q ∈ [0, 1] that represents the
probability for an agent to update his neighborhood. The case q = 0 represents a static network,
and the case where q = 1 is that of a society where agents cannot update their strategy but only
theirs relationships.
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Network evolution: If an agent i decides to update her neighborhood, she will first pick
one of his neighbors j with a probability proportional to 1 − fij , thus an untrusted neighbor
has a higher probability to be selected. Depending on the game played, an interaction can be
bad for a player and good for the other one, because of this, agent j can try to maintain her
relationship with i. The probability of finally removing the link is represented by a number
equal to 1− (fij + fji)/2 where both trusts are taken into account.
If the link is cut, both directed links (i, j) and (j, i) disappear. Now player i will create a new
link to replace the lost one. To do so she will ask a neighbor k chosen this time proportionally
to fik to introduce her to one of his neighbors. Player k will then select a neighbor l also
proportionally to fkl and i will try to create a new link (i, l) (and the sibling link (l, i)) with
l. If this link already exist, i will continue and ask l for a possible match. If also this second
try fails, i will select a random agent in the network and establish a relationship with her (see
figure 4.2). The forces on this new links are initialized with the value 0.5.
i
j
k
l
fik
fkl
fil
Figure 4.2: Illustration of the rewiring of link (i, j) to (i, l). Agent k is chosen by i and introduces
player i to l (see text). To avoid cluttering the figure, only one of the two directed links between
the agents is represented in the picture.
At the end of this process j generally ends up loosing a link and will not have the opportunity
to create a new link to replace this one. The only exception to this is the case where j ends
up without any connection. In this case, the next time she will be selected for update, she will
simply establish a relationship with a random agent selected among the whole population.
4.6.2 Model Justifications
In this brief section we will try to explain and justify some choices we had to make when the
model was conceived. We will also try to address some question that may arise after reading
the description of the model.
Trust, memory and repeated games: The attentive reader would have noticed that the
trust that evolves between two agents contains some sort of memory of their past encounters.
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This is indeed the case, as the trust is dictated by the quality and thus strategies used in these
encounters. However, this value only vaguely represent the quality of the interaction as an
agent is unable to extract precise strategic information, such as the pattern of the moves of
the opponent, a possible mutation in the strategy of the partner or even the number of past
encounters. This value can for example lead to the termination of the interaction with an agent
that recently switched to a more useful strategy or to the protection of a link with agent that
has suddenly became a bad influence.
For these reasons the game played by our agent is not a repeated game in the sense of game
theory. Moreover, this trust is only used by an heuristic that tries to remove the bad links, and
never help a decision concerning a strategy update.
Rupture and creation of links: The link rupture is a bilateral, two-ways process, we apply
this method to represent the embedded cost for an agent to dismiss one of her relationships. In
particular, by using the average value of the trusts between the agents, we intend to capture
the simplicity of breaking a relationship that is bilaterally identified as bad, but also the more
difficult task that is the rupture of an interaction that is profitable by the other partner.
The link creation process is clearly biased and tends to create triangles if the quality of the
interactions is good. However, this is based on reality, since interaction are often established
with “friends of friends”. This is a unilateral, one-way process but the social interpretation of
the algorithm relies on a common neighbor of the two “newly connected” agents that is charged
to introduce the agents and to facilitate the creation of the new link.
It’s also important to say that the link rupture and creation process is not a strategic move aimed
to improve without doubt the benefit of an agent, but merely an heuristic that an individual
is able to apply in the attempt to improve his wellness. In this way, the present heuristic
fundamentally differs from rigorous models of strategic, i.e. game-theoretic, network formation
processes found in economics (e.g. see[123, 49]).
4.7 Community structure
Introduced in Section 3.1.3, communities represent an important characteristic of social net-
works. The presence of communities in a networked population can affect the speed of diffusion
of strategies. As an example, a sub-optimal strategy σ can coexist with a more efficient one if
the agents using σ represent the majority of the agents in a community. The high connectivity
within the community and the low connectivity toward the rest of the network can protect this
minority and allow the existence of some diversity in the population.
To detect communities in networks in this work we used the algorithm based on edge be-
tweenness proposed by Girvan and Newman in [31].
Betweenness is a centrality measure for the nodes of a network. The betweenness of a node
i represents how many shortest paths between pair of nodes run through i. Edge betweenness is
an extension to this definition that characterizes an edge with a number corresponding to how
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many shortest path between pair of nodes run through it.
We analyzed the community structure of static networks in B and in F to understand how the
underlying structure of the network can affect the quasi-stable state reached with simulations.
In dynamic networks we analyzed the communities in paper G at several points during the
simulations to monitor the evolution of the networks and understand how the behavior of players
affects the evolution of the topology.
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Abstract
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on
populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show
that the update rule, the payoff computation and, to some extent the timing of the operations,
have a marked influence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can
be established at equilibrium. We also study the dynamical behavior of the populations and
their evolutionary stability.
A.1 Introduction and Previous Work
The object of game theory is the analysis of situations where the different social actors have
conflicting requirements and individual decisions will have a mutual influence on each other[71].
In this framework, and due to their importance as simplified models of many common important
socio-economic situations, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the Snowdrift (SD) games have
received much attention in the literature. According to game theory, the PD and the SD are
paradigmatic examples of games in which cooperative attitude should vanish in the PD, and
should be limited to a given fraction in the SD. This is also the case when large populations
of individuals play the game pairwise in a random manner and anonimously, as prescribed
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by evolutionary game theory [128]. In spite of this, numerical simulations of the PD have
convincingly shown that, when the population of players possesses a spatial structure, a certain
amount of cooperation can emerge and remain stable. Nowak and May [84] were the first to
empirically show this using a population structured as a square lattice where each site is a player.
Standard evolutionary game theory is based on an infinite (or very large) population model, and
on the random pairing of two players at each time step. This amounts to a mean-field spatially
homogeneous model. The square grid is also spatially homogeneous but the absence of random
mixing enables the formation of clusters of cooperators, which allows for more frequent positive
encounters between cooperators than would be possible in the mean-field case. More recently, it
has become apparent that many real networks are neither regular nor random graphs; instead,
they have short diameters, like random graphs, but much higher clustering coefficients than the
latter, i.e. they have more local structure. These networks are collectively called small-world
networks (see [75] for a recent review). Many technological, social, and biological networks
are now known to be of this kind. Social networks, in addition, show recognizable community
structure [79, 35]. Since evolutionary PD or SD games are metaphors for conflicting social
interactions, the research attention has recently shifted from random graphs and regular lattices
towards better models of social interaction structures [1, 47, 101, 116].
Recently, Santos and Pacheco [101] presented a numerical study of the evolution of coop-
eration on (static) scale-free (SF) networks for the PD and the SD games. Their main result
was that, in contrast with what one observes in mixing populations or on regular lattices, much
higher levels of cooperation are sustainable on this kind of graphs, both for the PD as well as the
SD. These results are obviously interesting and encouraging for cooperation but they prompt a
number of questions. First of all, Bara´basi–Albert or correlationless configuration SF graphs [3]
that were used in [101] are not faithful representations of most typical social networks. In fact,
although social interaction networks where the degree distribution can be well described by a
power-law have been found [56, 34], several recent studies show that social networks in general
do not have a pure power-law degree distribution function, as they often show signs of exponen-
tial decay of the tail of the distribution [4, 73]. In addition, they usually have more clustering
than pure scale-free graphs [75]. Nevertheless, model SF networks are a useful bounding case to
study as they are closer to typical social networks than other more artificial kind of graphs, such
as Watts–Strogatz small worlds [127]. A second aspect of social networks that is not captured
by fixed graph structures is that they are not static; rather, the number of vertices and the links
between them continuously evolve as social actors come and go, and relationships are created
or abandoned. Dynamical features such as these have been introduced in evolutionary games,
among others, in [132, 131, 13, 59, 103]. However, in this paper we only focus on the static
aspects of the interaction networks. In other words, we make the hypothesis that the network is
at equilibrium and that network dynamics are either absent, or their time scale is longer (slower)
with respect to the strategy-change dynamics. This proves to be a useful approach, especially
for social acquaintance networks.
In the following we present a brief introduction to the games studied. This is followed by a
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discussion of the population model and of individual’s payoff calculation scheme for the players
in a complex network. Next we describe the numerical simulations and their results, including
a study of evolutionary stability. We finally present our conclusions.
A.2 Two Social Dilemmas
Let us first recall a few elementary notions on the PD and the SD. These are two-person,
symmetric games in which each player has two possible strategies: cooperate (C) or defect (D).
In strategic form, also known as normal form, these games have the following payoff bi-matrix:
C D
C (R,R) (S,T)
D (T,S) (P,P)
In this matrix, R stands for the reward the two players receive if they both cooperate, P is
the punishment for bilateral defection, and T is the temptation, i.e. the payoff that a player
receives if it defects, while the other cooperates. In this latter case, the cooperator gets the
sucker’s payoff S. For the PD, the payoff values are ordered numerically in the following way:
T > R > P > S, while in the SD game T > R > S > P . Defection is always the best rational
individual choice in the PD – (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium and also an evolutionary
stable strategy (ESS). Mutual cooperation would be preferable but it is a strongly dominated
strategy. Thus the dilemma is caused by the “selfishness” of the actors.
In the SD, when both players defect they each get the lowest payoff; (C,D) and (D,C)
are Nash equilibria of the game in pure strategies, and there is a third equilibrium in mixed
strategies where strategy D is played with probability 1/(2β−1), and strategy C with probability
1 − 1/(2β − 1), where β is another name for the temptation T , used in biological circles. The
dilemma in this game is caused by “greed”, i.e. players have a strong incentive to “bully” their
opponent by playing D, which is harmful for both parties if the outcome produced is (D,D).
A.3 Numerical Simulations
The two games were simulated in [101] on Baraba´si-Albert (BA) [3] and configuration model
[75] scale-free networks of size 104 over 104 time steps, using a discrete analogue of replicator
dynamics equations [128, 41]. The customary rescaling of the payoff values was used such that
there is only one independent parameter. For the PD, setting R = 1, P = S = 0, leaves
T = b > 1 to be the only parameter (temptation). For the SD, T is set equal to β > 1,
R = β−1/2, S = β−1, and P = 0, which makes the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation
r = 1/(2β−1) the only parameter. For the sake of comparison, our simulations were done under
the same conditions as in [101] (104 players and 104 time steps).
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However, replicator dynamics is not the only possibility for updating the agents’ strategies
in discrete, finite populations of players using hard-wired strategies. Moreover, in small non
degree-homogeneous populations, the mathematical requirements behind the replicator dynam-
ics, strictly speaking, are not satisfied [85]. Thus, we extended the investigation by simulating
an imitate the best evolution rule according to which an individual i will adopt the strategy of
the player with the highest payoff among its neighbors and itself. If a tie occurs, the winner is
chosen uniformly at random between the best. This rule is deterministic and was the original
rule used in [84].
Concerning the calculation of an individual’s payoff, there are several possibilities. A player’s
payoff may be defined as the sum (accumulated payoff ) of all pair interactions with its nearest
neighbors, which is the form used for instance in [101]. Another possibility consists in using
average payoff, which is the accumulated payoff divided by the number of interactions. Accumu-
lated and average payoff give the same results when considering degree-homogenous networks
such as lattices. Accumulated payoff seems more logical in degree-heterogeneous networks such
as scale-free graphs since it reflects the very fact that players may have different numbers of
neighbors in the network. Average payoff, on the other hand, smooths out the possible differ-
ences although it might be justified in terms of number of interactions that a player may sustain
in a given time. For instance, an individual with many connections is likely to interact less often
with each of its neighbors than another that has a lower number of connections. Also, if there is
a cost to maintain a relationship, average payoff will roughly capture this fact, while it will be
hidden if one uses accumulated payoff. For the sake of comparing the two extreme views, here
we use both accumulated and average payoff.
Under discrete replicator dynamics rule with accumulated payoff, and using synchronous
update, Santos and Pacheco [101] found that, when compared to regular lattices, SF networks
lead to high levels of cooperation for all values of the parameters b (for PD) and r (for SD). These
results have been reproduced by us and are shown in the upper half of figure A.1. Cooperation
is also much higher in SF graphs than what has been obtained for Watts–Strogatz small-world
graphs [1, 116]. When using the “imitation of the best” strategy-switching rule with synchronous
update and accumulated payoff the results are similar, as one can see in the lower part of figure
A.1, although there is a marked fall in the high-b and high-r region with respect to replicator
dynamics. However, when one lingers on the standard deviations (represented as error bars in
the figure), one sees that the results for the imitate the best rule are noisy, with quite large
fluctuations. Deviations are smaller for the replicator dynamics, see figure A.1. The reason
for the instability and the large fluctuations can be traced to the step function nature of the
update rule, as can be seen in figure A.3 (a), in which 40 individual PD runs are plotted, all with
b = 1.8. In all runs cooperation falls at the beginning, the cooperators then often recover but
not always, as there are several runs (about 1/5 for the data used here) in which cooperation
never recovers. On the other hand, when using replicator dynamics, there is still a systematic
drop of cooperation at the beginning (figure A.3 (c)), nevertheless it tends to rise again in the
long run, although this may happen very late in the simulation (see figure A.3 (b)). To better
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observe this phenomenon, we have doubled the number of time steps (2× 104).
We thus see that the results on BA SF graphs depend on the update rule, although the
level of cooperation is still higher than what is found on regular, Watts–Strogatz, and random
graphs [41, 116]. However, we wish to point out that if we use an asynchronous update policy
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Figure A.1: Fraction of cooperators on SF BA networks of size 104 and average degree k¯ = 4
with accumulated payoff and synchronous dynamics. Mean values over 50 runs. Upper figures:
replicator dynamics; lower figures: imitation of the best.
1 with the “imitate the best” rule instead of the usual synchronous one, the result is a higher
level of cooperation with far less fluctuations than the synchronous case (compare lower parts
of figures A.1 and A.2). One might reason that the combination of synchronous update and
of “imitate the best” is fully deterministic, which implies that particular chains of events, such
as cascades of defection, will be amplified. Introducing stochasticity through asynchrony in the
update sequence strongly mitigates the likelihood of such series of events. On the other hand,
when using replicator dynamics, the lack of stochasticity in synchronous update is somehow
compensated for by the probabilistic strategy change rule, which could explain the similarity of
the results in this latter case (compare the upper parts of figures A.1 and A.2 respectively).
To illustrate the influence of timing when “imitate the best” is the rule used for strategy
update, suppose that a defector occupies the most highly connected node in the graph and that
it is surrounded by cooperators exclusively. Then, at the next time step in synchronous update,
all those cooperators will turn into defectors. From there, a wave of defection could quickly
propagate through the network, leading to a state whereby cooperation cannot be recovered.
On the other hand, when players are updated in random order, only a fraction of the neighbors
1We use the standard uniform random choice (with replacement) of players in the population, which is a
discrete approximation of a Poisson process.
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will imitate the defector, at the same time lowering the payoff of the central defector, and
thus making it less attractive to be imitated in future encounters. This kind of process limits
the propagation of defection and allows cooperation to establish itself and be stable. This
highlights some shortcomings of synchronous dynamics, which is unrealistic and may give rise
to spurious effects [48]. Our conclusion is that, although there is often no significant difference
between synchronous and asynchronous update in evolutionary games, as it is the case here
under replicator dynamics, the latter is to be preferred for reasons of generality and reliability.
However, for the sake of comparison with previous results, in the rest of the paper we use
synchronous update.
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Figure A.2: Fraction of cooperators on SF BA networks of size 104 and average degree k¯ = 4
with accumulated payoff and asynchronous dynamics. Mean values over 50 runs. Upper figures:
replicator dynamics; lower figures: imitation of the best.
Now we turn our attention to the assumption that a player’s utility is the sum, i.e. the
accumulated payoff of all pair interactions with its nearest neighbors. Although this appears
to be a logical step to follow, we shall show that it may cause both conceptual and technical
problems. Obviously, one would assume that if an individual has more links to cooperators, and
that the payoffs are positive quantities, she should earn more than another player with fewer
cooperating neighbors. However, this begs the question of how the network got there in the
first place. BA SF graphs are incrementally built by using linear preferential attachment [3]. In
this model there is no cost associated to the formation of a new link. However, although this
model may be adequate for citation networks or, to some extent, the Web, it is well known that
this cannot be the case in most other instances. Thus, other models have been proposed that
take into account cost and other factors in network formation [75]. In our case, it is as if the
population would be “injected” on an already full-grown, topology-favorable network, while the
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Figure A.3: PD time series with b = 1.8; (a) imitation of the best; (b) replicator dynamics; (c)
replicator dynamics (first 70 steps).
rules of the game and other considerations necessarily should play a role in the network formation
and dynamics. The same remarks also hold for the “configuration” SF graphs, although these
networks are built starting from the degree distribution and a fixed number of nodes, rather than
incrementally. Furthermore, a technical problem arises when combining replicator dynamics with
accumulated payoff. In infinite mixing populations, classical evolutionary game theory states
that replicator dynamics is invariant under positive affine transformations of payoffs with merely
a possible change of time scale [128]. This invariance still holds in finite degree-homogenous
populations. However, when different individuals start having different degrees, things are not
quite the same. Let Πi denote a player i’s aggregated payoff. Furthermore, let φ(Πj − Πi) =
(Πj −Πi)/(Dk>) be the probability function according to which i adopts neighbor j’s strategy,
with D = max{T,R, P, S} − min{T,R, P, S} and k> = max{ki, kj}, where kx represents the
degree of player x [101]. If we now apply a positive affine transformation of the payoff matrix,
this leads to the new aggregated payoff Π′i = αΠi + βki and hence φ(Π
′
j − Π′i) = (αΠj + βkj −
αΠi−βki)/(αDk>) = φ(Πj−Πi)+(kj−ki)/(αDk>). One can clearly see that using accumulated
payoff does not lead to an invariance of the replicator dynamics under shifts of the payoff matrix.
As an illustration of the violation of this invariance, figure A.4 shows cooperation curves for the
PD when applying such payoff transformations.
This has several implications such as limiting the results obtained in [101] strictly to the
studied values of b and r, and to an impossibility to rescale the payoff matrix. In a more recent
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Figure A.4: Fraction of cooperation for the PD game using replicator dynamics and accumulated
payoff. A translation of the payoff matrix can produce a fall in cooperation (shift of −1) as well
as unpredictable behaviors (shift of +5) with some runs containing high levels of cooperation and
others ending up with massive defection. Standard deviations are not plotted here to improve
readability.
study [104] Santos et al. investigated the same games in a wider parameter space, but still using
accumulated payoff, which again makes the results non-invariant with respect to a positive affine
transformation. Therefore, we repeated the numerical simulations with average payoff, i.e. the
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Figure A.5: Fraction of cooperators on SF BA networks of size 104 with average degree k¯ = 4
using average payoff and synchronous dynamics. Mean values over 50 runs. Upper figures:
replicator dynamics; lower figures: imitation of the best.
aggregated payoff obtained by one player divided by the number of links the player has to nearest
neighbors, which, along with the shortcomings described above, has the advantage of leaving
the replicator dynamics invariant under positive affine transformations.
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In figure A.5 we report results for the PD and SD games using average payoff with syn-
chronous updating dynamics, and the same parameter set as in [101]. Looking at the figures,
and comparing them with the results of [101] (replicated here for k¯ = 4 in figure A.1), one
immediately sees that the cooperation level reached after the transient equilibration period is
much lower, and comparable with the results found for regular and random graphs. This is
reasonable, given that now it is as if each individual had the same average number of neighbors
as far as its payoff is concerned.
To reach a better understanding of the difference between accumulated and average payoff,
we interpolated between the two extreme cases according to the formula
Πi =
1
kd
∑
j
pii,j , (A.1)
where d ∈ [0, 1], Πi is the net payoff of player i, and pii,j is the payoff player i obtains when
interacting with neighbor j. One can see that, when d = 0 we recover the accumulated payoff
value, while d = 1 corresponds to the average payoff case. Figure A.6 clearly shows that, as d
varies from 0 to 1, and thus the ratio varies from 1 to 1/k, cooperation levels steadily decrease for
all values of the temptation on the y-axis. So, the way in which individual payoff is computed has
a large influence on cooperation levels that can be reached, in the average, on a given network
topology.
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Figure A.6: Cooperation level as a function of the parameter d of equation A.1 in the PD for
temptation values between 1 and 2. Cooperation prevails in light areas; Darker areas mean more
defection. Results are the average of 50 runs.
A.4 Evolutionary Stability
Evolutionary stability, i.e. the resistance to invasion by mutant strategies, is an important issue
when dealing with evolutionary games [128]. The effect of switching the strategy of the hub
with largest connectivity in a totally cooperating population has been studied in [102]. Here we
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Figure A.7: System stability when using accumulated payoff. For each parameter set, 100 runs
have been perturbed, but only a few individual runs are plotted here to expose the behaviors
encountered. Upper figures: replicator dynamics; lower figures: imitation of the best. Left-hand
figures: b = 1.8; right-hand figures: r = 0.5.
use a different approach to perturb the population after it has reached a quasi-stable state by
switching the strategy of a few players having the strategy of the greater number. This was done
for values of b ∈ {1.2, 1.5, 1.8} and r ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}. We then give the system 6000 time steps to
attempt to reattain its initial stable state. For reasons of space, we only plot the results obtained
for b = 1.8 and r = 0.5 (see figure A.7). Given the scale-free nature of the interaction network,
introducing a small amount of random noise does not have any effect on the population stability.
On the other hand, when cooperator hubs switch strategy (one to five in our study), avalanches
of defection can form and propagate through the population. Under replicator dynamics and
when using accumulated payoff, about 1/6 of the PD runs do not recover the state previously
attained at time step 104. This fraction rises to 1/3 for the SD game. With the imitation of
the best rule, 1/10 of the PD and SD runs fail to recover from the perturbations. In contrast
to accumulated payoff, average payoff does not allow perturbations to generate any noticeable
effect, i.e. the system remains quite stable.
A.5 Conclusions
In conclusion, we have deepened and extended the study presented in [101] clarifying the role of
the updating rule and the type of payoff attributed to players. We have shown that the games are
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not invariant under linear affine tranformations when using accumulated payoff, while average
payoff does not have this problem, although it may artificially reduce the impact of scale-free
degree networks. We have also seen that asynchronous update dynamics, being more likely
in a system of independently interacting agents, by eliminating artificial effects due to the
nature of synchronous update, may give rise to steadier quasi-equilibrium states. Moreover,
we have studied several dynamical aspects of the evolution of the populations such as their
transients before attaining the steady-state, and their evolutionary stability, showing that scale-
free networks of interactions provide a quite stable environment for the emergence of cooperation
when using accumulated payoff, except when hubs are targeted by the mutations, in which case
a sizable number of runs do not recover the original state, at least within the simulation times
allowed in our numerical experiments.
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Abstract
Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in society. One way of
studying these important phenomena is by using simplified models of individual behavior under
conflicting situations such as evolutionary game theory. Starting from the observation that
individuals interact through networks of acquaintances, we study the evolution of cooperation
on model and real social networks through well known paradigmatic games. Using a new payoff
scheme which leaves replicator dynamics invariant, we find that cooperation is sustainable in
such networks, even in the difficult case of the prisoner’s dilemma. The evolution and stability of
cooperation implies the condensation of game strategies into the existing community structures
of the social network in which clusters of cooperators survive thanks to their higher connectivity
towards other fellow cooperators.
B.1 Introduction
Game theory [122, 39] deals with social situations of conflict where two or more individuals
take decisions that will mutually influence each other. It is thus a view of collective systems
in which global social outcomes emerge as a result of the interaction of the individual decisions
made by each agent. The theory makes simplifying assumptions about the behavior of the
59
60
ARTICLE B. COOPERATION AND COMMUNITY STRUCTURE IN SOCIAL
NETWORKS
agents to be able to cast results into a coherent mathematical framework. However, in spite
of their abstractness, some extremely simple games lead to puzzles and dilemmas that have
a deep social meaning. The Prisoner’s Dilemma, a universal metaphor for the tension that
exists between social welfare and individual selfishness, is the most famous game of this type.
It stipulates that, in situations where individuals may either cooperate or behave selfishly and
thus defect, they will rationally choose the latter. However, cooperation would be the preferred
outcome when global welfare is considered. And indeed, cooperation actually emerges when the
game is played by humans and in many other cases. For instance, in experiments where people
play the Prisoner’s Dilemma for money without repetition and anonymously, the fraction of
cooperation is observed to be about 40 to 50 per cent [99]. Other simple games that give rise to
social dilemmas are the Hawk-Dove and the Stag-Hunt games, to be described below.
Several mechanisms have been invoked to explain the emergence of cooperative behavior.
Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have
often been mentioned [6, 57]. However, the work of Nowak and May [84] showed that the simple
fact that players are arranged according to a spatial structure and only interact with neighbors is
sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously
and without repetition. Nowak and May’s study and much of the following work was based on
regular structures such as two-dimensional grids (see also [41] for the Hawk-Dove case, and [86]
for a recent review). Axelrod et al. [7] showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors,
i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge,
provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time, which is a first step toward a social
network structure. However, all these topologies can only be considered as approximations,
as it has now become clear that many actual networks, social or otherwise, usually have a
topological structure that is neither regular nor random but rather of the small-world type.
Roughly speaking, small-world networks are graphs in which any node is relatively close to
any other node. In this sense, they are similar to random graphs but unlike regular lattices.
However, in contrast with random graphs, they also have a certain amount of local structure, as
measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient which essentially represents
the probability that two neighbors of a given node are themselves connected (an excellent review
of the subject appears in [75]). Thus, most real conflicting situations in economy and sociology
are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the players in a regular lattice,
nor by a mixing population or a random graph, and it becomes relevant to study these dilemmas
on other, more realistic social structures. Some previous work has been done in this direction.
In particular we mention Santos and Pacheco’s work on scale-free networks [101, 104] and work
on Watts–Strogatz small-world graphs [1, 53, 116, 126]. These network types do have the right
global “statistical” properties, but we emphasize that they are only an approximation of the
actual local topological properties of measured networks of interactions. Thus, we introduce
more socially relevant topologies, including an actual coauthorship network, and we emphasize
the relationships between community structure and cooperation. Some recent works close to
the present one in spirit are Holme et al. [47], Santos et al. [101, 104], and [58]. However, the
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authors of [47] study only the prisoner’s dilemma on particular social networks using a different,
noisy, strategy update rule, while [101, 104] deal with scale-free graphs exclusively. Reference
[58] has similar goals as our work and it deals only with the Prisoner’s Dilemma on a couple of
empirically determined social networks. It uses a different strategy update rule and a restricted
parameter space. We shall discuss these and other differences with our work in the model and
results sections.
B.2 Social Dilemmas
The three representative games studied here are the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), the Hawk-Dove
(HD), and the Stag-Hunt (SH) of which we briefly summarize the significance and the main
results. More detailed accounts can be found in many places, for instance [122, 39, 6]. In their
simplest form, they are all two-person, two-strategies, symmetric games with the following payoff
bi-matrix:
C D
C (R,R) (S,T)
D (T,S) (P,P)
In this matrix, R stands for the reward the two players receive if they both cooperate (C), P is
the punishment for bilateral defection (D), and T is the temptation, i.e. the payoff that a player
receives if it defects, while the other cooperates. In this case, the cooperator gets the sucker’s
payoff S. In the three games the condition 2R > T + S is imposed so that mutual cooperation
is preferred over an equal probability of unilateral cooperation and defection. For the PD, the
payoff values are ordered numerically in the following way: T > R > P > S. Defection is always
the best rational individual choice in the PD; (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium (NE) and
also an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) [122, 128]. Mutual cooperation would be preferable
but it is a strongly dominated strategy.
In the HD, the order of P and S is reversed yielding T > R > S > P . Thus, in the HD when
both players defect they each get the lowest payoff. (C,D) and (D,C) are Nash equilibria of the
game in pure strategies, so the game is antagonistic, and there is a third equilibrium in mixed
strategies where strategy D is played with probability p, and strategy C with probability 1− p,
where p depends on the actual payoff values. The only ESS of the game is the mixed strategy,
while the two pure NE are not ESSs [128]. The dilemma in this game is caused by “greed”, i.e.
players have a strong incentive to “bully” their opponent by playing D, which is harmful for
both parties if the outcome produced happens to be (D,D).
In the SH, the ordering is R > T > P > S, which means that mutual cooperation (C,C) is the
best outcome, Pareto-superior, and a Nash equilibrium. However, there is a second equilibrium
in which both players defect (D,D) which is somewhat “inferior” to the previous one, although
perfectly equivalent from a NE point of view. Here the dilemma is represented by the fact that
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the socially preferable coordinated equilibrium (C,C) might be missed for “fear” that the other
player will play D instead. There is a third mixed-strategy NE in the game, but it is commonly
dismissed because of its inefficiency and also because it is not an ESS [128].
B.3 Nature of Social Networks
From the evolutionary game theory perspective [122, 128], these dilemmas have been classically
studied by modeling the behavior of a large population in which randomly paired individuals play
the game in an anonymous manner using the corresponding payoff matrix. Non-rational players
are “hard-wired” to play a given strategy, and those better than average increase their share in
the population. Among the fixed points of these replicator dynamics one finds evolutionarily
stable strategies, i.e. strategies that cannot be invaded by a mutant strategy [128].
If we take a network view in describing the structure of the population, the previous “mixing”
population would be represented by a complete graph, i.e. any individual may interact with any
other player. The advantage of the mixing model and also of random graphs is that they admit
an approach by mean-field methods, which treat the system as being homogeneous, ignoring
space dependences and correlations. For instance, the replicator dynamics leads to a system
of differential equations which, given an initial distribution of strategies among the agents,
describe the evolution of the vector of population frequencies [128]. However, we do know that
real social networks do not conform to these simple models. Instead, they are of finite size,
have heterogeneous connectivity, and often display small-world properties, in the sense that
any individual is only a few steps away from any other, and individuals cluster together in
neighborhoods [75, 126, 4, 12]. Therefore, the previous evolutionary games should be studied
on this type of networks, to understand the limitations of the theory, and to extend it as far as
possible to structures encountered in real-life.
We simulate the games on three main types of networks: scale-free graphs, a theoretical
social network model, and an existing coauthorship network. These network types go from least
realistic, the scale-free, to real, the coauthorship network. We construct scale-free networks
according to the classical Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model [3]. The social network model follows
[114]. Details of their construction are given in section B.4. As a typical example of a true social
network, we use a coauthorship network among researchers in the genetic programming (GP)
community. This network displays small-world properties, with a connected giant component
of 942 scientists and it has recently been analyzed [117]. It has clusters and communities and it
should be representative of other similar human acquaintance networks. Its degree distribution
function is not a pure power-law; rather, it can be fitted by an exponentially truncated power-
law.
Scale-free networks are characterized by a skewed degree distribution function P (k), i.e. the
probability that a given node has exactly k neighbors is a slow-decaying function of k. However,
except perhaps for sexual contact networks [56, 34], and some collaboration networks[8], most
social networks studied to date are not of the pure scale-free type, and show a faster decay of
the tail of the degree distribution [75, 4]. Intuitively, there must be a cutoff in the number of
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acquaintances a given agent can have, and in many cases also a typical number of acquaintances,
which gives a scale to the network. Besides, it has been observed that social networks have a
higher clustering coefficient than the typical values reached in scale-free graphs, another mani-
festation of the complex neighborhood structure of the network. Furthermore, the appearance of
communities – sets of densely connected vertices with sparse connections between the sets – is yet
another typical feature found in social structures [79]. Communities can highly influence the way
information is propagated throughout the network or opinion formation is processed. Finally,
another interesting aspect of real-life social networks is the correlation between the degrees of
neighbouring nodes, called degree assortativity. Technological and biological networks typically
have a negative correlation, i.e. high-degree vertices are preferentially connected to low-degree
vertices, whereas measured social networks are assortative, meaning highly connected nodes
tend to be connected with other highly connected nodes [75, 80].
We note that real social, communication, and technological networks are dynamical, i.e. new
nodes may join the network forming new links, and old nodes may leave it as social actors come
and go. As a first approximation we model only static networks, thus ignoring fluctuations
and non-equilibrium phenomena. In other words, we make the hypothesis that the network is
at equilibrium and that network dynamics are either absent, or their time scale is longer with
respect to the strategy-change dynamics. This proves to be a useful approach, especially for
social acquaintance networks. Some recent work has targeted the dynamical aspects of network
evolution [132, 25, 103, 38].
B.4 Model Description
B.4.1 Population Structure
We consider a population of players of size N . Each individual i in the population is represented
as a vertex vi of a graph G(V,E), with vi ∈ V . An interaction between two players i and
j is represented by the undirected edge eij ∈ E. The number of neighbors of player i is the
degree ki of vertex vi. The average degree of the network will be called k¯. The terms vertex,
node, individual, or player shall be used interchangeably in the sequel; likewise for edge, link,
interaction, and acquaintance. In the next two paragraphs we give details on the construction
of our population graphs.
Scale-Free Graphs Construction. We use the model proposed by Baraba´si and Albert [3].
Networks are grown incrementally starting with a small clique of m0 nodes. At each successive
time step a new node is added such that its m ≤ m0 edges link it to m nodes already present
in the graph. It is assumed that the probability p that a new node will be connected to node i
depends on the current degree ki of the latter. This is called the preferential attachment rule.
The probability p(ki) of node i to be chosen is given by p(ki) = ki/
∑
j kj , where the sum is over
all nodes already in the graph. The model evolves into a stationary network with power-law
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probability distribution for the vertex degree P (k) ∼ k−γ , with γ ∼ 3. For the simulations,
we constructed Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks (henceforth BA SF) of size N = 10000 and
with an average degree k = 4, starting with a clique of m0 = 2 nodes and at each time step the
new incoming node has m = 2 links.
Social Network Construction. This model, called here the TSN model and presented in
detail in [114], was conceived to construct a graph with most of the desired features of real-
life social networks i.e, assortative, highly clustered, showing community structures, having an
adjustable decay rate of the degree distribution, and a finite cutoff. The network is incrementally
grown starting from a seed of m0 randomly connected vertices. At each successive time step,
the following algorithm is applied:
1. On average mr ≥ 1 random vertices are picked to be initial contacts.
2. On average ms ≥ 0 neighbors of the mr initial contacts are chosen to be secondary contacts.
3. A newly added vertex v is connected to all the initial and secondary contacts determined
in the two previous steps.
The above is iterated until the network reaches the desired size. Notice that the process re-
sponsible for the appearance of high clustering, assortativity and community structure is step
2. In the numerical experiments, we used graphs of size N = 10000 with m0 = 30 initial
nodes. Every time a new node is added, its number of initial contacts mr is distributed as
p(# of initial contacts = 1) = 0.95 and p(# of initial contacts = 2) = 0.05. The number of its
secondary contacts ms is uniformly distributed between 0 and 3. The resulting degree distribu-
tion falls below a power-law for high values of k [114].
B.4.2 Strategy Update Rules
To update the strategies of the individuals given an initial strategy distribution in the population,
we use a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics as discussed in [46] and used in lattices by [41].
The replicator dynamics assumes that the share of the population playing a particular strategy
grows in proportion to how well this strategy is doing relative to the average population payoff.
Replicator dynamics is usually defined for very large populations [128] where correlations are
absent and mean-field approximations can be used. In finite populations the behavior may be
different, as studied by Nowak et al. [85].
Let Πx be a player x’s aggregated payoff and kx the number of neighbors x has. We define
the replicator dynamics function φ(Πj−Πi) as being the probability function according to which
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player i adopts neighbor j’s strategy, namely
φ(Πj −Πi) =

Πj −Πi
Πj,max −Πi,min if Πj −Πi > 0
0 otherwise,
(B.1)
where Πx,max (resp. Πx,min) is the maximum (resp. minimum) payoff a player x can get. Note
that Santos et al. [101, 104] make use of a very similar expression which only differs from ours
by the choice of the normalization factor. The authors of [58] use another common strategy
update rule which consists in imitating the strategy of the most successful neighbor. This is a
deterministic rule while ours is stochastic. This, together with the use of accumulated payoff
(see next section) makes the results difficult to compare directly.
B.4.3 Utility Calculation
There exist several possibilities for determining a player’s utility or payoff. Some previous work
[84, 86, 101, 104, 58, 132] defined a player’s payoff as the sum (accumulated payoff ) of all pair
interactions with its nearest neighbors. Other studies [53, 116] use the average payoff, i.e. the
accumulated payoff divided by the number of interactions. Accumulated and average payoff
give the same results when considering degree-homogenous networks such as lattices [84, 86].
Accumulated payoff seems more logical to use in degree-heterogeneous networks since it reflects
the very fact that players may have different numbers of neighbors. However, accumulated
payoff may lead to a technical problem when players have a different number of interactions.
Evolutionary game theory states that replicator dynamics is invariant under positive affine
transformations of payoffs save for a possible change of time scale [128]. However, on degree-
heterogenous networks, this assumption is not satisfied when combining accumulated payoff with
the replicator dynamics, as shown in [118]. This is essentially due to the translation component
of the affine transformation and can be verified by considering a player x’s new accumulated
payoff after transformation of the payoff matrix which is Π′x = αΠx + βkx, with α ∈ R+, β ∈ R.
Average payoff respects the replicator dynamics invariance but it prevents nodes with many
edges to potentially have higher payoffs than those with only a few links, although it might be
justified in terms of the number of interactions that a player may sustain in a given time, i.e.
an individual with many connections is likely to interact less often with each of its neighbors
than another that has a lower number of connections. Also, if there is a cost to maintain a
relationship, average payoff will roughly capture this fact, while it will be hidden if one uses
accumulated payoff. Moreover, nodes are very vulnerable to defecting neighbors who have just
one link.
We propose here a third definition for a player’s payoff that retains the advantages of the
accumulated and average payoffs without their drawbacks. Before proceeding, let us first make
a few notations. Let piij denote the payoff player i receives when interacting with player j,
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and let Vi be the set of i’s neighbors. Finally, let pii,γ denote the guaranteed minimum payoff
player i can obtain in a one-shot two-person game. This is what i would receive were he to
attempt to maximize his minimum payoff. Note that for symmetric games such as the ones
studied here, pii,γ = piγ for i = 1, . . . , N , where N is the size of the population. For example in
the PD, a player could choose to play C with the risk of obtaining the lowest payoff S were its
opponent to play D. However, by opting for strategy D a player would maximize its minimum
payoff thus guaranteeing itself at least piγ = P > S no matter what its opponent’s strategy
might be. In the HD we have piγ = S, for this time the payoff ordering is T > R > S > P
and a player needs only to play C to receive at least payoff S. Finally, in the SH, piγ = P .
We can now define a player i’s aggregated payoff as being Πi =
∑
j∈Vi (piij − pii,γ). Intuitively,
it can be viewed as the difference between the payoff an individual collects and the payoff it
would get by “playing it safe”. Our modified payoff has the advantage of leaving the replicator
dynamics invariant with respect to a positive affine transformation of the payoff matrix both on
degree-homogeneous and heterogeneous graphs while still allowing the degree distribution of the
network to have a strong impact on the dynamics of the game. Indeed, players placed on highly
connected nodes of a graph can benefit from their numerous interactions which enable them
to potentially collect a high payoff. However, these same players run a risk of totaling a much
lower score than a player with only a few links. One can notice that on degree-homogeneous
graphs such as lattices or complete graphs, using the adjusted accumulated payoff yields the
same results as using accumulated or average payoff. The proof of the invariance under positive
affine transformation of this new payoff definition is straightforward; simply note that in this
case Πx,max = kx(pix,max−pix,γ) and Πx,min = kx(pix,min−pix,γ), where pix,max = max{T,R, P, S}
and pix,min = min{T,R, P, S} for the symmetric games studied here.
B.4.4 Population Dynamics
Calling C(t) = (s1(t), s2(t), . . . , sN (t)) a configuration of the population strategies si ∈ {C,D}
at time step t, the global synchronous system dynamics leads to C(t + 1) by simultaneously
updating all the player’s strategies according to the chosen rule which is here a discrete analogue
of replicator dynamics. Synchronous update, with its idealization of a global clock, is customary
in spatial evolutionary games, and most results have been obtained using this model [84, 86, 52].
However, perfect synchronicity is only an abstraction as agents normally act at different and
possibly uncorrelated times [48]. In spite of this, it has been shown that the update mode does
not fundamentally alter the results for replicator dynamics [41, 83]. We have also checked that
asynchronous update dynamics does not influence the system evolution in a significant way and
so, all results presented here refer to synchronous systems.
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B.5 Results
B.5.1 Simulation Parameters
We simulate on our networks the three games previously mentioned in section B.2. As stated
above, we study three types of networks: BA SF, the TSN model, and the real acquaintance GP
network. Let us point out that the BA SF graphs are only used as a benchmark for comparison
with more realistic networks. Indeed, they have already been studied in [101, 104], although
here we use a different payoff scheme.
For each game, we can explore the entire game space by limiting our study to the variation of
only two parameters per game. This is possible without loss of generality owing to the invariance
of Nash equilibria and replicator dynamics under positive affine transformations of the payoff
matrix and using our payoff scheme [128]. In the case of the PD, we set R = 1 and S = 0, and
vary 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ P ≤ 1. For the HD, we set R = 1 and P = 0 and the two parameters
are 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ S ≤ 1. Finally, in the SH, we decide to fix R = 1 and S = 0 and vary
0 ≤ T ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ P ≤ T .
We deliberately choose not to vary the same two parameters in all three games. The reason
we choose to set T and S in both the PD and the SH is to simply provide natural bounds on
the values to explore of the remaining two parameters. In the PD case, P is limited between
R = 1 and S = 0 in order to respect the ordering of the payoffs (T > R > P > S) and T ’s upper
bound is equal to 2 due to the 2R > T + S constraint. Had we fixed R = 1 and P = 0 instead,
T could be as big as desired, provided S ≤ 0 is small enough. In the HD, setting R = 1 and
P = 0 determines the range of S (since this time T > R > S > P ) and gives an upper bound of
2 for T , again due to the 2R > T + S constraint. Note however, that the only valid value pairs
of (T, S) are those that satisfy the latter constraint.
We used networks of size N = 10000, except for the GP network case, whose size is N = 942.
Each network is randomly initialized with exactly 50% cooperators and 50% defectors. In all
cases, the parameters are varied between their two bounds by steps of 0.1. For each set of values,
we carry out 50 runs of 16000 time steps each, using a fresh graph realization in each run (the
GP network is constant). Cooperation level is averaged over the last 1000 time steps, well after
the transient equilibration period.
B.5.2 Evolution of Cooperation
In this section we present global results as they pertain to the whole network of agents; discussion
of local structures, such as clusters and communities is deferred to the next section. In Figure
B.1, we report average cooperation levels for the three games on three different types of networks,
for systems having attained a steady-state. As expected, the region in which cooperation is
possible is much more restricted in the PD than for the other two games. Cooperation is more
widespread for the HD, as mutual defection is the worst outcome in this game. For the PD
and the SH, cooperation is sensitive to the “punishment” level P, for a given T, with the PD
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Figure B.1: Level of cooperation at the end of the simulation. From left to right: PD, HD, SH;
from top to bottom: BA SF, TSN model, GP network. For the HD, the meaningful phase space
is the lower left triangle; for the SH it is the upper left triangle. Results are averaged over 50
runs for each game, each network structure, and parameter set.
being influenced in a higher degree. Concerning the HD, one can see that the S parameter
has moderate influence on cooperation for a given T. We also notice that the transition from
cooperation to defection is much steeper in the PD and SH cases than for the HD.
Now, interpreting the results in terms of the three different topologies, BA SF networks are
the structures that yield the highest cooperation levels for the three games (compare the top
row with the second and third rows of Figure B.1), which qualitatively confirms the findings of
[101, 104]. However, note that Santos et al.’s results differ quantitatively from ours due to the
different payoff scheme used. Moreover, while our results are valid in the whole game’s space, the
results of [101, 104] are not because of the non-invariance of their dynamics using accumulated
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Figure B.2: Differences in cooperation between (a) TSN model and BA SF and (b) GP network
and BA SF for the PD. (c) and (d) show the same differences for the SH.
payoff on degree-heterogeneous networks. To highlight the effects of the network topology, in
Figure B.2 we show the cooperation difference plots between, respectively, the BA SF and the
TSN model, and the BA SF and the GP scientific coauthorship network. The left part refers to
the PD, while in the right two figures, differences are reported for the SH. Differences for the
HD are not shown as they are less marked. The difference plot between the TSN model and the
GP network is almost flat, as the differences are very small (not shown here). This can also be
inferred from the similarity between Figures B.2 (a), (b) and (c), (d) respectively. We can thus
say that the TSN model seems to be a good approximation of a real social network, at least as
far as the cooperation distribution in the games spaces is concerned.
Another important global quantity characterizing a population (or subpopulation) of players
as a whole is the total payoff at the end of the simulated games, sometimes called the wealth.
The cumulated wealth of defectors and cooperators is plotted in Figure B.3 for the PD in
the case of the TSN model. This is done for T = 1.3, for three values of the punishment
P, giving rise to different cooperation regimes: one in which cooperation prevails, a second
one with approximately an equal amount of cooperators and defectors, and a third case where
defection predominates. We found that, while defectors’ wealth curves are rather well fitted by
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an exponential function, the cooperators’ wealth is larger and has a broader distribution which
can be fitted by a stretched exponential. This hints at a clustering of cooperators, as this is
the only way for them to increase their payoff. In the next section we shall provide topological
evidence of this phenomenon.
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Figure B.3: Cumulative wealth distribution in the PD game averaged over 50 runs for the social
network model; (a) T = 1.3, P = 0.1 yielding ∼73% of cooperation. Average C-wealth=2.92,
average D-wealth=0.47; (b) T = 1.3, P = 0.15 yielding ∼52% of cooperation. Average C-
wealth=2.74, average D-wealth=0.34; (c) T = 1.3, P = 0.2 yielding ∼15% of cooperation.
Average C-wealth=2.30, average D-wealth=0.11.
B.5.3 Community Structure and Cooperation
As mentioned in a previous section, real social networks show community structure. A com-
munity can be seen as a set of highly connected vertices having few connections with vertices
belonging to other communities. It is a difficult task to distinguish the different communities
composing the network and to determine whether a given vertex belongs to only one or several
of them. There exist several algorithms to split a network into communities [79, 17, 76], each
one with its pros and cons. In our case, due to the computational burden of the simulations, we
chose one of the algorithms proposed by Newman [76].
When the community algorithm is run on the TSN model, the important observation is
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Table B.1: Comparison of the clustering coefficients and degree assortativity of the three net-
work types studied. For the TSN and BA SF, the values are averaged over 100 realizations.
Assortativity coefficient is computed using the expression that appears in [75].
TSN GP BA SF
Clustering coefficient 0.442± 0.004 0.665 0.026± 0.005
assortativity coefficient 0.133± 0.014 0.131 −0.089± 0.027
that, independent of the cooperation level, in most communities either cooperators or defectors
predominate. This is best seen in the GP coauthorship network, as its relatively small size makes
visualization easier. We also notice that the TSN model and the GP network both have a high
clustering coefficient, very similar degree assortativity, and also qualitatively similar community
structure. The corresponding features for the BA SF networks are very different (see Table B.1).
Powered by yFiles
Figure B.4: Communities: cooperators are represented by triangles and defectors by squares.
For reasons of space, in the following we mainly show results for the PD, giving occasional
comments for the other two games. In Figure B.4 we depict a portion of the GP graph, distin-
guishing between cooperators and defectors for the PD. As noted above, tightly-bound commu-
nities are mostly composed of players with the same strategy. Although we only show a small
portion of the whole network for reasons of clarity, we could have chosen many other places as
the phenomenon is widespread. Cooperators tend to “protect” themselves by occupying sites
with many links toward other cooperators. On the other hand, a cooperator like the central one
in the largest defecting community will have a tendency to become a defector since its neighbors
are nearly all defectors; but when its highly connected “wealthy” cooperator neighbor on the
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left of the figure is probabilistically selected to be imitated, then it will certainly become a coop-
erator again. So, the rare cooperators that are not tightly clustered with other cooperators will
tend to oscillate between strategies. Table B.2 illustrates the strategy clustering phenomenon
in a quantitative way by giving the average percentage of cooperating neighbors of a player as a
function of its strategy and of the global cooperation regime (high cooperation, medium cooper-
ation, and low cooperation). We can see that in all cases a cooperator is surrounded by a large
majority of cooperators, whereas a defector mainly interacts with other defectors. However, the
amount of strategy segregation is less extreme when considering the HD with respect to PD
and SH. In the HD case the two strategies are slightly more intermingled, confirming analogous
findings for grid-structured populations [41]. These results are in qualitative agreement with the
well known fact that for large mixing populations, the only evolutionary stable state in the HD
is one in which neither hawks nor doves completely disappear [46]. The community structure
of cooperators, together with the mutual payoff advantage of cooperating also explains the pre-
vious observation that the average cooperators’ wealth exceeds the average wealth of defectors.
While we focused on the way cooperators and defectors self-organize themselves within network
communities and how these community structures tend to naturally segregate the two strategies,
the authors of [58] concentrated on the study of the influence of the intra and intercommunity
structure on global cooperation levels for the PD only.
Table B.2: The proportion of cooperators in a player’s neighborhood depending on the game
played, the regime at the quasi-stable state, and the player’s strategy. The values were obtained
by averaging over 50 runs.
PD HD SH
C D C D C D
C regime 0.98± 0.01 0.18± 0.04 0.93± 0.02 0.28± 0.03 0.98± 0.02 0.11± 0.05
50-50 regime 0.96± 0.03 0.10± 0.06 0.91± 0.01 0.19± 0.03 0.96± 0.03 0.06± 0.05
D regime 0.92± 0.03 0.02± 0.02 0.61± 0.02 0.36± 0.02 0.93± 0.07 0.02± 0.04
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Figure B.5: Degree distribution functions for the TSN model; Prisoner’s dilemma. Data are
averaged over 50 runs; log-log scale. (a) T = 1.3, R = 1, P = 0.1, S = 0; 73% cooperation. (b)
T = 1.3, R = 1, P = 0.2, S = 0; 15% cooperation.
If we now focus on the degree distributions for the TSN model as a whole, and for cooperators
and defectors separately as shown in Figure B.5, we can make the following observations. Firstly,
although the distributions are fat-tailed, they are not well fitted by pure single power-laws for
the number of acquaintances an individual may establish is limited, similar to what happens in
real societies. Looking at the cooperators’ and defectors’ degree distributions, when cooperation
prevails, cooperators tend to occupy the highest degree nodes (Figure B.5 (a)). When defectors
predominate, as in Figure B.5 (b), the two curves tend to be closer, although the cooperators
still monopolize higher degree nodes. The 50/50 case falls just in between these two extremes
(not shown here to save space). As a matter of fact, for high cooperation, the defectors’ curve
are well fitted by an exponential distribution P (k) = 0.473 exp(−0.453k). Another way of seeing
this is depicted in Figure B.6, where we plot the distribution of cooperators according to node
degree, relative to the average for a given level of cooperation. Both for high and low cooperation
fractions, cooperators’ degrees are skewed toward higher values. For the HD and the SH the
results are similar, namely, degree distributions for defectors fall off more rapidly than those
for cooperators. However, when defection prevails, the effect is more marked for the HD, while
for the SH the skewness is less pronounced. Finally, the same measures on the GP graph give
qualitatively similar trends.
B.6 Conclusions
Our results have implications for evolutionary games, and they may also serve to illuminate how
the structure of social networks influences the game dynamics and the emergence of cooperation.
For that purpose, we have chosen to use a model for the construction of networks producing
features that are typical of social networks, and an actual social network that is precisely known.
The standard BA SF model has also been used but only as a benchmark against which to
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Figure B.6: Distribution of cooperators as a function of the players’ degree relative to the
population average. Prisoner’s dilemma. Data are averaged over 50 runs and logarithmically
binned. Left: 73% cooperation. Right: 15% cooperation.
compare the results obtained on social networks. It is encouraging that the results on the two
different social network structures are quite similar, and have much more in common between
themselves than with BA SF graphs. This is shown quite clearly by the values of the clustering
coefficient and by the degree assortativity, which is assortative for the social networks and slightly
disassortative for the BA SF graphs.
For evolutionary games, the study of graph structures that extend the usual regular lattices
and the more complex, but still socially unrealistic Watts–Strogatz and BA SF graphs, should
be a useful one. As these games are supposedly metaphorically played by people and entities in
many kinds of social interactions, it becomes important to take into account in as precise a man-
ner as possible the actual ties that exist. When this is done, one discovers that the community
structures that are so common in society play an extremely important role in the evolution of
cooperation. Starting with an equal amount of randomly distributed cooperators and defectors,
all simulations end up with the majority of cooperators separated from the defectors according
to the underlying community structure of the network. This phenomenon is quite independent
of the final global level of cooperation, at least for the simulations performed.
When one takes the structure of the social interactions into account, there are serious chal-
lenges from the theoretical point of view. However, this is a very promising direction to advance
our understanding of social processes. Simulations like those presented here can help to make
progress and can pave the way for more formal models.
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Abstract
We study the effects of conformity, the tendency of humans to imitate locally common be-
haviors, in the evolution of cooperation when individuals occupy the vertices of a graph and
engage in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Snowdrift game with their neighbors. Two
different graphs are studied: rings (one-dimensional lattices with cyclic boundary conditions)
and scale-free networks of the Baraba´si-Albert type. The proposed evolutionary-graph model is
studied both by means of Monte Carlo simulations and an extended pair-approximation tech-
nique. We find improved levels of cooperation when evolution is carried on rings and individuals
imitate according to both the traditional pay-off bias and a conformist bias. More important,
we show that scale-free networks are no longer powerful amplifiers of cooperation when fair
amounts of conformity are introduced in the imitation rules of the players. Such weakening
of the cooperation-promoting abilities of scale-free networks is the result of a less biased flow
of information in scale-free topologies, making hubs more susceptible of being influenced by
less-connected neighbors.
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C.1 Introduction
Understanding the emergence and stability of cooperation is a central problem in many fields
of both natural and social sciences. Researchers have traditionally adopted evolutionary game
theory [128] as common formal framework for studying the dynamics of strategy change, and
games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the Snowdrift Game (SG) as metaphors for the
tension between group welfare and individual selfishness. The PD and the SG (also known as
Chicken or Hawks-Doves) are two-person, symmetric games in which a given player can be, at
each time step, either a Cooperator (C) or a Defector (D). Cs are willing to engage in cooperative
tasks, while Ds prefer not to, thus exploiting Cs. If two individuals of the same type interact,
they both get the reward for mutual cooperation R if they cooperate or the punishment for
mutual defection P if they defect. If a D and a C interact, the D receives the temptation to
defect T and the C receives the sucker’s pay-off S. In the PD, the pay-offs are ordered such that
T > R > P > S with 2R > T + S. Since T > R and P > S, the only Nash equilibrium of the
game is the pure strategy (D,D). In this case, the dilemma is caused both by “greed” (or the
temptation to cheat) and “fear” that the other player cheats. In the SG, the order of P and S is
reversed, yielding T > R > S > P . Thus, when both players defect they get the lowest possible
pay-off. The pairs of pure strategies (C,D) and (D,C) are Nash equilibria of the game. There
is also a third equilibrium in mixed strategies in which strategy D is played with probability
p and strategy C with probability 1 − p, where p depends on the actual pay-off values. The
dilemma in this game is caused only by “greed”, i.e. players have a strong incentive to threat
their opponent by playing D, which is harmful for both parties if the outcome happens to be
(D,D).
Conventional evolutionary game theoretical models assume an infinite population in which pairs
of randomly drawn individuals interact according to a given game. Selection is strictly pay-off
biased, which implies that fitter individuals reproduce more (genetic evolution) or successful in-
dividuals tend to be imitated more frequently (cultural evolution). In both genetic and cultural
evolution, the evolutionary process can be analytically described by a set of equations called
the replicator dynamics [128]. In the SG, the only stable equilibrium of such equations is an
internal one, corresponding to the mixed strategy of classical game theory, while the two pure
equilibria are unstable. In the PD, the only stable rest point occurs when the population is
entirely composed of Ds: Cs are doomed to extinction in this game.
Given these unfavorable predictions for the evolution of cooperation, several mechanisms have
been invoked in order to explain why altruism can actually emerge, such as kin selection, group
selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity and network reciprocity [82]. Network reci-
procity [84, 101, 55, 112] arises when individuals occupy the vertices of a graph (modeling
spatially subdivided populations or social networks) such that interactions are constrained to
direct neighbors. When the population of players possesses such a structure, Cs can survive in
clusters of related individuals for certain ranges of the game parameters, as it has been known
since the pioneering work by Nowak and May [84]. Among the different conceivable population
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topologies, scale-free networks have received particular attention since they have been found to
promote cooperation to a point that Cs dominate Ds in a significant portion of the parameters’
space [101].
In addition to positing infinite well-mixed populations, the replicator dynamics relies on the
assumption that selection is entirely pay-off biased. Such a premise, although natural to posit in
genetic evolution, is less straightforward to postulate in cultural evolution where information is
transmitted by means of imitation. Humans not only have a bias for imitating more successful
people, but also to conform, or to show a disproportionate tendency to copy the behavior of
the majority [16]. Recent empirical research has shown that conformity is an important bias in
our social learning psychology [20, 24], and that it can partially account for the results obtained
in laboratory experiments on social dilemmas [18, 9]. Theoretical research has also shown that
conformity can promote cooperation in the PD. In the standard case of a large, well-mixed
population, the dynamics can lead either to full defection or to bi-stability, depending on the
amount of conformity [45, 89, 44]. In [89] the case of square lattices was studied by simulation,
with the result that conformity stabilizes cooperation in such population topologies, a result
confirmed for rings in [66] and, in a more detailed way, in the work presented here.
In this paper we investigate the evolution of cooperation when individuals imitate with a given
amount of conformity and both interaction and imitation are constrained to nearest neighbors in
a network. In order to extend previous work [84, 41, 23, 101, 116, 89] and to study the influence
of the network topology, we use rings and Ba´rabasi-Albert scale-free networks as examples of,
respectively, simple degree-homogeneous (i.e. regular) and highly degree-heterogeneous graphs.
It will be shown that, while conformity reinforces the cooperation-promoting advantages of
network reciprocity in rings, the very same mechanism may strongly hinder the evolution of
cooperation when the network topology is scale-free. Indeed, when Cs are not initially in the
majority and imitation is partly conformist, scale-free networks are no longer the powerful am-
plifiers of cooperation expected from the results of previous studies. There is thus an interesting
interplay between conformity and network reciprocity so that the cooperation-promoting effects
of conformity depend on the particular type of networks on which evolutionary dynamics are
played.
C.2 Model
We consider a population of size N where the i-th individual is represented by the vertex vi of
an undirected, simple graph G(V,E). The neighborhood of i, Γ(i), is the set of all individuals j
such that there is an edge eij ∈ E. The number of neighbors of i is thus the degree ki of vertex
vi.
At each time step, each individual is either a C or a D. The system evolves by the successive
application of interaction and imitation phases. During the interaction phase, individuals simul-
taneously engage in a single round of the game with their neighbors. As a result, individual i
collects an accumulated payoff Πi =
∑
l∈Γ(i) piil, where piil is the pay-off player i receives when
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Figure C.1: (Color online) Individuals imitate following two different update rules, each reflect-
ing a different bias of our social learning psychology: pay-off based imitation and conformist
imitation. Cooperators are shown in light yellow; defectors in dark blue. Social interaction is
modeled by a rescaled Prisoner’s Dilemma with T = b > 1, R = 1, P = S = 0. (a) Successful
pay-off biased transmission. When applying a pay-off biased rule of imitation, A can copy B’s
strategy and become a defector, since B’s pay-off is greater than A’s. (b) Unsuccessful conformist
transmission. If A were to imitate B according to conformity, no transmission would take place,
since defectors are in the minority of A’s neighborhood (3 defectors vs. 4 cooperators). (c)
Unsuccessful pay-off biased transmission. B will not copy A’s strategy under a pay-off biased
rule since A’s pay-off is smaller than B’s. (d) Successful conformist transmission. Conformist
transmission from A to B can take place because cooperators constitute the majority in B’s
neighborhood (5 cooperators vs. 1 defector).
interacting with player l (e.g. T , R, P or S). During the imitation phase, each individual
randomly chooses one of its neighbors as its cultural model. Let us denote i’s cultural model
by j. We consider two update rules for the cultural evolutionary dynamics: pay-off biased im-
itation and conformist imitation. (i) For pay-off biased imitation, i copies j’s strategy with a
probability given by f ((Πj −Πi)/(θk>)), where f(x) is equal to x if x > 0 and 0 otherwise,
k> = max {ki, kj}, θ = T−S in the PD and θ = T−P in the SG. This update rule is a local, finite
population analogue of the replicator dynamics, commonly used in the literature [41, 101]. (ii)
For conformist imitation the probability that i copies j’s strategy is given by f
(
(nj|i − ni|i)/ki
)
where nl|i is the number of i’s neighbors with strategy l. This update rule is related to the
majority rule and to the voter model, commonly used in interdisciplinary physics studies [21].
In our model individuals imitate according to a pay-off bias with probability 1−α, and accord-
ing to a conformist bias with probability α. Thus, the parameter α represents the amount of
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conformity in the individuals’ behavior and gives the average proportion of players imitating
according to the conformity rule at each time step. When α = 0 our local dynamics reduce
to the strictly pay-off biased imitation rule used in previous studies [101, 41]. Figure C.1 gives
some illustrative examples of the imitation dynamics of the proposed model.
In order to allow comparison with previous studies, we focus on the commonly used rescaled
version of the PD [84, 101], for which T = b, 1 ≤ b ≤ 2, R = 1 and P = S = 0. The parameter
b represents the advantage of defectors over cooperators. For the SG we make, as in [101],
T = β > 1, R = β − 1/2, S = β − 1, and P = 0, such that the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual
cooperation is given by r = 1/(2β − 1). It is worthy of note that, in degree-inhomogeneous
networks, the local replicator dynamics using accumulated payoff is not invariant with respect
to affine transformations of the payoff matrix [118, 61]. Although this fact invalidate general-
izations of the obtained results to the extended parameter space, it allows us to compare our
results with relevant previous work.
Before studying our model with actual network models (rings and scale-free networks) by
means of numerical simulation, we briefly present analytical results obtained using the mean-
field method and the pair approximation. Such analytical results are important in order to
identify the dynamical regions of the system and to serve as starting point for comparisons with
the dynamics on actual networks studied in Section C.4.
C.3 Analytical Results
C.3.1 Mean-Field Approach
Within the framework of the traditional mean-field approach [112] network locality is ignored
and the system is assumed to have an infinite size, leading to an infinite, well-mixed population.
In this case, it is easy to show that the time evolution of the fraction of Cs ρ is ruled by the
following equation:
ρ˙ = ρ(1− ρ) {γ [piC − piD] + α(2ρ− 1)} , (C.1)
where piC = ρR + (1 − ρ)S and piD = ρT + (1 − ρ)P are the average pay-offs to Cs and
Ds, and γ = (1 − α)/θ. Equation C.1 (or a similar formula) has been derived in related
work on cultural transmission processes including both pay-off biased imitation and conformist
imitation [44, 45, 18, 89, 110]. The dynamics has the two trivial fixed points ρ∗0 = 0 and ρ∗1 = 1,
as well as (possibly) one internal non-trivial equilibrium given by
ρ∗ =
γ(P − S) + α
γ {R− T + P − S}+ 2α.
For α = 0 (pure pay-off biased transmission) Eq. C.1 recovers the standard replicator dynamics
of the original game, whereas for α = 1 (pure conformist transmission), Eq. C.1 is equivalent
to the replicator dynamics of a pure coordination game with internal (unstable) equilibrium
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ρ∗ = 1/2. For 0 < α < 1, variations in the amount of conformity and the entries of the pay-off
matrix can change the evolutionary dynamics of the social dilemma. In particular, the global
behavior of the system depends on the two critical values αD = (S − P )/(θ + S − P ) and
αC = (T −R)/(θ+ T −R) so that the system is in one of the following four dynamical regions:
1. Dominant defection (α > αD ∧ α < αC): ρ∗0 = 0 is the only stable equilibrium. In this
case, Cs are doomed to extinction regardless of their initial frequency in the population.
2. Co-existence (α < αD ∧ α < αC): only the internal equilibrium ρ∗ is stable. Cs and Ds
coexist in equilibrium at proportions given by ρ∗ and 1− ρ∗, respectively.
3. Bi-stability (α > αD ∧ α > αC): both ρ∗0 = 0 and ρ∗1 = 1 are stable whereas the internal
fixed point ρ∗ is unstable. In this case, the evolutionary dynamics depends on the initial
frequency of Cs, ρ(0). For ρ(0) > ρ∗ cooperation prevails, whereas it vanishes for ρ(0) < ρ∗.
4. Dominant cooperation (α < αD ∧ α > αC): ρ∗1 = 1 is the only stable equilibrium; Cs get
fixed regardless of their initial frequency in the population.
These regimes can be seen in Fig. C.2, which shows the phase diagrams of the two rescaled
games. In the PD with conformity, S < P ⇒ αD < 0, so that only dominant defection and
bi-stability are possible. In particular, for the rescaled version of the game, conformity can make
the system bi-stable if α > (b−1)/(2b−1). However, for all values of b in the bi-stability region,
the basin of attraction of ρ∗0 is greater than the basin of attraction of ρ∗1, i.e. Cs initially in the
minority are doomed to extinction regardless of their initial proportion and the values of b and
α. In the SG with conformity, the four dynamical regions above described are possible, with
αD = (1− r)/2 and αC = r/(1 + 2r). In the co-existence region, the equilibrium proportion of
Cs is larger than what is expected in the α = 0 case when r < 1/2 and smaller when r > 1/2.
In the bi-stability region, the basin of attraction of ρ∗1 is greater than the basin of attraction of
ρ∗0 for r < 1/2.
In sum, conformity can promote cooperation in the PD to a certain degree in the mean-field
limit. If in the majority (and if conformity is strong enough) Cs now have a chance of surviving
invasion from Ds, and eventually take over the whole population [89]. In the SG, whether
conformity helps or hinders the evolution of cooperation actually depends on the cost-to-benefit
ratio r. Cs are favored for r < 1/2 and disfavored for r > 1/2.
C.3.2 Pair Approximation
Pair approximation [63, 121] improves over traditional mean-field approach for structured pop-
ulations by considering the frequency of strategy pairs (i.e. C-C, C-D and D-D). Since the
technique assumes regular graphs without loops, it only applies to Bethe lattices in a strict
sense [42]. However, pair approximation has been used to predict evolutionary dynamics on
more general regular graphs with considerable success [41, 42]. We extended the pair-dynamics
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Figure C.2: (Color online) Mean-field solutions of the phase diagrams for the PD with conformity
on the b-α plane (left) and for the SG with conformity on the r-α plane (right). For the PD, the
system can be in the dominant defection (D) or the bi-stability (C or D) regions. For the SG,
dominant cooperation (C ) and co-existence (C+D) are also possible outcomes. Darker colors
indicate more defection in the average. In the C or D region, colors indicate the size of the basin
of attraction for the cooperative equilibrium. In the C+D region, colors indicate the equilibrium
proportion of Cs.
model presented in the Supplementary Information of Ref. [41] to investigate the cultural evo-
lutionary dynamics of social dilemmas on graphs. The pair approximation of our model leads
to a system of ordinary differential equations tracking changes in the proportions pc,c, pc,d and
pd,d of, respectively, the C-C, C-D and D-D links in the population graph. The resulting system,
although impossible to solve analytically due to the nonlinearity of the equations, can be solved
numerically after specifying suitable initial conditions.
Figure C.3 shows the phase diagrams for the pair approximation of our model, for regular graphs
with degree k = 4 and k = 8. The figures were constructed by numerically integrating the equa-
tions under different initial proportions of Cs (ρ(0) = {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}) and averaging over all
initial conditions. Pure spatial effects can be seen when α = 0. For the PD, the dynamical
regime of the game is no longer of dominant defection, but of co-existence. Locality of interac-
tions thus favors Cs by allowing them to survive extinction. In addition to this classical result,
for k = 4 conformity is largely favorable to Cs. Indeed, augmenting α increases the proportion
of Cs in the co-existence region and, depending on the value of b, can shift the system to the
region of dominant cooperation. In the SG with k = 4 conformity has similar effects, resulting
in an analogous dynamic picture. The fact that the SG represents a less stringent dilemma
makes larger the area of dominant cooperation. For k = 8, phase diagrams get closer to those
predicted by the mean-field method (see Fig. C.2) but important levels of cooperation are still
sustained. In the PD, for instance, the basins of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium in the
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Figure C.3: (Color online) Pair approximations of the phase diagrams for the PD with conformity
on the b-α plane (top row) and the SG with conformity on the r-α plane (bottom row). The first
column shows the results for k = 4, the second column for k = 8. The system exhibits different
dynamical regimes depending on the game: dominant cooperation (C ), dominant defection
(D), coexistence (C+D), and bi-stability (C or D and C+D or C ). In the C+D or C region,
the system can stabilize in a mixed state or in pure cooperation. Darker colors indicate more
defection in the average.
bi-stability region are larger than those expected in a well-mixed population (compare the top
right panel of Fig. C.3 with the left panel of Fig. C.2).
In a nutshell, when the population of players possesses local structure, a given amount of confor-
mity in the imitation rules of the players is able to foster cooperation, at least for low values of
the mean degree k. The reason for this is the easier formation of clusters of individuals playing
the same strategy induced by conformist imitation.
C.4 Simulation Results
We now turn our attention to actual networks as population topologies, in particular (i) rings
(regular 1D-lattices with cyclic boundary conditions) with degrees k = 4, k = 8 and k = 16,
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and (ii) Baraba´si–Albert scale-free networks [3] with average degrees k¯ = 4, k¯ = 8, and k¯ = 16.
For both types of networks we generated graphs of size N = 104. In the case of rings, graphs
are constructed by arranging the nodes on a circle and connecting each node to the k most-
neighboring nodes.
We study the model by Monte Carlo simulations in populations randomly initialized with 50% Cs
and 50% Ds (but see Section C.4.3 for other initial conditions). The probability α of conformist
transmission was set to α ∈ [0, 0.5] in steps of 0.1. We privilege values of α ≤ 0.5 so that
dynamics are primarily driven by pay-off differences in the competing strategies. However, we
also study the limiting case α = 1 in Section C.4.4 and the case 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 in Section C.4.3.
The advantage of defectors b (PD) and the cost-to-benefit ratio r (SG) were varied in steps of
0.05. We carried out 50 runs for each couple of values of α and the game parameter. For the
scale-free networks, we used a fresh graph realization in each run. The average final frequency
of Cs ρˆ was obtained by averaging over 103 time steps after a relaxation time of 104 time steps.
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Figure C.4: (Color online) Final average frequency of Cs on rings with k = 4 for the PD (upper
panels) and the SG (lower panels) as a function of b or r for different values of the propensity to
conform α. Results by Monte Carlo simulations are shown in the right panels while predictions
by pair approximation are shown in the left panels. Mean-field approximations for the SG and
α = 0 are shown with dotted lines.
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Figure C.5: (Color online) Final average frequency of Cs on rings with k = 8 for the PD (upper
panels) and the SG (lower panels) as a function of b or r for different values of the propensity to
conform α. Results by Monte Carlo simulations are shown in the right panels while predictions
by pair approximation are shown in the left panels. Mean-field approximations for the SG and
α = 0 are shown with dotted lines.
C.4.1 Results for Rings
Figure C.4 summarizes the results obtained for the PD and the SG on rings with k = 4. These
plots confirm the results previously obtained for the standard α = 0 case on these population
topologies [101, 116], which in turn are qualitatively similar to those obtained for square lat-
tices [84, 41]. In the PD, Cs are able to survive for low values of b by forming clusters wherein
they interact more often with their own strategy than what is expected in well-mixed popula-
tions. Cs can thus benefit from mutual cooperation and counterbalance the exploitation of Ds
at the borders of the clusters [23]. In the SG, spatial structure hinders the evolution of coop-
eration [41], such that only for small values of r (i.e. r < 0.3) the final fraction of Cs is higher
than what is expected in a well-mixed population. As it is evident from our results, conformity
enhances cooperation in rings, moving rightward the critical value b∗ for which ρˆ = 0 in the
PD, and the value r∗ for which the ρˆ becomes smaller than the corresponding proportion in a
well-mixed population in the SG. Furthermore, the different curves are ordered in a way that
the higher α, the higher ρˆ for all values of b and r (except for the SG, r = 0.5, α = 0.1) and the
larger the critical values b∗ and r∗.
Figure C.5 plots the results for rings with k = 8. In the PD, conformity enhances cooperation
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even more pronouncedly than in the k = 4 case. Indeed, the threshold b∗ has moved rightward
for every value of α. Such trend is still present in the results obtained for rings with k = 16
(not shown here to avoid cluttering the figures). In the SG, the increase in the degree of the
graph makes conformity cooperation-enhancing up to a threshold value rˆ (where a curve with
α > 0 crosses the curve with α = 0) but detrimental afterwards. As b∗ in the PD, also rˆ moves
rightward as α increases.
With respect to simulation results, pair approximation tends to underestimate cooperation for
low values of α and b or r and to overestimate it for medium to large values of these parameters.
For the PD with conformity, results for k = 8 are rather pessimistic and are much closer to what
we have obtained for random graphs (data not shown here). This is not surprising since random
graphs are locally similar to Bethe lattices [14]. Notice, however, that pair approximation pre-
dicts reasonably well the cooperation-enhancing effects of conformity in the PD and the ordering
of the curves for different values of α. Also, for the SG, pair approximation accurately predicts
the fact that the curves with conformity (α > 0) are above the curve without conformity (α = 0)
when k = 4 (Fig. C.4, lower panels), but that they cross it when k = 8 (Fig. C.5, lower panels).
This means that pair approximation correctly predicts the fact that, for k = 8, there is a point
up to which conformity helps Cs but beyond which Ds are favored with respect to the standard
case without conformity.
C.4.2 Results for Scale-Free Graphs
Let us now turn our attention to the results obtained for scale-free networks (Fig. C.6). When
imitation is strictly pay-off biased (α = 0) these degree-heterogeneous graphs importantly foster
cooperation in both the PD and the SG with respect to what is obtained in rings and other
degree-homogeneous graphs [101]. As an aside, we note that the higher the average degree k¯,
the lower the gains in cooperation 1. The addition of conformity has important consequences
in the evolution of cooperation on scale-free graphs. In the PD, conformity improves ρˆ for all
values of b only for a scale-free topology with k¯ = 4 and α < 0.3. For the other cases, conformity
does not hamper cooperation for small values of b but is detrimental for medium to large values
of the game parameter. Furthermore, the threshold value bˆ above which ρˆ is higher than in
the case without conformity is a monotonically decreasing function of both α and k¯, such that
the higher the amount of conformity and the average connectivity of the graph, the smaller the
value of bˆ. Particularly, for scale-free networks with k¯ = 8 and α ≥ 0.2, conformity weakens the
advantage of these graphs in promoting cooperation to a point that ρˆ becomes comparable to
the corresponding fraction obtained in rings (compare the right upper panels of Fig. C.6 and
Fig. C.5).
Results for the SG on scale-free networks (lower panels of Fig. C.6) are qualitatively similar to
those obtained for the PD. Again, conformity is beneficial for cooperation for all values of the
game parameter r only for k¯ = 4 and α < 0.3. For the remaining cases, there is a threshold
1When comparing our results with those of [101], note that the curves are in the wrong order in [101] as
cooperation should decrease with increasing mean degree for scale-free networks.
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Figure C.6: (Color online) Final average frequency of Cs on scale-free networks for the PD
(upper panels) and the SG (lower panels) as a function of b (PD) or r (SG) for different values
of the propensity to conform α. Results are shown for k¯ = 4 (left panels) and k¯ = 8 (right
panels). Mean-field approximations for the SG and α = 0 are shown with dotted lines.
value rˆ of the cost-to-benefit ratio above which ρˆ is smaller than the corresponding frequency
of Cs in the α = 0 case. We note again the fact that the higher the value of α, the lower the
value of rˆ. Finally, and as in the PD, for k¯ = 8 and α ≥ 0.2 there are no important quantitative
differences in ρˆ between rings and scale-free networks: scale-free networks have again lost the
cooperation-enhancing capabilities they feature when imitation is strictly pay-off biased. For
k¯ = 8 and high values of r, the addition of conformity can even make Cs go extinct, which would
not happen in the non-conformist case.
C.4.3 Dependence on the initial conditions
In order to investigate the robustness of cooperation and to study the influence of the initial
fraction of Cs ρ(0) we have also run simulations for the PD on rings and scale-free graphs for
k¯ = 8 starting from values of ρ(0) other than 0.5, and on an extended range of values of α
going from 0 to 1. Results are shown in Fig. C.7 in the form of phase diagrams for each initial
condition. In contrast to the notion of bi-stability in a system of ordinary differential equations
(such as those resulting from the mean-field approach and the pair approximation), here we
define bi-stability as the ability of the system to reach either full cooperation or full defection
starting from the same global initial conditions, due to its stochastic dynamics and finite size.
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Figure C.7: (Color online) Phase diagrams for the PD game on rings with k = 8 (top row) and
for scale-free graphs with k¯ = 8 (bottom row) as a function of b and α. The images are for
increasing initial fractions of cooperation ρ(0) from left to right.
Not unexpectedly, initial conditions influence the final outcomes of the simulations, so that the
strategy initially in the majority is always favored with respect to the case when ρ(0) = 0.5.
Notice, however, that the effects of conformity are still qualitatively different for each of the two
types of networks considered in this study. On these phase diagrams the transition from the
region of dominant cooperation (C ) to dominant defection (D) is steeper on rings, where the
two zones with monomorphic populations are divided by a narrow region of co-existence (C+D).
On scale-free networks a large region of bi-stability (C or D) tends to be formed in the middle of
the parameter’s space, being the largest for ρ(0) close to 50%. Indeed, the cultural evolutionary
dynamics are much more sensitive to the initial conditions when applied on top of scale-free
networks than when they are played on top of rings. For rings, conformity favor Cs even if
they are initially in the minority, such that, in general, the higher the value of α the higher the
final fraction of Cs in the population. For scale-free networks, conformity can be favorable to
cooperation when Cs are initially in the majority, but decidedly detrimental if they are in the
minority. The remarkable observation is that in scale-free networks even a small change in the
initial fraction of Cs can drastically change the final outcome (see the second and fourth images
in the lower row of Fig. C.7 for ρ(0) = 0.45 and ρ(0) = 0.55). It would be tempting to compare
the numerical results for scale-free graphs with those obtained analytically in the mean-field case
and with the pair approximation (Figs. C.2 and C.3). However, this cannot be done as both the
mean-field and pair approximation approaches give poor results in highly degree-inhomogeneous
networks.
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Figure C.8: (Color online) Final population composition as a function of the average degree k¯
and the initial proportion of cooperators when imitation is purely conformist (α = 1).
C.4.4 Pure conformist dynamics
We briefly comment on the case with α = 1 which is special as the dynamics is completely
driven by the majority rule and games’ payoffs play no role. Figure C.8 shows what happens in
this case as a function of the network’s average degree k¯ and the initial proportion of Cs. For
k¯ = 2 there is a large co-existence region for both graphs, and the pure equilibria have relatively
small basins of attraction. With increasing k¯, the co-existence region decreases so that a greater
connectivity favors fixation in a monomorphic population. Whereas in rings co-existence is still
reached for k¯ as large as 12, for scale-free networks such regime disappears for k¯ > 5. For these
networks, only in the narrow central strip around ρ(0) = 0.5 may bi-stability arise. Note that
in this case the C and D labels indicating cooperators or defectors are purely conventional as
payoffs (and so, the behavioral strategies of the individuals) are completely ignored.
C.5 Discussion
Conformity and network reciprocity are able to act together and foster cooperation in degree-
homogeneous graphs for social dilemmas such as the PD and the SG. The basic principle behind
network reciprocity is the formation of clusters of related individuals leading to assortative
interactions that favor Cs. Conformity further helps such cluster formation thus improving the
efficiency of cooperative behavior in a network of interacting individuals.
More interestingly, conformity may hinder the evolution of cooperation on the otherwise co-
operation-promoting scale-free networks. The different dynamical organization of cooperation
in degree-heterogeneous graphs with conformity can explain the reason of such phenomenon.
When individuals imitate exclusively according to a pay-off bias, Cs and Ds coexist in quasi-
equilibrium, with some nodes fixed in cooperative or defective behavior and others where there is
no fixation and cycles of invasion follow indefinitely [32]. Thus, the gradual drop in cooperation
seen in Fig. C.6 for the case α = 0 is mostly due to fluctuating individuals spending less and
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Figure C.9: (Color online) Evolution of the frequency of Cs on scale-free networks (k¯ = 8) during
the first 500 time steps for the PD, without conformity (upper panel) and with conformity (lower
panel). In both figures, b = 1.35. 20 distinct curves are shown.
less time engaging in cooperative behavior. This dynamical picture changes when individuals
imitate not only according to a pay-off bias, but also to conformity. In this case, for k¯ = 8, the
population always reaches one of the two absorbing states, so that in the limit only one strategy
gets fixed: Cs for low values of b, Cs or Ds (with a certain probability) for intermediate values of
b, and Ds for large values of b (see also the bottom row of Fig. C.7). In general, and contrary to
what happens without conformity, intermediate levels of cooperation for α > 0 (when averaging
over several runs) are not the result of the co-existence or fluctuation of different strategies but of
the fact that, for an interval of values of b, whose length increases with α, the system sometimes
converges to the cooperative equilibrium and some others to the defective equilibrium (see
Fig. C.7 bottom row, central image). Additionally, evolutionary dynamics develop much faster
in the presence of conformity. Figure C.9 illustrates these observations for the case of scale-free
networks with k¯ = 8 and b = 1.35. Without conformity (upper panel of Fig. C.9) the fraction
of Cs for each run slowly increases during the initial part of the simulation until, eventually, it
stabilizes around 0.9. Conversely, with conformity (lower panel of Fig. C.9), very early in the
evolutionary process the population goes either to full cooperation or to full defection.
We can gain an insight into the interplay between network reciprocity and conformity by making
use of the notion of the temperature of players [55, 62]. Hot players are those who play more
since they have a large number of neighbors, whereas cold players are those who have few
neighbors and, consequently, play less games. By playing more often, and provided that pay-offs
are positively biased (i.e. S ≥ 0 in the PD), hot players get higher accumulated payoffs than
cold players. Under pure pay-off biased imitation (α = 0) this implies that hot players are also
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Figure C.10: (Color online) Evolution of cooperation around the most connected hub of a scale-
free network with k¯ = 8. The game is a rescaled PD with b = 1.35 for α = 0 (upper panel) and
α = 0.1 (lower panel). The fraction of C neighbors is shown in solid lines and the strategy of the
hub in dashed lines (D corresponds to 0; C to 1). As a reference, the level of 50% cooperation
is depicted in dotted lines. The most connected hub is initially set to D (upper panel) or to C
(lower panel). The rest of the population is initialized to around 50% Cs.
more successful in being imitated and in disseminating their strategies [62].
Both Cs and Ds do better when they are surrounded by Cs. By spreading defective behavior,
hot Ds become less and less successful, since the number of their C neighbors decreases. Hot
Cs, on the contrary, see their pay-off increased by spreading their own strategy. The more hot
Cs are imitated the more they earn and the more difficult it is for a surrounding D to invade. A
typical example of such “hub dynamics” is illustrated in Fig. C.10 (upper panel) for the most
connected hub of a scale-free network. The hub is D at the beginning of the simulation, while the
rest of the population is initialized to around 50% Cs. Many C neighbors imitate the defective
hub (or other surrounding Ds) during the first steps of simulation, so that the proportion of
C neighbors is reduced to approximately 30%. As a consequence, the total pay-off of the hub
is reduced, and the hub becomes vulnerable to invasion from a neighboring C. When the hub
becomes a C, more and more of its D neighbors also switch their strategies. Consequently, the
proportion of C neighbors (and the total pay-off to the hub) increases and is maintained at a high
level afterwards. The presence of such positive feedback mechanism, and the fact that it only
works for Cs, greatly enhances cooperation in degree-heterogeneous graphs and, particularly, in
scale-free networks [100].
The introduction of conformity decreases the bias in the flow of information in degree-hetero-
geneous graphs, making hubs vulnerable to invasion from their cold neighbors. While hubs
are unlikely to imitate their low connected neighbors when using a pay-off biased rule, nothing
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prevents them from imitating a cold surrounding player if it holds the strategy of the local
majority (see Fig. C.1(d)). Since the fraction of Cs generally decreases at the outset of the
simulation (see the first time steps of the curves shown in Fig. C.9), conformity further favors
Ds, which become predominant in the population. An example of this dynamics is shown
in Fig. C.10 (lower panel). Initially, the hub is a C. Many of the hub’s neighbors turn to
defection during the first time steps, making cooperation the less common strategy in the hub’s
neighborhood. Around the 100th time step, the hub imitates by conformity one of its defector
neighbors, leading to a quicker decrease in the proportion of Cs in its neighborhood. Shortly
after, Cs completely vanish around the most connected hub. During those first time steps,
hubs imitating according to a conformist bias will have many chances of becoming Ds. When
Cs are not initially in the large majority, such initial asymmetry in the strategies of the hubs
can account for the negative effects of conformity in the evolution of cooperation in scale-free
networks. Conformity partly reverses the flow of information on degree-heterogeneous networks
so that hubs no longer conduct the dynamics and instead quickly conform to the general trend
of the whole population.
C.6 Conclusions
To sum up, we have investigated the effects of conformity in the evolution of cooperation on
regular one-dimensional lattices (rings) and scale-free networks. This was done by proposing
an updating rule that is a stochastic average of the traditional local replicator dynamics, which
models pay-off biased imitation, and a conformist biased rule of transmission favoring the most
common variants around focal individuals. We explored rings and scale-free networks with dif-
ferent average degrees, as well as different values of the propensity to conform α. Two games
representing social dilemmas were studied: the rescaled versions of the PD, and the SG. In
addition to Monte Carlo simulations, we also used an extended pair-dynamics model to predict
the average fraction of cooperators in equilibrium, and compare them with the results obtained
from our simulations.
The results presented in this paper show that whether conformity strengthens or weakens the
evolution of cooperation depends on the intrinsic characteristics of the underlying graph. In
the PD, conformity favors cooperation on rings by allowing clusters of Cs forming more easily.
Conversely, it can hinder cooperation in scale-free networks for medium to large values of b,
due to the exposure of hubs to the opinions of the local majority in their neighborhoods. In
particular, and already for small amounts of conformity in the imitation rules of the players,
scale-free networks do not show the great improvement over regular structures that has been
previously reported in the literature. In the SG, conformity fosters cooperation on rings in the
case k = 4 for all values of the cost-to-benefit ratio r, and for low to medium values of r in the
case k = 8. In scale-free networks, conformity is rather detrimental for large values of r. Thus,
for both the PD and the SG, conformity often hinders the evolution of cooperation on scale-free
networks for the cultural evolutionary dynamics described in this paper.
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It is worth pointing out that other factors dismissing the advantage of scale-free networks in
the evolution of cooperation have been identified, such as participation costs [62], other positive
affine transformations of the pay-off matrix [118, 61], and the use of average instead of accu-
mulated pay-offs [102]. While these factors are extrinsic to the imitation rules of the agents,
conformity is a simple mechanism undoubtedly present in our social learning psychology and
central to better understand cultural dynamics and the way cooperation evolves on real social
networks.
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C.7 Appendix: Pair approximation
An analytical approximation of the dynamics of evolutionary games on graphs can be obtained
by means of pair approximation [63, 121]. For detailed surveys of this technique, and its ap-
plications to games on graphs, we refer the interested reader to Refs. [41, 42, 112]. We limit
ourselves to briefly introduce the pair approximation and to explain how we have extended it
for taking into account conformity in the imitation rules of the players.
Pair approximation is a method for constructing a system of ordinary differential equations
for the global frequencies of strategies by tracking the changes in the frequencies of strategy
pairs. In our case, we are interested in determining the global frequency ρ of Cs by tracking
the fluctuations in pc,c, pc,d, pd,c and pd,d, where ps,s′ is the probability of having an individual
playing strategy s connected to an individual playing strategy s′. For pair approximation to be
consistent with the mean-field approach, it is assumed that ps =
∑
s′ ps,s′ . Furthermore, and
in order to “close” the set of equations, configurations of triplets and more complicated con-
figurations are approximated by the configuration probabilities of strategy pairs. For example,
the configuration probability of the triplet s, s′, s′′ is approximated by ps,s′,s′′ = ps,s′ps′,s′′/ps′ .
It is important to note that pair approximation (i) requires regular graphs and (ii) corrections
arising from loops are ignored. Finally, note that the predictions of the pair approximation for
any two regular graphs with the same degree k are exactly the same. This allows us to compare
our results to those of [41] when α = 0.
Let us consider individuals sitting on the vertices of a graph of degree k. Whenever a randomly
chosen site A updates its strategy, a random neighbor B is selected as A’s cultural model. Com-
mon neighbors of any pair of vertices are considered to be independent by pair approximation
(i.e. loops are neglected). Thus, let us denote by a1, . . . , ak−1 (resp. b1, . . . , bk−1) the k − 1 the
neighbors of A (resp. B) other than B (resp. A). The probability of a generic configuration
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Figure C.11: A generic configuration for pair approximation. A is the focal individual, B is
A’s cultural model, a1, a2, . . . , ak−1 are A’s neighbors other than B, and a1, a2, . . . , ak−1 are B’s
neighbors other than A. A and B are assumed to have no common neighbors, i.e. triangles and
loops are neglected.
(see Fig. C.11) is given by:
pA,B
∏k−1
i=1 pai,Apbi,B
pk−1A p
k−1
B
.
The probability that the pair A,B becomes B,B is calculated by multiplying the transition
probability σA→B by the configuration probability and summing over all possible configurations,
so that:
pA,B→B.B =
∑
a1,...,ak−1
∑
b1,...,bk−1
σA→B × pA,B
∏k−1
i=1 pai,Apbi,B
pk−1A p
k−1
B
.
In our model, the transition probability σA→B depends not only on the payoffs of A and B
but also on α (the probability to imitate according to a conformist bias) and on the number of
players among a1, . . . , ak−1 playing the same strategy of A and B. The transition probability is
given by:
σA→B = (1− α)f
(
ΠB(b1, . . . , bk−1)−ΠA(a1, . . . , ak−1)
kθ
)
+
αf
(
nB(a1, . . . , ak−1, B)− nA(a1, . . . , ak−1, B)
k
)
,
where ΠB(x1, . . . , xk−1), ΠA(x1, . . . , xk−1) denote the payoffs ofB (A) interacting with x1, . . . , xk−1
plus A (B), and nB(a1, . . . , ak−1, B), nA(a1, . . . , ak−1, B) specify the number of players with
strategy B (A) among a1, . . . , ak−1 and B. The definitions of the parameter θ and the function
f are given in Section C.2.
WheneverA imitatesB, the pair configuration probabilities change so that pB,B, pB,ai , . . . , pB,ak−1
increase, while pA,B, pA,ai , . . . , pA,ak−1 decrease. All these changes lead to a set of ordinary dif-
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ferential equations governing the dynamics of the system:
p˙c,c =
∑
a1,...,ak−1
(nc(a1, . . . , ak−1) + 1)
k−1∏
i=1
pd,ai
∑
b1,...,bk−1
k−1∏
j=1
pc,bj ×{
(1− α)f
(
Πc(b1, . . . , bk−1)−Πd(a1, . . . , ak−1)
kθ
)
+
αf
(
2nc(a1, . . . , ak−1) + 2− k
k
)}
−
∑
a1,...,ak−1
nc(a1, . . . , ak−1)
k−1∏
i=1
pc,ai
∑
b1,...,bk−1
k−1∏
j=1
pd,bj ×{
(1− α)f
(
Πd(b1, . . . , bk−1)−Πc(a1, . . . , ak−1)
kθ
)
+
αf
(
k − nc(a1, . . . , ak−1)
k
)}
p˙c,d =
∑
a1,...,ak−1
(
k
2
− 1− nc(a1, . . . , ak−1)
) k−1∏
i=1
pd,ai
∑
b1,...,bk−1
k−1∏
j=1
pc,bj ×{
(1− α)f
(
Πc(b1, . . . , bk−1)−Πd(a1, . . . , ak−1)
kθ
)
+
αf
(
2nc(a1, . . . , ak−1) + 2− k
k
)}
−
∑
a1,...,ak−1
(
k
2
− nc(a1, . . . , ak−1)
) k−1∏
i=1
pc,ai
∑
b1,...,bk−1
k−1∏
j=1
pd,bj ×{
(1− α)f
(
Πd(b1, . . . , bk−1)−Πc(a1, . . . , ak−1)
kθ
)
+
αf
(
k − nc(a1, . . . , ak−1)
k
)}
,
where nc(a1, . . . , ak−1) gives the number of Cs among a1, . . . , ak−1 and Πc(x1, . . . , xk−1), Πd(x1, . . . , xk−1)
denote the payoffs of a C (D) interacting with x1, . . . , xk−1 plus a D (C). Because of the symmetry
condition pc,d = pd,c and the constraint pc,c+pc,d+pd,c+pd,d = 1 these two differential equations
are sufficient to describe the system. Note that whenever α = 0 the system of equations is equiv-
alent to that derived in the supplementary information of Ref. [41] and the appendix of Ref. [42].
Following those works, the above equations also omit the common factor 2pc,d/(ρ
k−1pk−1d ), which
has no influence in the equilibria of the system. The equilibrium values pˆc,c, pˆc,d, were obtained
by numerically integrating the equations after specifying initial conditions for 1010 time steps.
In all cases, pc,c(0) = (ρ(0))
2, pc,d(0) = ρ(0)(1 − ρ(0)). The equilibrium frequency of Cs was
then approximated by pˆc = pˆc,c + pˆc,d.
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Abstract
Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in society and game theory is
one major way in which they can be investigated. Starting from the observation that individuals
in society interact through networks of acquaintances, we model the co-evolution of the agents’
strategies and of the social network itself using two prototypical games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and the Stag Hunt. Allowing agents to dismiss ties and establish new ones, we find that coop-
eration and coordination can be achieved through the self-organization of the social network, a
result that is non-trivial, especially in the Prisoner’s Dilemma case. The evolution and stabil-
ity of cooperation implies the condensation of agents exploiting particular game strategies into
strong and stable clusters which are more densely connected, even in the more difficult case of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
D.1 Introduction
In this paper we study the behavior of a population of agents playing some simple two-person,
one-shot non-cooperative game. Game theory [71] deals with social interactions where two or
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more individuals take decisions that will mutually influence each other. It is thus a view of
collective systems in which global social outcomes emerge as a result of the interaction of the
individual decisions made by each agent. Some extremely simple games lead to puzzles and
dilemmas that have a deep social meaning. The most widely known among these games is
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a universal metaphor for the tension that exists between social
welfare and individual selfishness. It stipulates that, in situations where individuals may either
cooperate or defect, they will rationally choose the latter. However, cooperation would be the
preferred outcome when global welfare is considered. Other simple games that give rise to social
dilemmas are the Hawk-Dove and the Stag-Hunt (SH) games.
In practice, however, cooperation and coordination on common objectives is often seen in
human and animal societies [6, 109]. Coordinated behavior, such as having both players coop-
erating in the SH, is a bit less problematic as this outcome, being a Nash equilibrium, is not
ruled out by theory. For the PD, in which cooperation is theoretically doomed between rational
agents, several mechanisms have been invoked to explain the emergence of cooperative behav-
ior. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have
often been mentioned [6]. Yet, the work of Nowak and May [84] showed that the simple fact
that players are arranged according to a spatial structure and only interact with neighbors is
sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously
and without repetition. Nowak and May’s study and much of the following work were based
on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids (see [86] for a recent review). Nevertheless,
many actual social networks usually have a topological structure that is neither regular nor
random but rather of the small-world type. Roughly speaking, small-world networks are graphs
in which any node is relatively close to any other node. In this sense, they are similar to random
graphs but unlike regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, they also have a
certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering
coefficient which essentially represents the probability that two neighbors of a given node are
themselves connected (an excellent review of the subject appears in [75]). Some work has been
done in recent years in the direction of using those more realistic kind of networks, including
actual social networks. In particular we mention Santos and Pacheco’s work on scale-free net-
works [101], work on Watts–Strogatz small-world graphs [1, 116], and on model and real social
networks [60]. A recent contribution focuses on repeated games and learning [125] and Szabo´
and Fa´th have published an excellent and very complete review of work done up to 2006 [112].
These investigations have convincingly shown that a realistic structure of the society, with inter-
actions mainly limited to neighbors in the network, is well sufficient in allowing cooperative and
coordinated behavior to emerge without making any particular assumption about the rationality
of the actors or their computational and forecasting capabilities.
Most of the above mentioned studies have assumed a fixed population size and structure,
which amounts to dealing with a closed system and ignoring any fluctuations in the system’s
size and internal interactions. However, real social networks, such as friendship or collaboration
networks, are not in an equilibrium state, but are open systems that continually evolve with
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new agents joining or leaving the network, and relationships (i.e. links in network terms) being
made or dismissed by agents already in the network [8, 54, 115]. Thus, the motivation of the
present work is to re-introduce these coupled dynamics into our model and to investigate under
which conditions, if any, cooperative and coordinated behavior may emerge and be stable. In
this paper, we shall deal with networked populations in which the number of players remains
constant but the interaction structure, i.e. who interacts with whom, does not stay fixed; on
the contrary, it changes in time and its variation is dictated by the very games that are being
played by the agents. A related goal of the present work is to study the topological structures
of the emergent networks and their relationships with the strategic choices of the agents.
Some previous work has been done on evolutionary games on dynamic networks [59, 103, 111,
131]. Skyrms and Pemantle [111] was recently brought to our attention by a reviewer. It is one
of the first important attempts to study the kind of networks that form under a given game
and, as such, is closely related to the work we describe here. The main ideas are similar to ours:
agents start interacting at random according to some game’s payoff matrix and, as they evolve
their game strategy according to their observed payoffs, they also have a chance of breaking
ties and forming new ones, thus giving rise to a social network. The main differences with
the present work is that the number of agents used is low, of the order of 10 instead of the
103 used here. This allows us to study the topological and statistical nature of the evolving
networks in a way that is not possible with a few agents, while Skyrms’ and Pemantle’s work
is more quantitative in the study of the effects of the stochastic dynamics on the strategy and
network evolution process. The work of Zimmermann and Egu´ıluz [131] is based on similar
considerations too. There is a rather large population which has initially a random structure.
Agents in the population play the one-shot two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game against each
other and change their strategy by copying the strategy of the more successful agent in their
neighborhood. They also have the possibility of dismissing interactions between defectors and
of rewiring them randomly in the population. The main differences with the present work are
the following. Instead of just considering symmetrical undirected links, we have a concept of
two directed, weighted links between pairs of agents. In our model there is a finite probability of
breaking any link, not only links between defectors, although defector-defector and cooperator-
defector links are much more likely to be dismissed than cooperator-cooperator links. When a
link is broken it is rewired randomly in [131] while we use a link redirection process which favors
neighbors with respect to more relationally distant agents. In [131] only the Prisoner’s Dilemma
is studied and using a reduced parameter space. We study both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
the Stag Hunt games covering a much larger parameter space. Concerning timing of events,
we use an asynchronous update policy for the agents’ strategies, while update is synchronous
in [131]. Finally, instead of a best-takes-over discrete rule, we use a smoother strategy update
rule which changes an agent’s strategy with a probability proportional to the payoffs difference.
Santos et al. [103] is a more recent paper also dealing with similar issues. However, they use
a different algorithm for severing an undirected link between two agents which, again, does
not include the concept of a link weight. Furthermore, the Stag Hunt game is only mentioned
Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks Enea Pestelacci
100
ARTICLE D. EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN A
DYNAMICALLY NETWORKED SOCIETY
in passing, and their strategy update rule is different. In particular, they do not analyze in
detail the statistical structure of the emerging networks, as we do here. Other differences with
the above mentioned related works will be described in the discussion and analysis of results.
Finally, our own previous work [59] also deals with the co-evolution of strategy and structure in
an initially random network. However, it is very different from the one presented here since we
used a semi-rational threshold decision rule for a family of games similar, but not identical to
the Prisoner’s Dilemma in [59]. Furthermore, the idea of a bidirectional weighted link between
agents was absent, and link rewiring was random.
This article is structured as follows. In sect. D.2, we give a brief description of the games
used in our study. This part is intended to make the article self-contained. In sect. D.3, we
present a detailed description of our model of co-evolving dynamical networks. In sect. D.4, we
present and discuss the simulation results and their significance for the social networks. Finally,
in sect. D.5, we give our conclusions and discuss possible extensions and future work.
D.2 Social Dilemmas
The two representative games studied here are the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the Stag-Hunt
(SH) of which we briefly summarize the significance and the main results. More detailed accounts
can be found elsewhere, for instance in [6, 109]. In their simplest form, they are two-person,
two-strategies, symmetric games with the following payoff bi-matrix:
C D
C (R,R) (S,T)
D (T,S) (P,P)
In this matrix, R stands for the reward the two players receive if they both cooperate (C), P is
the punishment for bilateral defection (D), and T is the temptation, i.e. the payoff that a player
receives if it defects, while the other cooperates. In this case, the cooperator gets the sucker’s
payoff S. In both games, the condition 2R > T + S is imposed so that mutual cooperation is
preferred over an equal probability of unilateral cooperation and defection. For the PD, the
payoff values are ordered numerically in the following way: T > R > P > S. Defection is always
the best rational individual choice in the PD; (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium (NE) and
also an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) [71, 128]. Mutual cooperation would be preferable
but it is a strongly dominated strategy.
In the SH, the ordering is R > T > P > S, which means that mutual cooperation (C,C) is the
best outcome, Pareto-superior, and a Nash equilibrium. However, there is a second equilibrium in
which both players defect (D,D) and which is somewhat “inferior” to the previous one, although
perfectly equivalent from a NE point of view. The (D,D) equilibrium is less satisfactory yet “risk-
dominant” since playing it “safe” by choosing strategy D guarantees at least a payoff of P, while
playing C might expose a player to a D response by her opponent, with the ensuing minimum
payoff S. Here the dilemma is represented by the fact that the socially preferable coordinated
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equilibrium (C,C) might be missed for “fear” that the other player will play D instead. There is
a third mixed-strategy NE in the game, but it is commonly dismissed because of its inefficiency
and also because it is not an ESS [128]. Although the PD has received much more attention in
the literature than the SH, the latter is also very useful, especially as a metaphor of coordinated
social behavior for mutual benefit. These aspects are nicely explained in [109].
D.3 Model Description
Our model is strictly local as no player uses information other than the one concerning the
player itself and the players it is directly connected to. In particular, each agent knows its own
current strategy and payoff, and the current strategies and payoffs of its immediate neighbors.
Moreover, as the model is an evolutionary one, no rationality, in the sense of game theory, is
needed [128]. Players just adapt their behavior such that they copy more successful strategies
in their environment with higher probability, a process commonly called imitation in the litera-
ture [46]. Furthermore, they are able to locally assess the worth of an interaction and possibly
dismiss a relationship that does not pay off enough. The model and its dynamics are described
in detail in the following sections.
D.3.1 Network and Interaction Structure
The network of agents will be represented as an undirected graph G(V,E), where the set of
vertices V represents the agents, while the set of edges (or links) E represents their symmetric
interactions. The population size N is the cardinality of V . A neighbor of an agent i is any
other agent j such that there is an edge {ij} ∈ E. The set of neighbors of i is called Vi and its
cardinality is the degree ki of vertex i ∈ V . The average degree of the network will be called k¯.
Although from the network structure point of view there is a single undirected link between a
player i and another player j ∈ Vi, we shall maintain two links: one going from i to j and another
one in the reverse direction (see fig. D.1). Each link has a weight or “force” fij (respectively
fji). This weight, say fij , represents in an indirect way an abstract quality that could be related
to the “trust” player i attributes to player j, it may take any value in [0, 1] and its variation is
dictated by the payoff earned by i in each encounter with j, as explained below.
fij
fji
ji
Figure D.1: Schematic representation of mutual trust between two agents through the strengths
of their links.
We point out that we do not believe that this model could represent, however roughly, a
situation of genetic relatedness in a human or animal society. In this case, at the very least, one
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should have at the outset that link strengths between close relatives should be higher than the
average forces in the whole network and such groups should form cliques of completely connected
agents. In contrast, we start our simulations from random relationships and a constant average
link strength (see below). Thus, our simplified model is closer to one in which relationships
between agents are only of socio-economic nature.
The idea behind the introduction of the forces fij is loosely inspired by the potentia-
tion/depotentiation of connections between neural networks, an effect known as the Hebb rule
[43]. In our context, it can be seen as a kind of “memory” of previous encounters. However, it
must be distinguished from the memory used in iterated games, in which players “remember” a
certain amount of previous moves and can thus conform their future strategy on the analysis of
those past encounters [71]. Our interactions are strictly one-shot, i.e. players “forget” the results
of previous rounds and cannot recognize previous partners and their possible playing patterns.
However, a certain amount of past history is implicitly contained in the numbers fij and this
information may be used by an agent when it will come to decide whether or not an interaction
should be dismissed (see below)1. This bilateral view of a relationship is, to our knowledge, new
in evolutionary game models on graphs.
We also define a quantity si called satisfaction of an agent i which is the sum of all the
weights of the links between i and its neighbors Vi divided by the total number of links ki:
si =
∑
j∈Vi fij
ki
.
We clearly have 0 ≤ si ≤ 1.
D.3.2 Initialization
The constant size of the network during the simulations is N = 1000. The initial graph is
generated randomly with a mean degree comprised between k¯ = 5 and k¯ = 20. These values of k¯
are of the order of those actually found in many social networks (see, for instance, [8, 54, 73, 117]).
Players are distributed uniformly at random over the graph vertices with 50% cooperators.
Forces between any pair of neighboring players are initialized at 0.5. With k¯ > 1 a random
graph finds itself past the percolation phase transition [15] and thus it has a giant connected
component of size O(N) while all the other components are of size O(log(N)). We do not
assure that the whole graph is connected, as isolated nodes will draw a random link during the
dynamics (see below).
Before starting the simulations, there is another parameter q that has to be set. This is akin
to a “temperature” or noise level; q is a real number in [0, 1] and it represents the frequency
with which an agent wishes to dismiss a link with one of its neighbors. The higher q, the faster
the link reorganization in the network. This parameter has a role analogous to the “plasticity”
1A further refinement of the concept could take obsolescence phenomena into account. For instance, in the
same way that pheromone trails laid down by ants evaporate with time, we could introduce a progressive loss of
strength of the links proportional to the time during which there is no interaction between the concerned agents.
For the sake of simplicity, we prefer to stick with the basic model in this work
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of [131] and it controls the speed at which topological changes occur in the network. As social
networks may structurally evolve at widely different speeds, depending on the kind of interaction
between agents, this factor might play a role in the model. For example, e-mail networks change
their structure at a faster pace than, say, scientific collaboration networks [54, 115]. A similar
coupling of time scales between strategy update and topological update also occurs in [111, 103].
D.3.3 Timing of Events
Usually, agents systems such as the present one, are updated synchronously, especially in evolu-
tionary game theory simulations [60, 84, 101, 131]. However, there are doubts about the physical
signification of simultaneous update [48]. For one thing, it is strictly speaking physically un-
feasible as it would require a global clock, while real extended systems in biology and society
in general have to take into account finite signal propagation speed. Furthermore, simultaneity
may cause some artificial effects in the dynamics which are not observed in real systems [48, 59].
Fully asynchronous update, i.e. updating a randomly chosen agent at a time with or without
replacement also seems a rather arbitrary extreme case that is not likely to represent reality
very accurately. In view of these considerations, we have chosen to update our population in a
partially synchronous manner. In practice, we define a fraction f = n/N (with N = an, a ∈ N)
and, at each simulated discrete time step, we update only n ≤ N agents randomly chosen with
replacement. This is called a microstep. After N/n microsteps, called a macrostep, N agents
will have been updated, i.e. the whole population will have been updated in the average. With
n = N we recover the fully synchronous update, while n = 1 gives the extreme case of the fully
asynchronous update. Varying f thus allows one to investigate the role of the update policy on
the dynamics. We study several different values of f , but we mainly focus on f = 0.01.
D.3.4 Strategy and Link Dynamics
Here we describe in detail how individual strategies, links, and link weights are updated. Once
a given node i is chosen to be activated, i.e. it belongs to the fraction f of nodes that are to be
updated in a given microstep, i goes through the following steps:
• if the degree of agent i, ki = 0 then player i is an isolated node. In this case a link with
strength 0.5 is created from i to a player j chosen uniformly at random among the other
N − 1 players in the network.
• otherwise,
– either agent i updates its strategy according to a local replicator dynamics rule with
probability 1−q or, with probability q, agent i may delete a link with a given neighbor
j and creates a new 0.5 force link with another node k ;
– the forces between i and its neighbors Vi are updated
Let us now describe each step in more detail.
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Strategy Evolution. We use a local version of replicator dynamics (RD) as described in [41]
and further modified in [60] to take into account the fact that the number of neighbors in a degree-
inhomogeneous network can be different for different agents. The local dynamics of a player i
only depends on its own strategy and on the strategies of the ki players in its neighborhood
Vi. Let us call piij the payoff player i receives when interacting with neighbor j. This payoff is
defined as
piij = σi(t) M σ
T
j (t),
where M is the payoff matrix of the game (see sect. D.2) and σi(t) and σj(t) are the strategies
played by i and j at time t. The quantity
Π̂i(t) =
∑
j∈Vi
piij(t)
is the accumulated payoff collected by player i at time step t. The rule according to which
agents update their strategies is the conventional RD in which strategies that do better than
the average increase their share in the population, while those that fare worse than average
decrease. To update the strategy of player i, another player j is drawn at random from the
neighborhood Vi. It is assumed that the probability of switching strategy is a function φ of the
payoff difference, where φ is a monotonically increasing function [46]. Strategy σi is replaced by
σj with probability
pi = φ(Π̂j − Π̂i).
The major differences with standard RD is that two-person encounters between players are only
possible among neighbors, instead of being drawn from the whole population, and the latter is
finite in our case. Other commonly used strategy update rules include imitating the best in the
neighborhood [84, 131], or replicating in proportion to the payoff [41, 116]. Although, these
rules are acceptable alternatives, they do not lead to replicator dynamics and will not be dealt
with here. We note also that the straight accumulated payoff Π̂i has a technical problem when
used on degree-inhomogeneous systems such as those studied here, where agents (i.e. nodes)
in the network may have different numbers of neighbors. In fact, in this case Π̂i does not
induce invariance of the RD with respect to affine transformations of the game’s payoff matrix
as it should [128], and makes the results depend on the particular payoff values. Thus, we
shall use a modified accumulated payoff Π instead as defined in [60]. This payoff, which is
the standard accumulated payoff corrected with a factor that takes into account the variable
number of neighbors an agent may have, does not suffer from the standard accumulated payoff
limitations.
Link Evolution. The active agent i, which has ki 6= 0 neighbors will, with probability q,
attempt to dismiss an interaction with one of its neighbors. This is done in the following way.
Player i will look at its satisfaction si. The higher si, the more satisfied the player, since a
high satisfaction is a consequence of successful strategic interactions with the neighbors. Thus,
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there should be a natural tendency to try to dismiss a link when si is low. This is simulated by
drawing a uniform pseudo-random number r ∈ [0, 1] and breaking a link when r ≥ si. Assuming
that the decision is taken to cut a link, which one, among the possible ki, should be chosen?
Our solution again relies on the strength of the relevant links. First a neighbor j is chosen with
probability proportional to 1 − fij , i.e. the stronger the link, the less likely it will be chosen.
This intuitively corresponds to i’s observation that it is preferable to dismiss an interaction with
a neighbor j that has contributed little to i’s payoff over several rounds of play. However, in
our system dismissing a link is not free: j may “object” to the decision. The intuitive idea is
that, in real social situations, it is seldom possible to take unilateral decisions: often there is a
cost associated, and we represent this hidden cost by a probability 1− (fij +fji)/2 with which j
may refuse to be cut away. In other words, the link is less likely to be deleted if j appreciates i,
i.e. when fji is high. A simpler solution would be to try to cut the weakest link, which is what
happens most of the time anyway. However, with a finite probability of cutting any link, our
model introduces a small amount of noise in the process which can be considered like “trembles”
or errors in game theory [71] and which roughly reproduces decisions under uncertainty in the
real world.
Assuming that the {ij} link is finally cut, how is a new link to be formed? The solution
adopted here is inspired by the observation that, in social networks, links are usually created
more easily between people who have a mutual acquaintance than those who do not. First, a
neighbor k is chosen in Vi \ {j} with probability proportional to fik, thus favoring neighbors
i trusts. Next, k in turn chooses player l in his neighborhood Vk using the same principle,
i.e. with probability proportional to fkl. If i and l are not connected, a link {il} is created,
otherwise the process is repeated in Vl. Again, if the selected node, say m, is not connected to
i, a new link {im} is established. If this also fails, a new link between i and a randomly chosen
node is created. In all cases the new link is initialized with a strength of 0.5 in both directions.
This rewiring process is schematically depicted in fig. D.2 for the case in which a link can be
successfully established between players i and l thanks to their mutual acquaintance k.
i
j
k
l
fik
fkl
fil
Figure D.2: Illustration of the rewiring of link {ij} to {il}. Agent k is chosen to introduce player
l to i (see text).
At this point, we would like to stress several important differences with previous work in
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which links can be dismissed in evolutionary games on networks [59, 103, 131]. In [131], only
links between defectors are allowed to be cut unilaterally and the study is restricted to the PD.
Instead, in our case, any link has a finite probability to be abandoned, even a profitable link
between cooperators if it is recent, although links that are more stable, i.e. have high strengths,
are less likely to be rewired. This smoother situation is made possible thanks to our bilateral
view of a link which is completely different from the undirected choice made in [131].
In [103], links can be cut by an unsatisfied player, where the concept of satisfaction is different
from ours, and simply means that a cooperator or a defector will wish to break a link with a
defector. The cut will be done with a certain probability that depends on the strategies of the
two agents involved and their respective payoffs. Once a link between i and j is actually cut
and, among the two players, i is the one selected to maintain the link, the link is rewired to a
random neighbor of j. If both i and j wish to cease their interaction, the link is attributed to i
or j probabilistically, as a function of the respective payoffs of i and j, and rewiring takes place
from there. Thus, although both i’s and j’s payoffs are taken into consideration in the latter
case, there is no analogous of our “negotiation” process as the concept of link strength is absent.
In [59] links are cut according to a threshold decision rule and are rewired randomly anywhere
in the network.
A final observation concerns the evolution of k¯ in the network. While in [103, 131] the initial
mean degree is strictly maintained during network evolution through the rewiring process, here
it may increase slightly owing to the existence of isolated agents which, when chosen to be
updated, will create a new link with another random agent. While this effect is of minor
importance and only causes small fluctuations of k¯, we point out that in real evolving networks
the mean connectivity fluctuates too [8, 54, 115].
Updating the Link Strengths. Once the chosen agents have gone through their strategy or
link update steps, the strengths of the links are updated accordingly in the following way:
fij(t+ 1) = fij(t) +
piij − p¯iij
ki(pimax − pimin) ,
where piij is the payoff of i when interacting with j, p¯iij is the payoff earned by i playing with j,
if j were to play his other strategy, and pimax (pimin) is the maximal (minimal) possible payoff
obtainable in a single interaction. This update is performed in both directions, i.e. both fij and
fji are updated ∀j ∈ Vi because both i and j get a payoff out of their encounter.
The following algorithms schematically describe the whole co-evolution process for one mi-
crostep:
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Algorithm 1: Simulation of a microstep of the population evolution
Data: V is a set of players; I is a subset of n randomly selected players in V ; Vi is the
set of first neighbors of player i; fij is the strength of the oriented arc {~ij}; r is a
pseudo-random number ∈ [0, 1)
forall the players i ∈ I do
foreach j ∈ Vi do
i plays with j and updates its payoff
fij(t+ 1) = fij(t) + ∆fij(t)
fji(t+ 1) = fji(t) + ∆fji(t)
end
if ki = 0 then
i is isolated and creates a new link to a randomly selected j ∈ V
else
if r < q then
Link Evolution(i)
else
Strategy Evolution(i)
end
end
end
Algorithm 2: Link Evolution(i)
Data: r1 and r2 are pseudo-random numbers ∈ [0, 1); si is the satisfaction of player i
if r1 > si then
j ∈ Vi selected proportionally to 1− fij
if r2 > (fij + fji)/2 then
remove the link {ij}
k ∈ Vi selected proportionally to fik
l ∈ Vk selected proportionally to fkl
if {il} link doesn’t exist then
create the link{il}
else
m ∈ Vl selected proportionally to flm
if {im} link doesn’t exist then
create the link{im}
else
i creates a new link to a randomly selected j ∈ V \ Vi
end
end
end
end
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Algorithm 3: Strategy Evolution(i)
Data: r is a pseudo-random number ∈ [0, 1); Πk is the aggregated payoff of player k; φ
is a monotonically increasing function
j ∈ Vi randomly selected
pi = φ(Πj −Πi)
if r > pi then
i imitate the strategy of j
end
D.4 Simulation Results
D.4.1 Simulation Parameters
We simulate on our networks the two games previously mentioned in sect. D.2. For each game, we
can explore the entire game space by limiting our study to the variation of only two parameters
per game. This is possible without loss of generality owing to the invariance of Nash equilibria
and replicator dynamics under positive affine transformations of the payoff matrix using our
payoff scheme [128]. In the case of the PD, we set R = 1 and S = 0, and vary 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and
0 ≤ P ≤ 1. For the SH, we decided to fix R = 1 and S = 0 and vary 0 ≤ T ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ P ≤ T .
The reason we choose to set T and S in both the PD and the SH is to simply provide natural
bounds on the values to explore of the remaining two parameters. In the PD case, P is limited
between R = 1 and S = 0 in order to respect the ordering of the payoffs (T > R > P > S)
and T ’s upper bound is equal to 2 due to the 2R > T + S constraint. Had we fixed R = 1 and
P = 0 instead, T could be as big as desired, provided S ≤ 0 is small enough. In the SH, setting
R = 1 and S = 0 determines the range of T and P (since this time R > T > P > S). Note
however, that for this game the only valid value pairs of (T, P ) are those that satisfy the T > P
constraint.
As stated in sect. D.3.2, we used networks of size N = 1000, randomly generated with an
average degree k¯ ∈ {5, 10, 20} and randomly initialized with 50% cooperators and 50% defectors.
In all cases, the parameters are varied between their two bounds in steps of 0.1. For each set of
values, we carry out 50 runs of at most 20000 macrosteps each, using a fresh graph realization
in each run. A run is stopped when all agents are using the same strategy, in order to be able
to measure statistics for the population and for the structural parameters of the graphs. The
system is considered to have reached a pseudo-equilibrium strategy state when the strategy
of the agents (C or D) does not change over 150 further macrosteps, which means 15 × 104
individual updates. We speak of pseudo-equilibria or steady states and not of true evolutionary
equilibria because, as we shall see below, the system never quite reaches a totally stable state in
the dynamical systems sense in our simulations but only transient states that persist for a long
time.
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D.4.2 Cooperation and Stability
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Figure D.3: Cooperation level for the PD in the game’s configuration space. Darker gray means
more defection.
Cooperation results for the PD in contour plot form are shown in fig. D.3. We remark that,
as observed in other structured populations, cooperation may thrive in a small but non-negligible
part of the parameter space. Thus, the added degree of freedom represented by the possibility
of refusing a partner and choosing a new one does indeed help to find player’s arrangements that
help cooperation. This finding is in line with the results of [103, 131]. Furthermore, the fact that
our artificial society model differs from the latter two in several important ways also shows that
the result is a rather robust one. When considering the dependence on the fluidity parameter
q, one sees in fig. D.3 that the higher q, the higher the cooperation level. This was expected
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since being able to break ties more often clearly gives cooperators more possibilities for finding
and keeping fellow cooperators to interact with. This effect has been previously observed also in
the works of [103, 131] and, as such, seems to be a robust finding, relatively independent of the
other details of the models. The third parameter considered in fig. D.3 is the mean degree k¯.
For a given value of q, cooperation becomes weaker as k¯ increases. We believe that, as far as k¯ is
concerned, a realistic average characterization of actual social networks is represented by k¯ = 10
(middle row in fig. D.3) as seen, for instance, in [8, 54, 73, 117]. Higher average degrees do exist,
but they are found either in web-based pseudo-social networks or in fairly special collaboration
networks like the particle physics community, where it is customary to include as coauthors tens
or even hundreds of authors [73]. Clearly, there is a limit to the number of real acquaintances a
given agent may manage with.
We have also performed many simulations starting from different proportions of randomly dis-
tributed cooperators and defectors to investigate the effect of this parameter on the evolution
of cooperation. In Fig. D.4 we show five different cases, the central image corresponding to the
50% situation. The images correspond to the lower left quarter of the right image in the middle
row of Fig. D.3 with k¯ = 10, q = 0.8, 1 < T < 1.5, and 0 < P < 0.5.
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Figure D.4: Cooperation level for the PD starting with different fractions of cooperators increas-
ing from 20% to 80% from left to right. Only the lower left quarter of the parameter space is
shown. Results are the average of 50 independent runs.
Compared with the level of cooperation observed in simulations in static networks, we can say
that results are consistently better for co-evolving networks. For example, the typical cases with
k¯ = 10 and q = 0.5, 0.8 show significantly more cooperation than what was found in model and
real social networks in previous work [60]. Even when there is a much lower rewiring frequency,
i.e. with q = 0.2, the cooperation levels are approximately as good as those observed in our
previous study in which exactly the same replicator dynamics scheme was used to update the
agents’ strategies and the networks were of comparable size. The reason for this behavior is to
be found in the added constraints imposed by the invariant network structure. The seemingly
contradictory fact that an even higher cooperation level may be reached in static scale-free
networks [101], is theoretically interesting but easily dismissed as those graphs are unlikely
models for social networks, which often show fat-tailed degree distribution functions but not
pure power-laws (see, for instance, [4, 73]). As a further indication of the latter, we shall see in
Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks Enea Pestelacci
D.4. SIMULATION RESULTS 111
sect. D.4.3 that, indeed, emerging networks do not have a power-law degree distribution.
From the point of view of the evolutionary dynamics, it is interesting to point out that
any given simulation run either ends up in full cooperation or full defection. When the full
cooperation state of the population is attained, there is no way to switch back to defection by
the intrinsic agent dynamics. In fact, all players are satisfied and have strong links with their
cooperating neighbors. Even though a small amount of noise may still be present when deciding
whether or not to rewire a link, since there are only cooperators around to imitate, there can
be no strategy change and only very little link rewiring. On the other hand, well before this
stable state is reached and there are still many defectors around, the system may experience
some random drift that may drive it to full defection. The converse may also happen, but when
the full defection state is reached, the situation is qualitatively different. In this case agents are
unsatisfied, they will often try to rewire their links. However, all the other players around being
also defectors, there will be constant changes of the local network structure. Thus the system
will find itself in a fluctuating state, but this matters little for the bulk statistical properties of
the population and of the network. To be assured that this is indeed the case, we have conducted
some very long runs with all-defect end states. Global statistics do not change, except that the
mean degree tends to increase slightly with time and the degree distribution function continues
to evolve (see sect. D.4.3).
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Figure D.5: Cooperation level for the SH game.
Cooperation percentages as a function of the payoff matrix parameters for the SH game are
shown in fig. D.5 for k¯ = 1 and q = 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8. Note that in this case only the upper
left triangle of the configuration space is meaningful (see sect. D.4.1). The SH is different from
the PD since there are two evolutionarily stable strategies which are therefore also NEs: one
population state in which everybody defects and the opposite one in which everybody cooperates
(see sect. D.2). Therefore, it is expected, and absolutely normal, that some runs will end up
with all defect, while others will witness the emergence of full cooperation. In contrast, in the
PD the only theoretically stable state is all-defect and cooperating states may emerge and be
stable only by exploiting the graph structure and creating more favorable neighborhoods by
breaking and forming ties. The value of the SH is in making manifest the tension that exists
between the socially desirable state of full cooperation and the socially inferior but less risky
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state of defection [109]. The final outcome of a given simulation run depends on the size of
the basin of attraction of either state, which is in turn a function of the relative values of the
payoff matrix entries. To appreciate the usefulness of making and breaking ties in this game we
can compare our results with what is prescribed by the standard RD solution. Referring to the
payoff table of sect. D.2, let’s assume that the column player plays C with probability α and D
with probability 1− α. In this case, the expected payoffs of the row player are:
Er[C] = αR+ (1− α)S
and
Er[D] = αT + (1− α)P
The row player is indifferent to the choice of α when Er[C] = Er[D]. Solving for α gives:
α =
P − S
R− S − T + P . (D.1)
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Figure D.6: Probabilities of cooperation for the mixed strategy NE as a function of the game’s
parameters for the Stag Hunt.
Since the game is symmetric, the result for the column player is the same and (αC, (1−α)D)
is a NE in mixed strategies. We have numerically solved the equation for all the sampled points
in the game’s parameter space, which gives the results shown in fig. D.6. Let us now use the
following payoff values in order to bring them within the explored game space (remember that
NEs are invariant w.r.t. such a transformation [128]):
C D
C (1, 1) (0, 2/3)
D (2/3, 0) (1/3, 1/3)
Substituting in(D.1) gives α = 1/2, i.e. the (unstable) polymorphic population should be
composed by about half cooperators and half defectors. Now, if one looks at fig. D.5 at the points
where P = 1/3 and T = 2/3, one can see that this is approximately the case for the first image,
within the limits of the approximations caused by the finite population size, the symmetry-
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breaking caused by the non-homogeneous graph structure, and the local nature of the RD. On
the other hand, in the middle image and, to a greater extent, in the rightmost image, this point
in the game space corresponds to pure cooperation. In other words, the non-homogeneity of the
network and an increased level of tie rewiring has allowed the cooperation basin to be enhanced
with respect to the theoretical predictions of standard RD. Skyrms and Pemantle found the
same qualitative result for very small populations of agents when both topology and strategy
updates are allowed [111]. It is reassuring that coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium
can still be achieved in large populations as seen here.
D.4.3 Structure of the Emerging Networks
In this section we present a statistical analysis of the global and local properties of the networks
that emerge when the pseudo-equilibrium states of the dynamics are attained. Let us start
by considering the evolution of the average degree k¯. Although there is nothing in our model
to prevent a change in the initial mean degree, the steady-state average connectivity tends to
increase only slightly. For example, in the PD with q = 0.8 and k¯init = 5 and k¯init = 10, the
average steady-state (ss) values are k¯ss ' 7 and k¯ss ' 10.5 respectively. Thus we see that,
without imposing a constant k¯ as in [103, 131], k¯ nonetheless tends to increase only slightly,
which nicely agrees with observations of real social networks [8, 54, 115]. There is a special case
when the steady-state is all-defect and the simulation is allowed to run for a very long time
(2× 104 macrosteps); in this case the link structure never really settles down, since players are
unsatisfied, and k¯ may reach a value of about 12 when starting with k¯ = 10 and q = 0.8.
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Figure D.7: Clustering coefficient level for the PD game. Lighter gray means more clustering.
Another important global network statistics is the average clustering coefficient C. The clus-
tering coefficient Ci of a node i is defined as Ci = 2Ei/ki(ki − 1), where Ei is the number of
edges in the neighborhood of i. Thus Ci measures the amount of “cliquishness” of the neighbor-
hood of node i and it characterizes the extent to which nodes adjacent to node i are connected
to each other. The clustering coefficient of the graph is simply the average over all nodes:
C = 1N
∑N
i=1 Ci [75]. Random graphs are locally homogeneous and for them C is simply equal
to the probability of having an edge between any pair of nodes independently. In contrast, real
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networks have local structures and thus higher values of C. Fig. D.7 gives the average clustering
coefficient C¯ = 150
∑50
i=1 C for each sampled point in the PD configuration space, where 50 is
the number of network realizations used for each simulation. It is apparent that the networks
self-organize and acquire local structure in the interesting, cooperative parts of the parameter’s
space, since the clustering coefficients there are higher than that of the random graph with the
same number of edges and nodes, which is k¯/N = 10/1000 = 0.01. Conversely, where defection
predominates C is smaller, witnessing of a lower amount of graph local restructuring. These
impressions are confirmed by the study of the degree distribution functions (see below). The
correlation between clustering and cooperation also holds through increasing values of q: C tends
to increase from left to right in fig. D.7, a trend similar to that observed in the middle row of
fig. D.3 for cooperation. This correlation is maintained also for k¯ = 5 and k¯ = 20 (not shown).
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Figure D.8: Clustering coefficient level for the SH game.
As far as the clustering coefficient is concerned, the same qualitative phenomenon is ob-
served for the SH namely, the graph develops local structures and the more so the higher the
value of q for a given k¯ (see fig. D.8). Thus, it seems that evolution towards cooperation and
coordination passes through a rearrangement of the neighborhood of the agents with respect to
the homogeneous random initial situation, something that is made possible through the higher
probability given to neighbors when rewiring a link, a stylized manifestation of the commonly
occurring social choice of partners.
The degree distribution function (DDF) p(k) of a of a graph represents the probability that a
randomly chosen node has degree k [75]. Random graphs are characterized by DDF of Poissonian
form, while social and technological real networks often show long tails to the right, i.e. there are
nodes that have an unusually large number of neighbors [75]. In some extreme cases the DDF
has a power-law form p(k) ∝ k−γ ; the tail is particularly extended and there is no characteristic
degree. The cumulative degree distribution function (CDDF) is just the probability that the
degree is greater than or equal to k and has the advantage of being less noisy for high degrees.
Fig. D.9 (a) shows the CDDFs for the PD for three cases of which two are in the cooperative
region and the third falls in the defecting region (see fig. D.3). The dotted curve refers to a region
of the configuration space in which there is cooperation in the average but it is more difficult
to reach, as the temptation parameter is high (T=1.8,P=0.1). The curve has a rather long tail
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Figure D.9: Cumulative degree distributions. Average values over 50 runs. (a): PD, (b): SH.
q = 0.8, k¯ = 10. Linear-log scales.
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Figure D.10: Cumulative degree distributions for the PD in case of defection before (dotted line)
and after (thick line) reaching a steady-state. Linear-log scales.
and is thus broad-scale in the sense that there is no typical degree for the agents. Therefore,
in the corresponding network there are cooperators that are linked to many other cooperators.
On the other hand, if one considers the dotted-dashed curve, which corresponds to a defecting
region (T=1.1,P=0.4), it is clear that the distribution is much closer to normal, with a well-
defined typical value of the degree. Finally, the third thick curve, which corresponds to a region
where cooperation is more easily attained (T=1.1,P=0.1), also shows a rather faster decay of
the tail than the dotted line and a narrower scale for the degree. Nevertheless, it is right-skewed,
indicating that the network is no longer a pure random graph. Since we use linear-log scales, the
dotted curve has an approximately exponential or slower decay, given that a pure exponential
would appear as a straight line in the plot. The tail of the thick curve decays faster than an
exponential, while the dashed-dotted curve decays even faster. Almost the same observations
also apply to the SH case, shown in fig. D.9 (b). These are quite typical behaviors and we can
conclude that, when cooperation is more difficult to reach, agents must better exploit the link-
redirection degree of freedom in order for cooperators to stick together in sufficient quantities
and protect themselves from exploiting defectors during the co-evolution. When the situation
is either more favorable for cooperation, or defection easily prevails, network rearrangement is
less radical. In the limit of long simulation times, the defection case leads to networks that have
degree distribution close to Poissonian and are thus almost random. Fig. D.10 shows such a case
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for the PD. The dashed curve is the CDDF at some intermediate time, when full defection has
just been reached but the network is still strongly reorganizing itself. Clearly, the distribution
has a long tail. However, if the simulation is continued until the topology is quite stable at the
mesoscopic level, the distribution becomes close to normal (thick curve).
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k)
PD 0.1 1.2 q=0.2
PD 0.1 1.2 q=0.5
PD 0.1 1.2 q=0.8
Figure D.11: Cumulative degree distribution functions for three values of q, for the same point
in the PD configuration space in the cooperating region.
Finally, it is interesting to observe the influence of the q parameter on the shape of the
degree distribution functions for cooperating networks. Fig. D.11 reports average curves for
three values of q. For high q, the cooperating steady-state is reached faster, which gives the
network less time to rearrange its links. For lower values of q the distributions become broader,
despite the fact that rewiring occurs less often, because cooperation in this region is harder to
attain and more simulation time is needed.
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Figure D.12: Cooperation levels in the PD for P = 0.1 and 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 as a function of the
synchronicity parameter f .
Influence of Timing. Fig. D.12 depicts a particular cut in the configuration space as a
function of the synchronicity parameter f . The main remark is that asynchronous updates
give similar results, in spite of the difference in the number of agents that are activated in a
single microstep. In contrast, fully synchronous update (f = 1) appears to lead to a slightly
less favorable situation for cooperation. Since fully synchronous update is physically unrealistic
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and can give spurious results due to symmetry, we suggest using fully or partially asynchronous
update for agent’s simulation of artificial societies.
D.4.4 Clusters
We have seen in the previous section that, when cooperation is attained in both games as a
quasi-equilibrium state, the system remains stable through the formation of clusters of players
using the same strategy. In fig. D.13 one such typical cluster corresponding to a situation in
which global cooperation has been reached in the PD is shown. Although all links towards the
“exterior” have been suppressed for clarity, one can clearly see that the central cooperator is
a highly connected node and there are many links also between the other neighbors. Such a
tightly packed structure has emerged to protect cooperators from defectors that, at earlier times,
were trying to link to cooperators to exploit them. These observations explain why the degree
distributions are long-tailed (see previous section), and also the higher values of the clustering
coefficient in this case (see sect. D.4.3).
Figure D.13: Example of a tightly packed cluster of cooperators for PD networks. T = 1.8, P =
0.1 and q = 0.8.
When the history of the stochastic process is such that defection prevails in the end, the
situation is totally different. Fig. D.14 (a) and (b) show two typical examples of cluster structures
found during a simulation. Fig. D.14 (a) refers to a stage in which the society is composed solely
by defectors. However, the forces of the links between them are low, and so many defectors try
to dismiss some of their links. This situation lasts for a long simulated time (actually, the system
is never at rest, as far as the links are concerned) but the dense clusters tend to dissolve, giving
rise to structures such as the one shown in fig. D.14 (b). If one looks at the degree distribution at
this stage (fig. D.10) it is easy to see that the whole population graph tends to become random.
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(a) (b)
Figure D.14: Example of defector clusters for PD networks, for T = 1.8, P = 0.3 and q = 0.8.
Clusters like (a) exists only just after the all-defect state is reached. When a steady-state is
reached only clusters like (b) are present in a network of defectors.
The SH case is very similar, which is a relatively surprising result. In fact, when coopera-
tion finally takes over in regions of the configuration space where defection would have been an
almost equally, likely final state, players are highly clustered and there are many highly con-
nected individuals, while in less conflicting situations the clusters are less dense and the degree
distribution shows a faster decay of the tail. On the other hand, when defection is the final
quasi-stable state, the population graphs looses a large part of its structure. Thus, the same
topological mechanisms seem to be responsible for the emergence of cooperation in the PD and
in the SH. The only previous study that investigates the structure of the resulting networks in a
dynamical setting is, to our knowledge, reference [131], where only the PD is studied. It is diffi-
cult to meaningfully compare our results with theirs as the model of Zimmermann et al. differs
from ours in many ways. They use a deterministic hard-limit rule for strategy update which is
less smooth than our stochastic local replicator dynamics. Moreover, they study the PD in a
reduced configuration space, only links between defectors can be broken, and links are rewired at
random. They concentrate on the study of the stability of the cooperating steady-states against
perturbations, but do not describe the topological structures of the pseudo-equilibrium states in
detail. Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that the degree distribution functions for cooperators
and defectors follow qualitatively the same trend, i.e. cooperators networks have distributions
with fatter tails to the right than defector networks.
D.5 Conclusions and Future Work
Using two well known games that represent conflicting decision situations commonly found in
animal and human societies, we have studied by computer simulation the role of the dynami-
cally networked society’s structure in the establishment of global cooperative and coordinated
behaviors, which are desirable outcomes for the society’s welfare. Starting from randomly con-
nected players which only interact locally in a restricted neighborhood, and allowing agents to
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probabilistically and bilaterally dismiss unprofitable relations and create new ones, the stochas-
tic dynamics lead to pseudo-equilibria of either cooperating or defecting agents. With respect
to standard replicator dynamics results for mixing populations, we find that there is a sizable
configuration space region in which cooperation may emerge and be stable for the PD, whereas
the classical result predicts total defection. For the SH, where both all-cooperate and all-defect
steady-states are theoretically possible, we show that the basin of attraction for cooperation
is enhanced. Thus, the possibility of dismissing a relationship and creating a new one does
indeed increase the potential for cooperation and coordination in our artificial society. The self-
organizing mechanism consists in both games in forming dense clusters of cooperators which are
more difficult to dissolve by exploiting defectors. While the beneficial effect of relational or geo-
graphical static population structures on cooperation was already known from previous studies,
here we have shown that more realistic dynamic social networks may also allow cooperation to
thrive. Future work will deal with the stability of the cooperating states against stronger pertur-
bations than merely the implicit noise of the stochastic dynamics. We also intend to study more
fully the structure of the emerging clusters and their relationships, and we plan to extend the
model to other important paradigmatic games such as Hawks-Doves and coordination games.
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Abstract
Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted ac-
cording to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the Hawks-Doves game
when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquain-
tances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather
strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks,
and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical im-
portance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard
theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always
exist at equilibrium.
E.1 Introduction and Previous Work
Game Theory [122] is the study of how social or economical agents take decisions in situations of
conflict. Some games such as the celebrated Prisoner’s Dilemma have a high metaphorical value
for society in spite of their simplicity and abstractness. Hawks-Doves, also known as Chicken,
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is one such socially significant game. Hawks-Doves is a two-person, symmetric game with the
generic payoff bi-matrix of Table E.1. In this matrix, D stands for the defecting strategy “hawk”,
C D
C (R,R) (S,T)
D (T,S) (P,P)
Table E.1: Payoff matrix for a symmetric two person game.
and C stands for the cooperating strategy “dove”. The “row” strategies correspond to player
1 and the “column” strategies to player 2. An entry of the table such as (T,S) means that if
player 1 chooses strategy D and player 2 chooses strategy C, then the payoff or utility to player
1 is T, while the payoff of player 2 is S. Metaphorically, a hawkish behavior means a strategy
of fighting, while a dove, when facing a confrontation, will always yield. R is the reward the
two players receive if they both cooperate, P is the punishment for bilateral defection, and T is
the temptation, i.e. the payoff that a player receives if it defects, while the other cooperates. In
this case, the cooperator gets the sucker’s payoff S. The game has a structure similar to that
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma [6]. However, the ordering of payoffs for the Prisoner’s Dilemma is
T > R > P > S rendering defection the best rational individual choice, while in the Hawks-
Doves game studied here the ordering is T > R > S > P thus making mutual defection, i.e.
result (D,D), the worst possible outcome. Note that in game theory, as long as the above order-
ings are respected, the actual numerical payoff values do not change the nature and number of
equilibria [122].
In contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma which has a unique Nash equilibrium that corresponds
to both players defecting, the strategy pairs (C,D) and (D,C) are both Nash equilibria of the
Hawks-Doves game in pure strategies, and there is a third equilibrium in mixed strategies in
which strategy D is played with probability p, and strategy C with probability 1 − p, where
0 < p < 1 depends on the actual payoff values. We recall that a Nash equilibrium is a combina-
tion of strategies (pure or mixed) of the different players such that any unilateral deviation by
any agent from this combination can only decrease her expected payoff [122].
As it is the case for the Prisoner’s Dilemma (see for example [6, 57] for the iterated case, among
a vast literature), Hawks-Doves, for all its simplicity, appears to capture some important fea-
tures of social interactions. In this sense, it applies in many situations in which “parading”,
“retreating”, and “escalating” are common. One striking example of a situation that has been
thought to lead to a Hawks-Doves dilemma is the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 [94]. Territorial
threats at the border between nations are another case in point as well as bullying in teenage
gangs. Other well known applications are found in the animal kingdom during ritualized fights
[64].
In this article, we shall present our methods and results in the framework of evolutionary game
theory [46]. In evolutionary game theory a very large mixing population of players is considered,
and randomly chosen pairs of individuals play a sequence of one-shot two-person games. In the
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Hawks-Doves game, the theory prescribes that the only Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) of
the population is the mixed strategy, giving rise, at equilibrium, to a polymorphic population
composed of hawks and doves in which the frequency of hawks equals p, the probability with
which strategy hawk would be played in the NE mixed strategy.
In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, one finds a unique ESS with all the individuals defecting.
However, Nowak and May [84] showed that cooperation in the population is sustainable under
certain conditions, provided that the network of the interactions between players has a lattice
spatial structure. Killingback and Doebeli [52] extended the spatial approach to the Hawks-
Doves game and found that a planar lattice structure with only nearest-neighbor interactions
may favor cooperation, i.e. the fraction of doves in the population is often higher than what is
predicted by evolutionary game theory. In a more recent work however, Hauert and Doebeli [41]
were led to a different conclusion, namely that spatial structure does not seem to favor cooper-
ation in the Hawks-Doves game.
Further studies extended the structured population approach to other graph structures repre-
senting small worlds (for an excellent review, see [112]). Small-world networks are produced
by randomly rewiring a few links in an otherwise regular lattice such as a ring or a grid [127].
These “shortcuts”, as they are called, give rise to graphs that have short path lengths between
any two nodes in the average as in random graphs, but in contrast to the latter, also have a
great deal of local structure as conventionally measured by the clustering coefficient1. These
structures are much more typical of the networks that have been analyzed in technology, society,
and biology than regular lattices or random graphs [75]. In [116] it was found that cooperation
in Hawks-Doves may be either enhanced or inhibited in small-world networks depending on the
gain-to-cost ratio r = R/(R− P ), and on the strategy update rule using standard local evo-
lutionary dynamics with one-shot bilateral encounters. However, Watts–Strogatz small-world
networks, although more realistic than lattices or random graphs, are not good representations
of typical social networks. Santos and Pacheco [101] extended the study of the Hawks-Doves
game to scale-free networks, i.e. to networks having a power-law distribution of the connectivity
degree [75]. They found that cooperation is remarkably enhanced in them with respect to previ-
ously described population structures through the existence of highly connected cooperator hubs.
Scale-free networks are much closer than Watts–Strogatz ones to the typical socio-economic net-
works that have been investigated, but they are relatively uncommon in their “pure” form due
to finite cutoffs and other real-world effects (for example, see [75, 4, 73, 50]), with the notable
exception of sexual contact networks [56]. Using real and model static social networks, Luthi
et al. [60] also found that cooperation is enhanced in Hawks-Doves, although to a lesser degree
than in the scale-free case, thanks to the existence of tight clusters of cooperators that reinforce
each other.
Static networks resulting from the analysis of actual social networks or good models of the latter
1The clustering coefficient Ci of a node i is defined as Ci = 2Ei/ki(ki − 1), where Ei is the number of edges
in the neighborhood of i. Thus Ci measures the amount of “cliquishness” of the neighborhood of node i and it
characterizes the extent to which nodes adjacent to node i are connected to each other. The clustering coefficient
of the graph is simply the average over all nodes: C = 1
N
∑N
i=1 Ci [75].
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are a good starting point; however, the static approach ignores fluctuations and non-equilibrium
phenomena. As a matter of fact, in many real networks nodes may join the network forming
new links, and old nodes may leave it as social actors come and go. Furthermore, new links
between agents already in the network may also form or be dismissed. Often the speed of these
network changes is comparable to that of the agent’s behavioral adaptation, thus making it
necessary to study how they interact. Examples of slowly-changing social networks are scien-
tific collaborations, friendships, firm networks among others. A static network appears to be
a good approximation in these cases. On the other hand, in our Internet times, there exist
many social or pseudo-social networks in which topology changes are faster. For example, e-
mail networks [54], web-based networks for friendship and entertainment, such as Facebook, or
professional purposes such as LinkedIn, and many others. Furthermore, as it is not socially
credible that people will keep for a long time unsatisfying relationships, addition and dismissal
of partners are an extremely common phenomenon, also due to natural causes such as moving,
changing fields, or interests. We note at this point that some previous work has focused on the
possibility of allowing players to choose or refuse social partners in game interactions [10, 108],
which has been shown to potentially promote cooperation. However, this work does not consider
an explicit underlying interaction network of agents, nor does it use the social link strengths as
indicators of partner’s suitability as we do here.
In light of what has been said above, the motivation of the present work is to study the co-
evolution of strategy and network structure and to investigate under which conditions cooper-
ative behavior may emerge and be stable in the Hawks-Doves game. A related goal is to study
the topological structures of the emergent networks and their relationships with the strategic
choices of the agents. Some previous work has been done on evolutionary games on dynamic
networks [111, 25, 131, 59, 103] almost all of them dealing with the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The
only one briefly describing results for the Hawks-Doves game is [103] but our model differs in sev-
eral important respects and we obtain new results on the structure of the cooperating clusters.
The main novelty is the use of pairwise interactions that are dynamically weighted according
to mutual satisfaction. The new contributions and the differences with previous work will be
described at the appropriate points in the article. An early preliminary version of this study
has been presented at the conference [91].
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our coevolutionary model.
This is followed by an exhaustive numerical study of the game’s parameter space. After that
we present our results on cooperation and we describe and discuss the structure of the emerging
networks. Finally we give our conclusions and suggestions for possible future work.
E.2 The Model and its Dynamics
The model is strictly local as no player uses information other than the one concerning the player
itself and the players it is directly connected to. In particular, each agent knows its own current
strategy and payoff. Moreover, as the model is an evolutionary one, no rationality, in the sense
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of game theory, is needed [122]. Players just adapt their behavior such that they imitate more
successful strategies in their environment with higher probability. Furthermore, they are able
to locally assess the worthiness of an interaction and possibly dismiss a relationship that does
not pay off enough. The model has been introduced and fully explained in [92], where we study
the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag-Hunt games; it is reported here in some detail in order to
make the paper self-contained.
E.2.1 Agent-Agent and Network Interaction Structure
The network of agents is represented by a directed graph G(V,E), where the set of vertices V
represents the agents, while the set of oriented edges (or links) E represents their unsymmetric
interactions. The population size N is the cardinality of V . A neighbor of an agent i is any
other agent j such that there is a pair of oriented edges ~ij and ~ji ∈ E. The set of neighbors of i
is called Vi. For network structure description purposes, we shall also use an unoriented version
G
′
of G having exactly the same set of vertices V but only a single unoriented edge ij between
any pair of connected vertices i and j of G. For G′ we shall define the degree ki of vertex i ∈ V
as the number of neighbors of i. The average degree of the network G
′
will be called k¯.
A pair of directed links between vertices i and j in G is schematically depicted in Fig. E.1. Each
link has a weight or “force” fij (respectively fji). This weight, say fij , represents in an indirect
way the “trust” player i attributes to player j. This weight may take any value in [0, 1] and its
variation is dictated by the payoff earned by i in each encounter with j, as explained below.
Figure E.1: Schematic representation of mutual trust between two agents through the strengths
of their links.
The idea behind the introduction of the forces fij is loosely inspired by the potentia-
tion/depotentiation of connections between neurons in neural networks, an effect known as
the Hebb rule [43]. In our context, it can be seen as a kind of “memory” of previous encounters.
However, it must be distinguished from the memory used in iterated games, in which players
“remember” a certain number of previous moves and can thus conform their future strategy on
the analysis of those past encounters [122]. Our interactions are strictly one-shot, i.e. players
“forget” the results of previous rounds and cannot recognize previous partners and their possi-
ble playing patterns. However, a certain amount of past history is implicitly contained in the
numbers fij and this information may be used by an agent when it will come to decide whether
or not an interaction should be dismissed (see below).
We also define a quantity si called satisfaction of an agent i which is the sum of all the weights
of the links between i and its neighbors Vi divided by the total number of links ki:
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si =
∑
j∈Vi fij
ki
.
We clearly have 0 ≤ si ≤ 1. Note that the term satisfaction is sometimes used in game-theoretical
work to mean the amount of utility gained by a given player. Instead, here satisfaction is
related to the average willingness of a player to maintain the current relationships in the player’s
neighborhood.
E.2.2 Initialization
The network is of constant size N = 1000; this allows a simpler yet significant model of network
dynamics in which social links may be broken and formed but agents do not disappear and
new agents may not join the network. The initial graph is generated randomly with a mean
degree k¯ = 10 which is of the order of those actually found in many social networks such as
collaboration, association, or friendship networks in which relations are generally rather long-
lived and there is a cost to maintain a large number; see, for instance, [73, 75, 69, 117]. Players
are distributed uniformly at random over the graph vertices with 50% cooperators. Forces of
links between any pair of neighboring players are initialized at 0.5.
We use a parameter q which is akin to a “temperature” or noise level; q is a real number in
[0, 1] and it represents the frequency with which an agent wishes to dismiss a link with one of
its neighbors. The higher q, the faster the link reorganization in the network. This parameter
has been first introduced in [131] and it controls the speed at which topological changes occur
in the network, i.e. the time scale of the strategy-topology co-evolution. It is an important
consideration, as social networks may structurally evolve at widely different speeds, depending
on the kind of interaction between agents. For example, e-mail networks change their structure
at a faster pace than, say, scientific collaboration networks.
E.2.3 Strategy and Link Dynamics
Here we describe in detail how individual strategies, links, and link weights are updated. The
node update sequence is chosen at random with replacement as in many previous works [48, 41,
59]. Once a given node i of G is chosen to be activated, it goes through the following steps:
• if the degree of agent i, ki = 0 then player i is an isolated node. In this case a link with
strength 0.5 is created from i to a player j chosen uniformly at random among the other
N − 1 players in the network.
• otherwise,
– either agent i updates its strategy according to a local replicator dynamics rule with
probability 1−q or, with probability q, agent i may delete a link with a given neighbor
j and creates a new 0.5 force link with another node k ;
– the forces between i and its neighbors Vi are updated
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Let us now describe each step in more detail.
E.2.4 Strategy Evolution
We use a local version of replicator dynamics (RD) for regular graphs [41] but modified as
described in [61] to take into account the fact that the number of neighbors in a degree-
inhomogeneous network can be different for different agents. Indeed, it has been analytically
shown that using straight accumulated payoff in degree-inhomogeneous networks leads to a loss
of invariance with respect to affine transformations of the payoff matrix under RD [61]. The
local dynamics of a player i only depends on its own strategy and on the strategies of the ki
players in its neighborhood Vi ∈ G′ . Let us call piij the payoff player i receives when interacting
with neighbor j. This payoff is defined as
piij = σi(t) M σ
T
j (t),
where M is the payoff matrix of the game and σi(t) and σj(t) are the strategies played by i and
j at time t. The quantity
Π̂i(t) =
∑
j∈Vi
piij(t)
is the weighted accumulated payoff defined in [61] collected by player i at time step t. The rule
according to which agents update their strategies is the conventional RD in which strategies
that do better than the average increase their share in the population, while those that fare
worse than average decrease. To update the strategy of player i, another player j is drawn at
random from the neighborhood Vi. It is assumed that the probability of switching strategy is
a function φ of the payoff difference; φ is required to be monotonic increasing; here it has been
taken linear [46]. Strategy σi is replaced by σj with probability
pi = φ(Π̂j − Π̂i),
where
φ(Π̂j − Π̂i) =

Π̂j − Π̂i
Π̂j,max − Π̂i,min
if Π̂j − Π̂i > 0
0 otherwise.
In the last expression, Π̂x,max (resp. Π̂x,min) is the maximum (resp. minimum) payoff a player x
can get (see ref. [61] for more details).
The major differences with standard RD is that two-person encounters between players are
only possible among neighbors, instead of being drawn from the whole population, and the latter
is of finite size in our case. Other commonly used strategy update rules include imitating the
best in the neighborhood [84, 131], or replicating in proportion to the payoff [41, 116].
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E.2.5 Link Evolution
The active agent i, which has ki 6= 0 neighbors will, with probability q, attempt to dismiss an
interaction with one of its neighbors in the following way. In the description we focus on the
outgoing links from i in G, the incoming links play a subsidiary role. Player i first looks at
its satisfaction si. The higher si, the more satisfied the player, since a high satisfaction is a
consequence of successful strategic interactions with the neighbors. Thus, the natural tendency
is to try to dismiss a link when si is low. This is simulated by drawing a uniform pseudo-random
number r ∈ [0, 1] and breaking a link when r ≥ si. Assuming that the decision is taken to cut a
link, which one, among the possible ki, should be chosen? Our solution is based on the strength
of the relevant links. First a neighbor j is chosen with probability proportional to 1−fij , i.e. the
stronger the link, the less likely it is that it will be selected. This intuitively corresponds to i’s
observation that it is preferable to dismiss an interaction with a neighbor j that has contributed
little to i’s payoff over several rounds of play. However, dismissing a link is not free: j may
“object” to the decision. The intuitive idea is that, in real social situations, it is seldom possible
to take unilateral decisions: often there is a cost associated, and we represent this hidden cost
by a probability 1 − (fij + fji)/2 with which j may refuse to be cut away. In other words, the
link is less likely to be deleted if j appreciates i, i.e. when fji is high.
Assuming that the ~ij and ~ji links are finally cut, how is a new interaction to be formed? The
solution adopted here is inspired by the observation that, in social settings, links are usually
created more easily between people who have a mutual acquaintance than those who do not.
First, a neighbor k is chosen in Vi \ {j} with probability proportional to fik, thus favoring
neighbors i trusts. Next, k in turn chooses player l in his neighborhood Vk using the same
principle, i.e. with probability proportional to fkl. If i and l are not connected, two links ~il and
~li are created, otherwise the process is repeated in Vl. Again, if the selected node, say m, is not
connected to i, an interaction between i and m is established by creating two new links ~im and
~mi. If this also fails, new links between i and a randomly chosen node are created. In all cases
the new links are initialized with a strength of 0.5 in each direction. This rewiring process is
schematically depicted in Fig. E.2 for the case in which a link can be successfully established
between players i and l thanks to their mutual acquaintance k.
Figure E.2: Illustration of the rewiring of link {ij} to {il}. Agent k is chosen to introduce player
l to i (see text). Only outgoing links are shown for clarity.
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At this point, we would like to stress several important differences with previous work in
which links can be dismissed and rewired in a constant-size network in evolutionary games.
First of all, in all these works the interaction graph is undirected with a single link between any
pair of agents. In [131], only links between defectors are allowed to be cut unilaterally and the
study is restricted to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Instead, in our case, any interaction has a finite
probability to be abandoned, even a profitable one between cooperators if it is recent, although
links that are more stable, i.e. have high strengths, are less likely to be rewired. This smoother
situation is made possible thanks to our bilateral view of a link. It also allows for a moderate
amount of “noise”, which could reflect to some extent the uncertainties in the system. The
present link rewiring process is also different from the one adopted in [103], where the Fermi
function is used to decide whether to cut a link or not and also from their new version of it
which has appeared in [107]. Finally, in [59] links are cut according to a threshold decision rule
and are rewired randomly anywhere in the network.
E.2.6 Updating the Link Strengths
Once the chosen agents have gone through their strategy or link update steps, the strengths of
the links are updated accordingly in the following way:
fij(t+ 1) = fij(t) +
piij − p¯iij
ki(pimax − pimin) ,
where piij is the payoff of i when interacting with j, p¯iij is the payoff earned by i playing with j,
if j were to play his other strategy, and pimax (pimin) is the maximal (minimal) possible payoff
obtainable in a single interaction. If fij(t+ 1) falls outside the [0, 1] interval then it is reset to 0
if it is negative, and to 1 if it is larger than 1. This update is performed in both directions, i.e.
both fij and fji are updated ∀j ∈ Vi because both i and j get a payoff out of their encounter.
E.3 Numerical Simulations and Discussion
E.3.1 Simulation Parameters
We simulated the Hawks-Doves game with the dynamics described above exploring the game
space by limiting our study to the variation of only two game parameters. We set R = 1 and
P = 0 and the two parameters are 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ S ≤ 1. Setting R = 1 and P = 0
determines the range of S (since T > R > S > P ) and gives an upper bound of 2 for T , due to
the 2R > T + S constraint, which ensures that mutual cooperation is preferred over an equal
probability of unilateral cooperation and defection. Note however, that the only valid value
pairs of (T, S) are those that satisfy the latter constraint.
We simulated networks of size N = 1000, randomly generated with an average degree k¯ = 10
and randomly initialized with 50% cooperators and 50% defectors. In all cases, parameters T
and S are varied between their two bounds in steps of 0.1. For each set of values, we carry out 50
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Figure E.3: Average cooperation values for the Hawks-Doves game for three values of q at
steady-state. Results are the average of 50 runs.
runs of at most 10000 steps each, using a fresh graph realization in each run. Each step consists
in the update of a full population. A run is stopped when all agents are using the same strategy,
in order to be able to measure statistics for the population and for the structural parameters
of the graphs. After an initial transient period, the system is considered to have reached a
pseudo-equilibrium strategy state when the strategy of the agents (C or D) does not change
over 150 further time steps, which means 15 × 104 individual updates. It is worth mentioning
that equilibrium is always attained well before the allowed 10000 time steps, in most cases, less
than 1′000 steps are enough. We speak of pseudo-equilibria or steady states and not of true
evolutionary equilibria because there is no analog of equilibrium conditions in the dynamical
systems sense.
To check whether scalability is an issue for the system, we have run several simulations with
larger graphs namely, N = 3000 and N = 10000. The overall result is that, although the
simulations take a little longer and transient times are also slightly longer, at quasi-equilibrium
all the measures explored in the next sections follow the same trend and the dynamics give rise
to comparable topologies and strategy relative abundance.
E.3.2 Emergence of Cooperation
Cooperation results in contour plot form are shown in Fig. E.3. We remark that, as observed in
other structured populations, cooperation is achieved in almost the whole configuration space.
Thus, the added degree of freedom represented by the possibility of refusing a partner and
choosing a new one does indeed help to find player’s arrangements that help cooperation. When
considering the dependence on the parameter q, one sees in Fig. E.3 that the higher q, the higher
the cooperation level, although the differences are small, since full cooperation prevails already
at q = 0.2. This is a somewhat expected result, since being able to break ties more often clearly
gives cooperators more possibilities for finding and keeping fellow cooperators to interact with.
The results reported in the figures are for populations starting with 50% cooperators randomly
distributed. We have also tried other proportions with less cooperators, starting at 30%. The
results, not reported here for reasons of space, are very similar, the only difference being that it
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takes more simulation time to reach the final quasi-stable state. Finally, one could ask whether
cooperation would still spread starting with very few cooperators. Numerical simulations show
that cooperation could indeed prevail even starting from as low as 1% cooperators, except on
the far left border of the configuration space where cooperation is severely disadvantaged.
Compared with the level of cooperation observed in simulations in static networks, we can say
that results are consistently better for co-evolving networks. For all values of q (Fig. E.3) there
is significantly more cooperation than what was found in model and real social networks [60]
where the same local replicator dynamics was used but with the constraints imposed by the
invariant network structure. A comparable high cooperation level has only been found in static
scale-free networks [101, 104] which are not as realistic as a social network structures.
The above considerations are all the more interesting when one observes that the standard RD
result is that the only asymptotically stable state for the game is a polymorphic population in
which there is a fraction α of doves and a fraction 1 − α of hawks, with α depending on the
actual numerical payoff matrix values. To see the positive influence of making and breaking ties
we can compare our results with what is prescribed by the standard RD solution. Referring to
the payoff table E.1, let’s assume that the column player plays C with probability α and D with
probability 1− α. In this case, the expected payoffs of the row player are:
Er[C] = αR+ (1− α)S
and
Er[D] = αT + (1− α)P
The row player is indifferent to the choice of α when Er[C] = Er[D]. Solving for α gives:
α =
P − S
R− S − T + P . (E.1)
Since the game is symmetric, the result for the column player is the same and (αC, (1−α)D)
is a NE in mixed strategies. We have numerically solved the equation for all the sampled points
in the game’s parameter space. Let us now use the following payoff values in order to bring
them within the explored game space (remember that NEs are invariant w.r.t. such an affine
transformation):
C D
C (1, 1) (2/3, 4/3)
D (4/3, 2/3) (0, 0)
Substituting in equation E.1 gives α = 2/3, i.e. the dynamically stable polymorphic popu-
lation should be composed by about 2/3 cooperators and 1/3 defectors. Now, if one looks at
Fig. E.3 at the points where S = 2/3 and T = 4/3, one can see that the point, and the region
around it, is one of full cooperation instead. Even within the limits of the approximations caused
by the finite population size and the local dynamics, the non-homogeneous graph structure and
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an increased level of tie rewiring has allowed cooperation to be greatly enhanced with respect
to the theoretical predictions of standard RD.
E.3.3 Evolution of Agents’ Satisfaction
According to the model, unsatisfied agents are more likely to try to cut links in an attempt
to improve their satisfaction level, which could be simply described as an average value of
the strengths of their links with neighbors. Satisfaction should thus tend to increase during
evolution. In effect, this is what happens, as can be seen in Fig. E.4. The figure refers to a
particular run that ends in all agents cooperating, but it is absolutely typical. One can remark
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Figure E.4: Fraction of agents having a given satisfaction level as a function of evolution time.
the “spike” at time 0. This is clearly due to the fact that all links are initialized with a weight
of 0.5. As the simulation advances, the satisfaction increases steadily and for the case of the
figure, in which all agents cooperate at the end, it reaches its maximum value of 1 for almost all
players.
E.3.4 Stability of Cooperation
Evolutionary game theory provides a dynamical view of conflicting decision-making in popula-
tions. Therefore, it is important to assess the stability of the equilibrium configurations. This
is even more important in the case of numerical simulation where the steady-state finite pop-
ulation configurations are not really equilibria in the mathematical sense. In other words, one
has to be reasonably confident that the steady-states are not easily destabilized by perturba-
tions. To this end, we have performed a numerical study of the robustness of final cooperators’
configurations by introducing a variable amount of random noise into the system. A strategy is
said to be evolutionarily stable when it cannot be invaded by a small amount of players using
another strategy [46]. We have chosen to switch the strategy of an increasing number of highly
connected cooperators to defection, and to observe whether the perturbation propagates in the
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population, leading to total defection, or if it stays localized and disappears after a transient
time. Figs. E.5 and E.6 show how the system recovers when the most highly connected 30% of
Figure E.5: Cooperation percentage as a function of simulated time when the strategy of the
30% most connected nodes is switched from cooperation to defection. T = 1.6, S = 0.4 and,
from left to right, q = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8.
Figure E.6: Cooperation percentage when the strategy of the 30% most connected nodes is
switched from cooperation to defection. T = 1.9, S = 0.1 and, from left to right, q = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8.
the cooperators are suddenly and simultaneously switched to defection. In Fig. E.5 the value
chosen in the game’s configuration space is T = 1.6 and S = 0.4. This point lies approximately
on the diagonal in Fig. E.3 and corresponds to an all-cooperate situation. As one can see, after
the perturbation is applied, there is a sizable loss of cooperation but, after a while, the system
recovers full cooperation in all cases (only 10 curves are shown in each figure for clarity, but
the phenomenon is qualitatively identical in all the 50 independent runs tried). From left to
right, three values of q = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 are used. It is seen that, as the rewiring frequency q
increases, recovering from the perturbation becomes easier as defection has less time to spread
around before cooperators are able to dismiss links toward defectors. Switching the strategy of
the 30 % most connected nodes is rather extreme since they include most cooperator clusters
but, nonetheless, cooperation is rather stable in the whole cooperating region. In Fig. E.6 we
have done the same this time with T = 1.9 and S = 0, 1. This point is in a frontier region in
which defection may often prevail, at least for low q (see Fig. E.3) and thus it represents one
of the hardest cases for cooperation to remain stable. Nevertheless, except in the leftmost case
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(q = 0.2) where half of the runs permanently switch to all-defect, in all the other cases the
population is seen to recover after cooperation has fallen down to less than 10%. Note that the
opposite case is also possible in this region that is, in a full defect situation, switching of 30%
highly connected defectors to cooperation can lead the system to one of full cooperation. In con-
clusion, the above numerical experiments have empirically shown that cooperation is extremely
stable after cooperator networks have emerged. Although we are using here an artificial society
of agents, this can hopefully be seen as an encouraging result for cooperation in real societies.
E.3.5 Structure of the Emerging Networks
In this section we present a statistical analysis of the global and local properties of the networks
that emerge when the pseudo-equilibrium states of the dynamics are attained. Note that in the
following sections the graph we refer to is the unoriented, unweighted one that we called G
′
in
Sect. E.2.1. In other words, for the structural properties of interest, we only take into account
the fact that two agents interact and not the weights of their directed interactions.
Small-World Nature
Small-world networks are characterized by a small mean path length and by a high clustering
coefficient [127]. Our graphs start random, and thus have short path lengths by construction
since their mean path length l¯ = O(logN) scales logarithmically with the number of vertices
N [75]. It is interesting to notice that they maintain short diameters at equilibrium too, after
rewiring has taken place. We took the average L¯ =
∑660
k=1 l¯ of the mean path length of 660
evolved graphs, which represent ten graphs for each T, S pair. This average is 3.18, which is of
the order of log(1000), while its initial random graph average value is 3.25. This fact, together
with the remarkable increase of the clustering coefficients with respect to the random graph (see
below), shows that the evolved networks have the small-world property. Of course, this behavior
was expected, since the rewiring mechanism favors close partners in the network and thus tends
to increase the clustering and to shorten the distances.
Average Degree
In contrast to other models [131, 103], the mean degree k¯ can vary during the course of the
simulation. We found that k¯ increases only slightly and tends to stabilize around k¯ = 11. This
is in qualitative agreement with observations made on real dynamical social networks [54, 8, 115]
with the only difference that the network does not grow in our model.
Clustering Coefficients
The clustering coefficient C of a graph has been defined in the Introduction section. Random
graphs are locally homogeneous in the average and for them C is simply equal to the probability
of having an edge between any pair of nodes independently. In contrast, real networks have
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Figure E.7: Average values of the clustering coefficient over 50 runs for three values of q.
local structures and thus higher values of C. Fig. E.7 gives the average clustering coefficient
C¯ = 150
∑50
i=1 C for each sampled point in the Hawks-Doves configuration space, where 50 is the
number of network realizations used for each simulation. The networks self-organize through
dismissal of partners and choice of new ones and they acquire local structure, since the clustering
coefficients are higher than that of a random graph with the same number of edges and nodes,
which is k¯/N = 10/1000 = 0.01. The clustering tends to increase with q (i.e. from left to right
in Fig. E.7). It is clear that the increase in clustering and the formation of cliques is due to the
fact that, when dismissing an unprofitable relation and searching for a new one, individuals that
are relationally at a short distance are statistically favored. But this has a close correspondence
in the way in which new acquaintances are made in society: they are not random, rather people
often get to interact with each other through common acquaintances, or “friends of friends” and
so on.
Degree Distributions
The degree distribution function (DDF) p(k) of a graph represents the probability that a ran-
domly chosen node has degree k. Random graphs are characterized by DDF of Poissonian form
p(k) = k¯ke−k¯/k!, while social and technological real networks often show long tails to the right,
i.e. there are nodes that have an unusually large number of neighbors [75]. In some extreme
cases the DDF has a power-law form p(k) ∝ k−γ ; the tail is particularly extended and there is
no characteristic degree. The cumulative degree distribution function (CDDF) is just the prob-
ability that the degree is greater than or equal to k and has the advantage of being less noisy
for high degrees. Fig. E.8 shows the CDDFs for the Hawks-Doves for three values of T , S = 0.2,
and q = 0.5 with a logarithmic scale on the y-axis. A Poisson and an exponential distribution
are also included for comparison. The Poisson curve actually represents the initial degree dis-
tribution of the (random) population graph. The distributions at equilibrium are far from the
Poissonian that would apply if the networks would remain essentially random. However, they
are also far from the power-law type, which would appear as a straight line in the log-log plot
of Fig E.9. Although a reasonable fit with a single law appears to be difficult, these empirical
distributions are closer to exponentials, in particular the curve for T = 1.7, for which such a fit
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Figure E.8: Empirical cumulative degree distribution functions for three different values of the
temptation T . A Poissonian and an exponential distribution are also plotted for comparison.
Distributions are discrete, the continuous lines are only a guide for the eye. Lin-log scales.
Figure E.9: Empirical cumulative degree distribution functions for three different values of the
parameter T . Log-log scales.
has been drawn. It can be observed that the distribution is broader the higher T (The higher T ,
the more agents gain by defecting). In fact, although cooperation is attained nearly everywhere
in the game’s configuration space, higher values of the temptation T mean that agents have
to rewire their links more extensively, which results in a higher number of neighbors for some
players, and thus it leads to a longer tail in the CDDF. The influence of the q parameter on
the shape of the degree distribution functions is shown in Fig. E.10 where average curves for
three values of q, T = 1.7, and S = 0.2, are reported. For high q, the cooperating steady-state
is reached faster, which gives the network less time to rearrange its links. For lower values of
q the distributions become broader, despite the fact that rewiring occurs less often, because
cooperation in this region is harder to attain and more simulation time is needed. In conclusion,
emerging network structures at steady states have DDFs that are similar to those found in actual
social networks [75, 4, 73, 50, 117], with tails that are fatter the higher the temptation T and
the lower q. Topologies closer to scale-free would probably be obtained if the model allowed for
growth, since preferential attachment is already present to some extent due to the nature of the
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Figure E.10: Empirical cumulative degree distribution functions for three different values of the
temptation q. Lin-log scales.
rewiring process [93].
Degree Correlations
Besides the degree distribution function of a network, it is also sometimes useful to investigate
the empirical joint degree-degree distribution of neighboring vertices. However, it is difficult to
obtain reliable statistics because the data set is usually too small (if a network has L edges,
with L  N2 where N is the number of vertices for the usually relatively sparse networks we
deal with, one then has only L pairs of data to work with). Approximate statistics can readily
be obtained by using the average degree of the nearest neighbors of a vertex i as a function of
the degree of this vertex, k¯Vi(ki) [88]. From Fig. E.11 one can see that the correlation is slightly
Figure E.11: Average degree of the direct neighbors of a vertex Vs. the vertex degree. The
relation is disassortative. Log-lin scales.
negative, or disassortative. This is at odds with what is reported about real social networks,
in which usually this correlation is positive instead, i.e. high-degree nodes tend to connect to
high-degree nodes and vice-versa [75]. However, real social networks establish and grow because
Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks Enea Pestelacci
138
ARTICLE E. MUTUAL TRUST AND COOPERATION IN THE EVOLUTIONARY
HAWKS-DOVES GAME
of common interests, collaboration work, friendship and so on. Here this is not the case, since
the network is not a growing one, and the game played by the agents is antagonistic and causes
segregation of highly connected cooperators into clusters in which they are surrounded by less
highly connected fellows. This will be seen more pictorially in the following section.
E.3.6 Cooperator Clusters
From the results of the previous sections, it appears that a much higher amount of cooperation
than what is predicted by the standard theory for mixing populations can be reached when ties
can be broken and rewired. We have seen that this dynamics causes the graph to acquire local
structure, and thus to loose its initial randomness. In other words, the network self-organizes in
order to allow players to cooperate as much as possible. At the microscopic, i.e. agent level, this
happens through the formation of clusters of players using the same strategy. Fig. E.12 shows
one typical cooperator cluster. In the figure one can clearly see that the central cooperator is a
Figure E.12: A typical cooperator cluster. Links to the rest of the network have been suppressed
for clarity. The size of a node is proportional to its connectivity in the whole graph. The most
connected central cooperator is shown as a square.
highly connected node and there are many links also between the other neighbors. Such tightly
packed structures have emerged to protect cooperators from defectors that, at earlier times,
were trying to link to cooperators to exploit them. These observations help understand why
the degree distributions are long-tailed (see previous section), and also the higher values of the
clustering coefficient.
Further studies of the emerging networks would imply investigating the communities and the
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way in which strategies are distributed in them. There are many ways to reveal the modular
structure of networks [22] but we leave this study for further work.
E.4 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a new dynamical population structure for agents playing a se-
ries of two-person Hawks and Doves game. The most novel feature of the model is the adoption
of a variable strength of the bi-directional social ties between pairs of players. These strengths
change dynamically and independently as a function of the relative satisfaction of the two end
points when playing with their immediate neighbors in the network. A player may wish to
break a tie to a neighbor and the probability of cutting the link is higher the weaker the directed
link strength is. The ensemble of weighted links implicitly represents a kind of memory of past
encounters although, technically speaking, the game is not iterated. While in previous work the
rewiring parameters where ad hoc, unspecified probabilities, we have made an effort to relate
them to the agent’s propensity to gauge the perceived quality of a relationship during time.
The model takes into account recent knowledge coming from the analysis of the structure and
of the evolution of social networks and, as such, should be a better approximation of real so-
cial conflicting situations than static graphs such as regular grids. In particular, new links are
not created at random but rather taking into account the “trust” a player may have on her
relationally close social environment as reflected by the current strengths of its links. This,
of course, is at the origin of the de-randomization and self-organization of the network, with
the formation of stable clusters of cooperators. The main result concerning the nature of the
pseudo-equilibrium states of the dynamics is that cooperation is greatly enhanced in such a
dynamical artificial society and, furthermore, it is quite robust with respect to large strategy
perturbations. Although our model is but a simplified and incomplete representation of social
reality, this is encouraging, as the Hawks-Doves game is a paradigm for a number of social and
political situations in which aggressivity plays an important role. The standard result is that
bold behavior does not disappear at evolutionary equilibrium. However, we have seen here that
a certain amount of plasticity of the networked society allows for full cooperation to be consis-
tently attained. Although the model is an extremely abstract one, it shows that there is place
for peaceful resolution of conflict. In future work we would like to investigate other stochastic
strategy evolution models based on more refined forms of learning than simple imitation and
study the global modular structure of the equilibrium networks.
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Abstract
Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behavior. Here we
study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an
evolutionary approach. We show that local network effects may promote selection of efficient
equilibria in both pure and general coordination games and may explain social polarization.
These results are put into perspective with respect to known theoretical results. The main
insight we obtain is that clustering, and especially community structure in social networks has
a positive role in promoting socially efficient outcomes.
F.1 Introduction
Game theory [122] has proved extremely useful in the study of economic, social, and biological
situations for describing interactions between agents having possibly different and often con-
flicting objectives. Paradigmatic games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma [6] have been used in
order to represent the tension that appears in society when individual objectives are in conflict
with socially desirable outcomes. Most of the vast research literature has focused on conflicting
situations in order to uncover the mechanisms that could lead to cooperation instead of socially
harmful outcomes (see e.g. [82] for a synthesis). However, there are important situations in
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society that do not require players to use aggressive strategies. In fact, many frequent social
and economic activities require individuals to coordinate their actions on a common goal since
in many cases the best course of action is to conform to the standard behavior. For example,
if one is used to drive on the right side of the road and travels to a country where the norm
is reversed, it pays off to follow the local norm. Bargaining and contracts are also of this type
because, even though expectancies may be different between a buyer and a seller, still both
would rather trade than not, provided that the respective prices are not too different. For an-
other example, consider a situation in which coordination in working contributions is required
in order to produce a good or a service. In a group it might pay off not to contribute, if this
behavior goes unnoticed, but the total output will be negatively affected. Games that express
this extremely common kind of interactions are called coordination games.
Coordination games confront the players with multiple Nash equilibria and the ensuing
problem of equilibrium selection. Given that these equilibria are equivalent from the game-
theoretical point of view, how to explain how agents make their decisions? This question has
important implications in opinion dynamics problems, for example in elections, choice of a new
technology and so on [33, 11, 29].
A useful approach has been to use evolutionary and learning ideas which offer a dynamical
perspective based on the forces of biological and social evolution. In evolutionary game theory
(EGT), the concept of a population of players where strategies that score best are more likely
to be selected and reproduced provides a justification for the appearance of stable states of the
dynamics that represent solutions of the game [122, 128].
For mathematical convenience, standard EGT is based on infinite mixing populations where
pairs of individuals are drawn uniformly at random at each step and play the game. Correlations
are absent by definition and the population has an homogeneous structure. However, everyday
observation tells us that in animal and human societies, individuals usually tend to interact
more often with some specified subset of partners; for instance, teenagers tend to adopt the
fashions of their close friends group; closely connected groups usually follow the same religion,
and so on. Likewise, in the economic world, a group of firms might be directly connected
because they share capital, technology, or otherwise interact in some way. In short, social
interaction is mediated by networks, in which vertices identify people, firms etc., and edges
identify some kind of relation between the concerned vertices such as friendship, collaboration,
economic exchange and so on. Thus, locality of interaction plays an important role. This kind of
approach was pioneered in EGT by Nowak and May [84] by using simple two-dimensional regular
grids. Recently, in the wake of a surge of activity in network research in many fields [75, 19],
the dynamical and evolutionary behavior of games on networks that are more likely to represent
actual social interactions than regular grids has been investigated (see [112] for a comprehensive
recent review). These studies, almost exclusively conducted on games of conflict such as the
Prisoner’s dilemma or Hawks-Doves, have shown that there are network structures, such as
scale-free and actual social networks that may favor the emergence of cooperation with respect
to the fully mixing populations used in the theory [104, 60].
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In this work we extend this kind of approach to games of the coordination type. We shall
use several types of network structures, both networks generated by an algorithm as well as an
actual social network to try to unravel the effect of structure on the population behavior. In
the present paper, we ignore that social networks are actually dynamical entities that change
constantly. Indeed, actors join and leave networks and they may accumulate and abandon ties
over time. Using static networks is a useful first approximation however, especially for the cases
where the rate of change of the network structure is slow with respect to the rate of change
of individual’s behaviors which is the approximation that is made here1. Comparatively little
theoretical work has been done on coordination games on networks, except for some standard
types such as rings or complete networks [26] for which rigorous results have been obtained
thanks to their regular structure. Although we do mention some known rigorous results as
discussed below, our methodology is essentially computer simulation-based. This is because for
most network types, inhomogeneity and correlations do not allow standard mean-field methods
to be used. Likewise, pair approximation methods [120] provide an acceptable approach for
random and regular graphs but not for the other more complex types and thus they are not
used here.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we first present a brief introduction to the
subject of coordination games, in order to make the work self-contained. Then, in Sect. F.3, we
enumerate the main theoretical results on coordination games, as well as the necessary definitions
for networks of agents and their dynamics. In Sect. F.4 we describe the simulation methodology
and the parameters used and, in Sect. F.5 we present and discuss the simulation results on
various network classes first for pure coordination games, and then for general coordination
ones. Finally, in Sect. F.6 we give our conclusions and ideas for future work.
F.2 Coordination Games
F.2.1 General Coordination Games
General two-person, two strategies coordination games have the normal form of Table F.1. With
a > d and b > c, (α, α) and (β, β) are both Nash equilibria. Now, if we assume that a > b and
(a−d) ≤ (b−c) then (β, β) is the risk-dominant equilibrium, while (α, α) is the Pareto-dominant
one. This simply means that players get a higher payoff by coordinating on (α, α) but they risk
less by using strategy β instead. There is also a third equilibrium in mixed strategies but it is
evolutionarily unstable. A well known example of games of this type are the so-called Stag-Hunt
α β
α a, a c, d
β d, c b, b
Table F.1: A general two-person, two strategies coordination game.
1a companion study on the dynamical network case is in progress.
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games [109]. This class of games has been extensively studied analytically in an evolutionary
setting [51, 26] and by numerical simulation on several model network types [109, 104, 60, 96].
In the following, we shall first deal with the easier case of pure coordination games which, in
spite of their simplicity, already clearly pose the equilibrium selection problem. Then we shall
report results on Stag-Hunt games, for which there exist many published studies to compare
with, both theoretical and with the use of simulation.
F.2.2 Pure Coordination Games
Two-person pure coordination games have the normal form depicted in Table F.2, with ui, ui > 0,
and ui, uj = 0, 0, i 6= j,∀i, j ∈ [1, k], where k is the number of strategies available to each player
in the strategy set S = {s1, s2, ..., sk}, and the u’s are payoffs. So all the Nash equilibria in
pure strategies correspond to diagonal elements in the table where the two players coordinate
on the same strategy, while there is a common lower uniform payoff for all other strategy pairs
which is set to 0 here. A simple coordination game is the driving game. In some countries
s1 s2 . . . sk
s1 u1,u1 0, 0 . . . 0, 0
s2 0, 0 u2,u2 . . . 0, 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
sk 0, 0 . . . . . . uk,uk
Table F.2: A general payoff bi-matrix of a two-person pure coordination game. Nash equilibria
in pure strategies are marked in bold.
people drive on the right side of the road, while in others they drive on the left side. This can
be represented by the pure coordination game represented in Table F.3. There are two Nash
right left
right 1,1 0, 0
left 0, 0 1,1
Table F.3: The driving game.
equilibria in pure strategies: (right, right) and (left, left) and obviously there is no reason, in
principle, to prefer one over the other, i.e. the two equilibria are equivalent. However, while
some countries have got accustomed to drive on the left such as the UK, Australia, and Japan,
others have done the opposite such as most European countries and the USA. Such norms or
conventions have stabilized in time and are often the product of social evolution. There is of
course a third equilibrium in mixed strategies in the driving game which consists in playing left
and right with probability 1/2 each but it would seem rather risky to play the game in this way
on a real road. Another well known example of a pure coordination game is the Battle of the
Sexes in which the Nash equilibria in pure strategies are those in which players use the same
strategy, but the two sides in a two person game prefer a different equilibrium [122].
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F.3 Mathematical Setting and Previous Results
In this section, we recall some rigorous results for two-person, two-strategies coordination games
on some particular network types. Indeed, network topology has an influence on the stable
states of the evolutionary dynamics that will be reached, as it will become clear in what follows.
We also give nomenclature and definitions for the graphs representing the population of agents
and for the dynamical decision processes implemented by the agents.
Let’s thus consider the game’s payoff matrix of Table F.4 with a ≥ b > 0. When a > b,
strategy α is said to be dominant since a player obtains a higher payoff playing α rather than
β.
α β
α a, a 0, 0
β 0, 0 b, b
Table F.4: A general two-person, two-strategies pure coordination game.
The network of agents will be represented by an undirected graph G(V,E), where the set of
vertices V represents the agents, while the set of edges (or links) E represents their symmetric
interactions. The population size N is the cardinality of V . A neighbor of an agent i is any
other agent j at distance one from i. The set of neighbors of i is called Vi and its cardinality is
the degree ki of vertex i ∈ V . The average degree of the network is called k¯ and p(k) denotes its
degree distribution function, i.e. the probability that an arbitrarily chosen node has degree k.
Since we shall adopt an evolutionary approach, we must next define the decision rule by
which individuals will update their strategy during time. An easy and well known adaptive
learning rule is myopic best-response dynamics, which embodies a primitive form of bounded
rationality and for which rigorous results are known [129, 36]. In the local version of this model,
time is discrete i.e. t = 0, 1, 2, . . . and, at each time step, an agent has the opportunity of
revising her current strategy. She does so by considering the current actions of her neighbors
and switching to the action that would maximize her payoff if the neighbors would stick to their
current choices. The model is thus completely local and an agent only needs to know her own
current strategy, the game payoff matrix, who are her neighbors, and their current strategies.
This rule is called myopic because the agents only care about immediate payoff, they cannot see
far into the future. Given the network structure of the population, the rule is implemented as
follows:
• at each time step a player i revises his strategy with probability p
• player i will choose the action that maximizes his payoff, given that the strategy profile of
his neighbors Vi remains the same as in the previous period
• if there is a tie or i is not given the opportunity of revising his strategy, then i will keep
his current strategy
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Using the above kind of stochastic evolutionary process, which can be modeled by a Markov
chain, the following theoretical results have been proved by several researchers and can be found
in Chapter 4 of [36], where references to the original works are given. They are valid for general
coordination games, and thus also for the special case of the pure coordination game of Table F.4.
Theorem. A strategy profile in which everyone plays the same action is a Nash equilibrium for
every graph G. If G is complete then these are the only possible equilibria. If G is incomplete,
then there may exist polymorphic equilibria as well.
The preceding theorem implies that social diversity may emerge at equilibrium depending on
the network structure. Given that complete networks are not socially relevant, this result leaves
open the possibility of equilibrium strategy distributions in the population. A second related re-
sult states that, starting from any initial strategy profile, the above described stochastic process
will converge to a Nash equilibrium of the coordination game with probability 1. To probe for
the stability of equilibria, the concept of mutation is introduced. A mutation simply means that
a player that is updating its current strategy can make a mistake with some small probability q.
These small random effects are meant to capture various sources of uncertainty such as delib-
erate and involuntary decision errors. Deliberate errors might play the role of experimentation
in the environment, and involuntary ones might be linked with insufficient familiarity with the
game, for example. A state of this adaptive noisy dynamics is called stochastically stable if in
the long term, the probability of being in that state does not go to tero as the error probability
tends to zero (see [129] for a rigorous definition). This idea allows one to discriminate among
the possible equilibria according to their stability properties.
From the above considerations, it may be concluded that the network topology plays an im-
portant role on the equilibrium states that the population will reach in the long run. However,
the graph types for which analytical results are available are far from the complex structures of
observed real social networks. Therefore, our aim in the following is to characterize the behavior
of such complex networks by using numerical simulations and appropriate statistical analysis.
F.4 Numerical Simulations Methodology
F.4.1 Network Types Studied
In the last few years a large amount of knowledge has accumulated about the structure of real
social networks and many model networks, both static and growing have been proposed [75, 19,
49]. We are thus in a position that allows us to make use of this recent information in order
to study the behavior of coordination games on such realistic networks. In detail, we shall use
the following network types: random, Bara´basi-Albert scale-free networks, a real social network,
and model social networks. We shall now briefly describe each of these network types, directing
the reader to the relevant references for more details.
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random graphs
For generating random graphs we use one of the classical models proposed by Erdo¨s and Re´nyi
and described in [15]. Given N indistinguishable vertices, each possible edge has an independent
probability p of appearing (0 ≤ p ≤ 1), which gives the G(N, p) ensemble of random graphs.
It is worth mentioning that for that type of random graph the average clustering coefficient2
C¯ = p = k¯/N . Thus C¯ at fixed k¯ tends to 0 for increasing N . This is one of the reasons that
make these random graphs rather unsuitable as model social networks, although they are useful
as a known benchmark to evaluate deviations from randomness. Furthermore, p(k) = e−k¯ k¯
k
k! is
Poissonian and thus it allows only small fluctuations around k¯, while actual measured networks
usually have long-tailed degree distribution functions.
Scale-Free graphs
Among the several available models for constructing scale-free networks [75], here we use the
classical one by Baraba´si–Albert [3]. Baraba´si–Albert networks are grown incrementally starting
with a small clique of m0 nodes. At each successive time step a new node is added such that its
m ≤ m0 edges link it to m nodes already present in the graph. It is assumed that the probability
p that a new node will be connected to node i depends on the current degree ki of the latter.
This is called the preferential attachment rule. The probability p(ki) of node i to be chosen is
given by p(ki) = ki/
∑
j kj , where the sum is over all nodes already in the graph. The model
evolves into a stationary network with power-law probability distribution for the vertex degree
P (k) ∼ k−γ , with γ ∼ 3. For the simulations, we started with a clique of m0 = 2 nodes and at
each time step the new incoming node has m = 2 links.
Scale-free graphs are rather extreme and are infrequent among social networks (see below), even
taking finite degree cutoffs into account. As the random graph, they are rather to be considered
as a model network.
An Actual Social Network
One important reason for introducing true or model social networks is that, as said above, clus-
tering is an important feature in networks of contacts while neither Erdo¨s-Re´nyi nor Baraba´si-
Albert scale-free graphs show a comparable level of clustering. As a typical example of a true
social network, we use a coauthorship network among researchers in the genetic programming
(GP) community. This network has a connected giant component of 1024 scientists and it has
recently been analyzed [117]. It has clusters and communities and it should be representative of
other similar human acquaintance networks. Its degree distribution function p(k), as is usually
the case with most measured social networks [4, 75, 49], is not a pure power-law; rather, it can
be fitted by an exponentially truncated power-law.
2We use the following common definition. The clustering coefficient Ci of a node i is defined as Ci = 2Ei/ki(ki−
1), where Ei is the number of edges in the neighborhood of i. Thus Ci measures the amount of “cliquishness” of
the neighborhood of node i and it characterizes the extent to which nodes adjacent to node i are connected to
each other. The clustering coefficient of the graph is the average over all nodes: C¯ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 Ci [75]
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Model Social Networks
Several ways have been proposed for growing artificial networks with properties similar to those
of observed social networks. Here we use the model of Toivonen et al. [114], which was conceived
to construct a graph with most of the desired features of real-life social networks i.e, assortative,
highly clustered, showing community structures, having an adjustable decay rate of the degree
distribution, and a finite cutoff. The network is incrementally grown starting from a seed of m0
randomly connected vertices. At each successive time step, the following algorithm is applied:
1. On average mr ≥ 1 random vertices are picked to be initial contacts.
2. On average ms ≥ 0 neighbors of the mr initial contacts are chosen to be secondary contacts.
3. A newly added vertex v is connected to all the initial and secondary contacts determined
in the two previous steps.
The above is iterated until the network reaches the desired size. Notice that the process re-
sponsible for the appearance of high clustering, assortativity and community structure is step
2. In the numerical experiments, we used graphs of size N = 1000 with m0 = 30 initial
nodes. Every time a new node is added, its number of initial contacts mr is distributed as
p(# of initial contacts = 1) = 0.95 and p(# of initial contacts = 2) = 0.05. The number of its
secondary contacts ms is uniformly distributed between 0 and 3. The resulting degree distribu-
tion falls below a power-law for high values of k [114].
F.4.2 Simulations Settings
The network used are of size N = 1000 except for the GP network, whose giant component has
size 1024. The mean degree k¯ of the networks generated was 6, except for the GP case which
has k¯ ' 5.8.
For pure coordination games the non-zero diagonal payoffs a (see sect. F.2.2) has been varied in
the range [0.5, 1] in steps of 0.05 with b = 1 − a; the range [0, 0.5] is symmetrically equivalent.
For general coordination games (sect. F.2) in which a > d > b > c, we have studied a portion of
the parameters’ space defined by c ∈ [−1, 0] and d ∈ [0, 1], a = 1, and b = 0, as is usually done
for the stag-hunt games [104, 96]. The c− d plane has been sampled with a grid step of 0.05.
Each value in the phase space reported in the following figures is the average of 50 independent
runs. Each run has been performed on a fresh realization of the corresponding graph, except
for the GP co-authorship network case which is a unique realization.
As already hinted in sect. F.3, we have used a fully asynchronous update scheme in which a
randomly selected agent is chosen for update with replacement at each discrete time step. To
detect steady states3 of the dynamics we first let the system evolve for a transient period of
3True equilibrium states in the sense of stochastic stability are not guaranteed to be reached by the simulated
dynamics. For this reason we prefer to use the terms steady states or quasi-equilibrium states which are states
that have little or no fluctuation over an extended period of time.
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5000 × N ' 5 × 106 time steps. After a quasi-equilibrium state is reached past the transient,
averages are calculated during 500 × N additional time steps. A steady state has always been
reached in all simulations performed within the prescribed amount of time, for most of them
well before the limit.
We have experimented with different proportions of uniformly randomly distributed initial
strategies α belonging to the set {0, 0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.95, 1} and we have used two differ-
ent values for the stochastic noise q in the simulations: q ∈ {0, 0.02}, i.e. either no noise or
a small amount, as prescribed by the most important theoretical stochastic models in order to
ensure that the evolutionary process is ergodic [51, 26, 129].
F.5 Simulation Results
F.5.1 Results on Pure Coordination Games
Figures F.1 and F.2 show global coordination results for random graphs and scale-free graphs
respectively. The plots report on the x-axis the payoff advantage of strategy α with respect
to strategy β, which goes from 0 to 1, and on the y-axis the frequency of α-strategists in the
population. The curves represent average values over 50 runs for each sampled point. By
simple inspection, it is clear that results do not differ by a large extent between the random and
the scale-free cases, which means that the degree distribution function has little effect on the
outcome. The general trend is for all the populations to converge toward the payoff-dominant
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies which is also the case for the standard well-mixed population,
as we know from analytical results. Polymorphic populations do exist temporarily but they are
unstable and the stochastic dynamics always reaches a monomorphic state. It is also quite
obvious that without mutations (Figs. F.1 and F.2 left-hand images), if a strategy is absent at
the beginning, it cannot appear later. Instead, with even a small amount of noise (q = 0.02
in the figures), the strategy offering the best payoff will take over the population thanks to
repeated mutations that will create individuals playing that strategy (Figs. F.1 and F.2 right-
hand images) even in case the strategy is absent in the initial population. Furthermore, noise
always promotes a quicker transition toward the payoff-dominant steady state.
Figures F.3 and F.4 depict the same quantities as above in the case of the real social network
and model social networks respectively. Although the general behavior is the same, i.e. the
Pareto-dominant steady state is reached in most situations, some aspects of the dynamics differ
from the case of random and scale-free networks. To begin with, one sees on the left-hand images
that, without noise, the payoff dominated strategy is able to resist in the population when the
payoff differences are small. For example, starting with an equal initial share of strategies α and
β, one sees in Figs. F.3 and F.4 that, up to a difference in payoffs of 0.02 the Pareto-dominated
strategy is still present in the population with a sizable fraction. This phenomenon can be
explained by looking at the clusters present in the social networks. Results will be presented
below.
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Figure F.1: Random network: k¯ = 6. Left image refers to noiseless best response dynamics. The
right image is for a noisy dynamics with q = 0.02. Graphics report the frequency of strategy α
in the population as a function of the payoff difference a− b. Continuous lines are just a guide
for the eye.
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Figure F.2: Scale-free network: Barabasi-Albert Model, k¯ = 6. Left image refers to noiseless
best response dynamics. In the right image the probability of mutation is q = 0.02. On the
y-axis the frequency of strategy α is plotted against the payoff difference a− b.
But the main remark is that, in the presence of noise, the payoff-dominant stable state is
reached for smaller differences in payoff (see right-hand images). In other words, a small a − b
advantage is enough to quickly steer the dynamics towards the dominant quasi-equilibrium.
The behavior is sufficiently different from the previous one to require at least a qualitative
explanation, which is presented next by introducing the concept of communities.
F.5.2 Social Communities and Game Strategies
Communities or clusters in networks can be loosely defined as being groups of nodes that are
strongly connected between them and poorly connected with the rest of the graph. These
structures are extremely important in social networks and may determine to a large extent the
properties of dynamical processes such as diffusion, search, and rumor spreading among others.
Several methods have been proposed to uncover the clusters present in a network (for a review
see, for instance, [28]). In order to study the effect of community structure on the distribution
of behaviors at steady state, here we have used the divisive method of Girvan and Newman [79]
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Figure F.3: Coauthorship network in the Genetic Programming community. Left image: no
noise. Right image: mutation probability q = 0.02. On the y-axis we report the fraction of
α-strategists in the population as a function of the payoff difference a− b.
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Figure F.4: Model social network. Left: mutation probability q = 0; right: q = 0.02. On
the y-axis we report the fraction of α-strategists in the population as a function of the payoff
difference a− b.
which is based on iteratively removing edges with a high value of edge betweennes.
The presence of communities has a marked effect on the game dynamics. Figure F.5 depicts the
community structure of a Baraba´si–Albert scale-free graph (a) and of a model social network
built according to Toivonen et al’s model (b). The difference is striking: while clear-cut clusters
exist in (b), almost no recognizable communities can be isolated in (a), a fact that is shown by the
high number of links between clusters, with a communities graph average degree of ∼ 32, while
k¯ is about 6.5 for the communities graphs arising from social networks. A common statistical
indicator of the presence of a recognizable community structure is the modularity Q. According
to Newman [77], where quantitative definitions are given, modularity is proportional to the
number of edges falling within clusters minus the expected number in an equivalent network
with edges placed at random. While modularity is not without flaws [37], it is still a convenient
indicator of the presence of clusters. In general, networks with strong community structure
tend to have values of Q in the range 0.4 − 0.7. Indeed, for the networks in Fig. F.5, we have
Q ' 0.3 for the scale-free network, while Q ' 0.6 for the model social network. Colors in the
figure represent frequency of strategies at steady state for a single particular, but representative,
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(a) (b)
Figure F.5: Distribution of strategies at steady state in the network communities when both
strategies share the same payoff: a = b = 0.5. (a) scale-free, frequency of α = 0.568. (b) model
social network, fraction of α = 0.585. Each vertex represents a whole community with size pro-
portional to the size of the community. Links represent inter-community connections and their
thickness is proportional to the number of inter-community links. The communities are much
less interconnected in the social network and this causes a greater difference in concentration
from community to community.
run in each case. In the average over 50 runs, final proportions of strategies α and β do not
depart much from the initial 50%. However, while in the scale-free case at the steady state
the standard deviation is high, meaning that the system converges often to one or the other
equilibrium, this is not the case for the social networks. In the latter, at steady state there
is always a mix of strategies; in other words, polymorphic equilibria may be stable. This is
a remarkable fact that is due to the community structure of social networks, which is almost
missing in the scale-free and random network cases. Thanks to this clear-cut cluster structure,
as soon as the nodes of a cluster are colonized by a majority of one of the two strategies by
statistical fluctuation, it becomes difficult for the other strategy to overtake, which explains
why these cluster strategies are robust. The effect of the community structure is even more
apparent in Fig. F.6 where strategy α has been given a slight initial advantage. At steady
state, in both the co-authorship network (a) as well as the model network (b) strategy β is still
present in some clusters. If we were to interpret strategies as social norms or conventions, then
this would suggest that a realistic social structure may help protect diversity, either political or
cultural, for example. The possibility of polymorphic equilibria had been theoretically predicted
by Morris [70] for symmetric payoffs in pure coordination games with best response dynamics
in the case of infinite populations and making use of a notion of “cohesion” which refers to the
relative frequency of ties among groups compared with non-members. Clearly, although it was
expressed in a different language that does not make explicit use of networks, this notion is
related to the communities we have here and the simulation results nicely confirm the prediction
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in the case of finite, actual networked systems.
(a) (b)
Figure F.6: Strategy distribution in the network communities when α has a small advantage
over β: a = 0.55. (a) Genetic Programming co-authorship network, proportion of α = 0.839.
(b) model social network, proportion of α = 0.833. The cluster structure of these networks
allows the preservation of the dominated strategy in some communities.
F.5.3 Results on the Stag Hunt Games
Figure F.7 shows strategy distribution on the game parameter space for the Stag Hunt class of
coordination games for the scale-free case. Results for random graphs are similar to those for
scale-free networks and are not shown. The two upper images are for equal initial proportions
of each strategy, while the bottom figures refer to an initial proportion of strategy α = 5%. The
first image in each row is for best response without noise, while the second image has noise level
q = 0.02.
For initially equidistributed strategies, although average values are reported in the figures, almost
all simulations attain one or the other absorbing state, i.e. all individuals play α or all play
β, and there is almost no difference when noise is present. This is in agreement with previous
results on scale-free graphs published by Roca et al. [97] where update was by best response
without noise, and also with [60] where replicator dynamics instead of best response dynamics
was used as a strategy update rule.
For the more extreme case in which initially the fraction of strategy α is 5% randomly distributed
over the graph vertices (bottom row images), a small amount of random noise does not have a
large effect: the cooperative strategy emerges in the favorable region of the parameter space, i.e.
for low d and high c (upper left corner) in both cases. However, the presence of noise enhances the
efficient coordination region. Indeed, even when strategy α is initially absent, once it is created
by mutation, it spreads as in the 5% case. It is to be noted that the same phenomenon happens
when the minority strategy is β = 0.05; in this case the images are specularly symmetrical, and
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Figure F.7: Distribution of strategies proportions at steady state on the d − c plane for scale-
free networks. Each sampled point is the average of 50 independent runs. The upper images
are for equal initial proportions of each strategy. In the lower figures the initial proportion
of randomly distributed α-strategists is 5%. Figures on the left column are for best response
dynamics without noise, while those on the right column represent a situation in which the
probability of mutation q = 0.02. Darker colors mean that risk-dominance prevails; light color
design the region where payoff-dominance prevails.
with colors reversed, with respect to the main diagonal, except for sampling differences (not
shown to save space).
Figure F.8 depicts average results for the model social network case of Toivonen et al. [114].
Results for the collaboration network are very close to those of model social networks. For this
reason, and in order not to clutter the graphics too much, we do not show them. It is immediately
apparent that the case in which strategies are initially randomly distributed in equal amounts
seems similar to the scale-free results. However, looking more carefully, the average results
shown in the figures hide to some extent the fact that now many simulations do not end in one
of the monomorphic population states, but rather there is a mix of the two strategies, when
noise is absent. This is visible in the upper left figure in the less crisp frontier along the diagonal
which is due to a more gradual transition between phase space regions. However, when a small
amount of noise is present (upper right image) the transition is again sharp and the dynamics
usually leads to a monomorphic population in which one of the two absorbing states is entered.
The reason why there can be mixed states in the noiseless case in social networks is related to
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Figure F.8: Distribution of strategies proportions at steady state on the d − c plane for model
social networks. Each sampled point is the average of 50 independent runs. The upper images
are for equal initial proportions of each strategy. In the lower figures the initial proportion
of randomly distributed α-strategists is 5%. Figures on the left column are for best response
dynamics without noise, while those on the right column represent a situation in which the
probability of mutation q = 0.02. Darker colors mean that risk-dominance prevails; light color
design the region where payoff-dominance prevails.
their mesoscopic structure. As we have seen in sect. F.5.2, model and real social networks can be
partitioned into recognizable clusters. Within these clusters strategies may become dominant as
in the pure coordination case just by chance. In other words, as soon as a strategy dominates in
a given cluster, it is difficult to eradicate it from outside since other communities, being weakly
connected, have little influence. This kind of effect in the Stag Hunt game has been observed
previously in simulations on grid-structured populations [109, 97]. However, grid structures are
not socially realistic; thus, the fact that more likely social structure do support efficient outcomes
is an encouraging result. However, when noise is present, there is always the possibility that the
other strategy appears in the cluster by statistical fluctuations and, from there, it can takeover
the whole community. To end this section, we remark that analogous effects due to the presence
of clusters in social networks have been observed and interpreted in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game in [58, 60].
We now briefly comment on the relationship between our numerical results and well known
theoretical results on Stag-Hunt games. These theoretical models are based on ergodic stochastic
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processes in large populations and state that, when using best-response dynamics in random
two-person encounters, and in the presence of a little amount of noise, both for well-mixed
populations as well as for populations structured as rings, the risk-dominant strategy should
take over the population in the long run [51, 26, 129]. From our simulation results on all kind of
networks this is not the case; in other words, at the steady state there is always either a single
strategy, but not necessarily the risk-dominant one, or a mix of both strategies. For scale-free
and random graphs, the numerical results of [97] agree with ours. The case of social networks,
presented here for the first time, also confirms the above and in addition makes explicit the
role played by communities. We may also mention at this point that, for the Stag-Hunt, the
presence of a local interaction structure provided by a network has been shown to increase the
region of the phase space in which the Pareto-dominant outcome prevails for other strategy
update rules, such as imitate the most successful neighbor or reproduce proportionally to fitness
(replicator dynamics) [109, 96]. Thus coordination is sensitive to the exact type of underlying
dynamics in networks. This is indirectly confirmed by the theoretical study of Robson and Vega-
Redondo [95] in which a different matching model is used with respect to Kandori et al [51].
In [95] players are immediately randomly rematched after each encounter and the result is that
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is selected instead.
In summary, it can be said that network effects tend to reinforce cooperation on the Pareto-
dominant case, which is a socially appreciable effect. However, these results must be taken
with a grain of salt. We are numerically studying finite, network-structured populations during
a limited amount of time, while theoretical results have been established for large well mixed
populations in the very long run. As for the finite-size population, we have performed many
simulations with larger (N = 2000) and smaller (down to N = 100) networks and the results
do not change significantly (not shown to save space). However, in the end, the conditions
of the numerical experiments are sufficiently different to conclude that numerical results and
theoretical predictions based on different assumptions do not have to agree necessarily.
F.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this work we have studied pure and general coordination games on complex networks by
numerical simulation. Situations described by coordination games are common in society and
it is important to understand when and how coordination on socially efficient outcomes can be
achieved.
In the case of pure coordination games on model networks using deterministic best response
strategy dynamics we have found that network effects are small or non-existent in standard
complex networks. On model social networks and a real co-authorship network the behavior is
similar, but the transition from one convention to the other is smoother and the cluster structure
of the networks plays an important role in protecting payoff-weaker conventions within commu-
nities and this leads to a clear polarization of conventions in the network. When a small amount
of noise is added in order to simulate errors and trembles in the agent’s decisions, the dynamics
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leads to the payoff-dominant norm for smaller values of the payoff difference between strategies.
However, in the case of social networks, even a tiny amount of payoff advantage is enough to
drive a minority of α-strategists to take over the whole network thanks to the cluster structure
and mutations.
In the case of general coordination games of the Stug Hunt type where there is a tension be-
tween payoff-dominance and risk-dominance, we have confirmed previous simulation results in
the sense that, with deterministic best response dynamics the influence of network structure
is very limited [109, 97, 96, 60]. On the other hand, when we consider model and social net-
works, again their community structure plays an important role which consists in allowing the
existence at steady state of dimorphic populations in which both strategies are present and
stable. The payoff-dominant strategy is favored in regions where risk-dominance should be the
only stable strategy and, conversely, it allows risk-dominant players to survive in clusters when
payoff-dominance should prevail.
We have also compared numerical results with theoretical ones when they exist. The latter
actually depend on the detailed structure of the stochastic processes generated by the particular
theoretical model. In this sense, numerical results are compatible with theoretical predictions
when they are applicable, i.e. for well mixed and ring-structured populations [51, 95, 26]. Also,
for pure coordination games the predictions of [70] in arbitrary non-homogeneous structures are
qualitatively confirmed. However, finite-size and complex network effects are difficult to describe
theoretically and thus our results on complex and social networks cannot always be easily com-
pared with theoretical predictions. Our current and future work is to investigate coordination
games in a more realistic co-evolutionary scenario in which both the agents’ strategies as well
as their interactions may vary dynamically.
Acknowledgments. We thank Rafael Lalive for stimulating discussions and for reading the
manuscript. We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Swiss National Science Foun-
dation under contract 200020-119719.
Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks Enea Pestelacci
160
ARTICLE F. EVOLUTION OF COORDINATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS: A
NUMERICAL STUDY
Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks Enea Pestelacci
Article G
Coordination Games on Dynamical
Networks
Authors: M. Tomassini, E. Pestelacci
Published in: Games
Volume: 1
Number: 3
Pages: 242–261
Year: 2010
DOI: 10.3390/g1030242
Abstract
We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of
contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect
links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. As a result, there is co-evolution of strategies in the
population and of the graph that represents the network of contacts.
We apply the model to the class of pure and general coordination games. For pure coor-
dination games, the networks co-evolve towards the polarization of different strategies. In the
case of general coordination games our results show that the possibility of refusing neighbors
and choosing different partners increases the success rate of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
G.1 Introduction
The purpose of Game Theory [122] is to describe situations in which two or more agents or
entities may pursue different views about what is to be considered best by each of them. In
other words, Game Theory, or at least the non-cooperative part of it, strives to describe what the
agents’ rational decisions should be in such conflicting situations. For example, games such as
the well known Prisoner’s Dilemma have been heavily used in order to represent the tension that
appears in society when individual objectives are in conflict with socially desirable outcomes.
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Indeed, a large part of the research literature has focused on conflicting situations in order to
uncover the mechanisms that could lead to cooperation instead of socially harmful outcomes (see
e.g. [82] for a synthesis). However, there are important situations in society that do not require
players to use aggressive strategies. In fact, many frequent social and economic activities require
individuals to coordinate their actions on a common goal since in many cases the best course
of action is to conform to the standard behavior. For example, if someone’s native language
is French and she travels to an English-speaking country, it pays off to follow the local norm,
i.e. to speak English instead of French. Games that express this extremely common kind of
interactions are called coordination games.
Coordination games confront the players with multiple Nash equilibria and the consequent
problem of how to choose among them. A useful approach has been to turn to evolutionary and
learning ideas which offer a dynamical perspective based on the forces of biological and social
evolution. In evolutionary game theory (EGT), the concept of a population of players where
strategies that score best are more likely to be selected and reproduced provides a justification for
the appearance of stable states of the dynamics that represent solutions of the game [122, 30].
For mathematical convenience, standard EGT is based on infinite mixing populations where
pairs of individuals are drawn uniformly at random at each step and play the game. Correlations
are absent by definition and the population has an homogeneous structure. However, everyday
observation tells us that in animal and human societies, individuals usually tend to interact more
often with some specified subset of partners; for instance, teenagers tend to adopt the fashions
of their close friends group; closely connected groups usually follow the same religion, and so on.
Likewise, in the economic world, a group of firms might be directly connected because they share
capital, technology, or otherwise interact in some way. In short, social interaction is mediated by
networks, in which vertices identify people, firms etc., and edges identify some kind of relation
between the concerned vertices such as friendship, collaboration, and economic exchange. Thus,
locality of interaction plays an important role. This kind of approach was pioneered in EGT
by Nowak and May [84] by using simple two-dimensional regular grids. Recently, in the wake
of a surge of activity in network research in many fields [75], the dynamical and evolutionary
behavior of games on networks that are more likely to represent actual social interactions than
regular grids has been investigated (see [112] for a comprehensive recent review). These studies
have shown that there are network structures, such as scale-free and actual social networks that
may favor the emergence of cooperation with respect to the fully mixing populations used in the
theory [101, 60]. Most studies have focused on conflicting games but some work has also been
done on games of the coordination type [109, 60, 96].
However, the above approach assumes a static point of view, i.e. it takes the network of
contacts as being fixed once and for all and investigates the evolution of the agents’ strategies
over time. In other words, it is as if we took a snapshot of a given network at a given time and
used this situation during all future times. Actually, however, social networks are dynamical
entities that change constantly: actors may join and leave networks at unpredictable times
and they may accumulate and abandon ties over time. Using static networks is a useful first
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approximation however, especially for the cases where the rate of change of the network structure
is slow with respect to the rate of change of individual’s behaviors. This could be the case of
long-term collaboration networks, friendship, or of biological networks that are the result of an
extremely long and slow evolution. But in many cases this static picture does not fit the reality
very well. If we think of social or pseudo-social networks such as e-mail exchanges, Facebook-like
networks, rumor-spreading networks and a host of other similar structures, we see that that the
evolution of the network of contacts itself can be quite rapid and plays an important role.
In the present work we study the co-evolution of agents’ behavior and of the agents’ ties in
the network over time. For the sake of simplicity, we investigate constant-size systems, i.e. we
start with a finite-size network of agents and allow agents to abandon and to create links among
themselves but there will be no new agents joining the system, nor agents will be allowed to leave
it. This is not what happens in actual social and technological networks, which all tend to grow
with time and are actually non-equilibrium systems, but our “closed system” approximation is
simpler to simulate and interpret, and will allow us to already draw significant conclusions. Our
methodology is essentially computer simulation-based since complex networks inhomogeneity
and correlations make standard mean-field methods not adequate.
Some previous work has been done on evolutionary games on dynamic networks essentially
dealing with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, e.g. [109, 59, 103, 131] and a recent review of these ap-
proaches has been written by Perc and Szolnoki [90]. The present study follows our own model
described in [92, 119] which differs from other approaches in the way in which links between
agents are represented and interpreted, as explained later. In these previous works we stud-
ied the antagonistic Hawk Doves game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma with replicator dynamics,
instead of the best response dynamics used here for coordination games.
We also note that in the last fifteen years economists have put forward a theory of strategic
network formation, i.e. formal models of how utility-based link formation moves might be
implemented in order to reach a Nash equilibrium for all the members of the network (see e.g.
Jackson’s book for a synthesis of this work [49]). Our approach is different from the above
view of strategic network formation for two reasons. First, we use networks that are at least
two orders of magnitude larger and, while the equilibrium predictions resulting from strategic
considerations usually lead to very simple topological structures such as small cliques or stars,
our large evolving networks show complex structure and behavior. Second, while in strategic
network formation the evolution of the network is submitted to utility maximization on the part
of the players, our linking moves are based on very simple forms of reinforcement learning. Only
the decisions of players concerning their behavioral strategies are based on a formal game payoff
matrix.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a brief introduction to the
subject of coordination games, in order to make the work self-contained. Then we describe the
dynamical network model in Sect. G.3. Next, in Sect. G.4 we present and discuss the simulation
results for pure coordination games. This is followed by the results on general coordination
games in Sect. G.5. Finally, in Sect. G.6 we give our conclusions.
Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks Enea Pestelacci
164 ARTICLE G. COORDINATION GAMES ON DYNAMICAL NETWORKS
G.2 Coordination Games
G.2.1 General Coordination Games
General two-person, two strategies coordination games have the normal form of Table G.1. With
a > d and b > c, (α, α) and (β, β) are both Nash equilibria. Now, if we assume that a > b and
(a−d) ≤ (b−c) then (β, β) is the risk-dominant equilibrium, while (α, α) is the Pareto-dominant
one. This simply means that players get a higher payoff by coordinating on (α, α) but they risk
less by using strategy β instead. There is also a third equilibrium in mixed strategies but it is
evolutionarily unstable. A well known example of games of this type are the so-called Stag Hunt
α β
α a, a c, d
β d, c b, b
Table G.1: A general two-person, two strategies coordination game.
games [109]. This class of games has been extensively studied analytically in an evolutionary
setting [51, 26] and by numerical simulation on several static model network types [109, 60, 96].
In the following, we shall first deal with the easier case of pure coordination games which, in
spite of their simplicity, already clearly pose the equilibrium selection problem. Then we shall
report results on Stag Hunt games which are more interesting in social terms as they pose a
problem of “trust”, since the socially efficient solution is more risky.
G.2.2 Pure Coordination Games
Two-person pure coordination games have the normal form depicted in Table G.2, with ui, ui > 0,
and ui, uj = 0, 0, i 6= j,∀i, j ∈ [1, k], where k is the number of strategies available to each player
in the strategy set S = {s1, s2, ..., sk}, and the u’s are payoffs. So all the Nash equilibria in pure
strategies correspond to diagonal elements in the table where the two players coordinate on the
same strategy, while there is a common lower uniform payoff for all other strategy pairs which
is set to 0 here.
s1 s2 . . . sk
s1 u1,u1 0, 0 . . . 0, 0
s2 0, 0 u2,u2 . . . 0, 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
sk 0, 0 . . . . . . uk,uk
Table G.2: A general payoff bi-matrix of a two-person pure coordination game. Nash equilibria
in pure strategies are marked in bold.
In this paper we shall consider two-person, two-strategies pure coordination games with the
payoff matrix of Table G.3 with a ≥ b > 0. When a > b, strategy α is said to be dominant since
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a player obtains a higher payoff playing α rather than β.
α β
α a, a 0, 0
β 0, 0 b, b
Table G.3: A general two-person, two-strategies pure coordination game.
G.3 Model Description
In this section we provide nomenclature and definitions for the graphs representing the popula-
tion and for the dynamical decision processes implemented by the agents. The dynamical model
has originally appeared in [92, 119]; it is summarized here to make the paper self-contained.
The network of players is represented by a directed weighted graph G(V,E), where the set of
vertices V represents the agents, while the set of oriented edges (or links) E represents their
unsymmetric weighted interactions. The population size N is the cardinality of V . A neighbor
of an agent i is any other agent j such that there is a pair of oriented edges i¯j and j¯i ∈ E.
The set of neighbors of i is called Ni. For network structure description purposes, we shall also
use an unoriented version G
′
of G having exactly the same set of vertices V but only a single
unoriented unweighted edge ij between any pair of connected vertices i and j of G. For G′ we
shall define the degree ki of vertex i ∈ V as the number of neighbors of i. The average degree
of the network G
′
will be called k¯.
Each link in G has a weight or “force” fij that represents in an indirect way the “trust” player
i places in player j. This weight may take any value in [0, 1] and its variation is dictated by
the payoff earned by i in each encounter with j. The detailed way in which weights evolve
dynamically is explained below. We define a quantity si called satisfaction of an agent i as the
mean weight of i’s links:
si =
∑
j∈Ni fij
ki
,
with 0 ≤ si ≤ 1. The link strengths can be seen as a kind of accumulated “memory” of previous
encounters. However, it must be distinguished from the memory used in iterated games, in
which players “remember” a certain number of previous moves and can thus conform their
future strategy on the analysis of those past encounters [122, 30]. Our interactions are strictly
one-shot, i.e. players “forget” the strategies used by neighbors in previous rounds and cannot
recognize their playing patterns over time. However, they do recognize neighbors in terms of
the strengths of the links they maintain with them. It could also be useful to model progressive
obsolescence of the fij over time, i.e. a discount rate of their values but, for the sake of simplicity,
we prefer not to consider this effect in a first step.
Since we shall adopt an evolutionary approach, we must next define the decision rule by which
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individuals update their strategy and their contacts during time. For the strategy update, an
easy and well known adaptive learning rule is myopic best-response dynamics, which embodies
a primitive form of bounded rationality and for which rigorous results for coordination games
are known in well mixed populations [51, 95] and in fixed one-dimensional and two-dimensional
lattices [26, 70].
In the local version of this model, time is discrete i.e. t = 0, 1, 2, . . . and, in each time step,
an agent has the opportunity of revising her current strategy. She does so by considering the
current actions of her neighbors and switching to the action that would maximize her payoff
if the neighbors would stick to their current choices. This rule is called myopic because the
agents only care about immediate payoff, they cannot see far into the future. The model is thus
completely local and an agent only needs to know her own current strategy, the game payoff
matrix, who are her neighbors, and their current strategies. Furthermore, the agent must be
able to “ask” one of her neighbors to introduce to her one of his neighbors. Given the network
structure of the population, the strategy update rule is implemented as follows:
• in each time step a randomly chosen1 player i revises her strategy with probability p
• player i will choose the action that maximizes her payoff, given that the strategy profile
of her neighbors Ni remains the same as in the previous period
• if there is a tie or i is not given the opportunity of revising her strategy, then i will keep
her current strategy
Now we describe the dynamics of links. The active agent i will, with probability q, attempt
to dismiss an interaction with one of her neighbors, say j, selected proportionally to 1 − fij ,
i.e. the higher fij , the lower the probability of the link being selected for rewiring. Likewise,
the lower the satisfaction si of agent i, the higher the probability of dismissing the ij link.
However, although i may take the lead in the decision to dismiss a link, j has some power in
opposing herself. The idea is that, in real social situations, it is seldom possible to take unilateral
decisions: often there is a cost associated, and we represent this hidden cost by a probability
1− (fij + fji)/2 with which j may refuse to be cut away. In other words, the link is less likely
to be deleted when j’s trust in i, fji, is high. If the decision is finally taken to cut the link,
i attempts to create a new link with a neighbor l of one of her neighbors k ∈ Ni \ {j}, such
that links ik and kl with high forces are probabilistically favored. Link ji simply disappears, as
relations in the weighted graph G are always reciprocal, although the corresponding weights will,
in general, be different. This process is schematically depicted in Fig. G.1. This process requires
that agent k “introduces” one of its neighbors, say l, to i. Obviously, this bias will cause the
clustering coefficient of the network to increase over time due to the transitive closure it causes,
i.e. triangles will be more likely in the evolving graph. The solution adopted here is inspired by
the observation that, in social networks, links are usually created more easily between people
who have a satisfactory mutual acquaintance than those who do not. If the new link already
1The active agent is chosen with uniform probability and with replacement.
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exists, the process is repeated with l’s neighbors. If this also fails, a new link between i and a
randomly chosen node is created. In all cases the new link is initialized with a strength of 0.5
in both directions.
i
j
k
l
fik
fkl
fil
Figure G.1: Illustration of the rewiring of link {ij} to {il}. Agent k is chosen to introduce player
l to i (see text). Between any pair of connected agents there are two directed links: only one of
them is shown for clarity.
Once the agents have played with their neighbors, and have gone through their strategy or
link update steps, the strengths of the links are updated in the following way:
fij(t+ 1) = fij(t) +
piij − p¯iij
ki (pimax − pimin) ,
where piij is the payoff of i when interacting with j, p¯iij is the payoff that i would have earned
against j, if j were to play his other strategy, and pimax (pimin) is the maximal (minimal) possible
payoff obtainable in a single interaction. ki = |Ni| is the number of i’s neighbors, i.e. its degree.
If fij(t + 1) falls outside the [0, 1] interval then it is reset to 0 if it is negative, and to 1 if it is
larger than 1. This update is performed in both directions, i.e. both fij and fji are updated
∀j ∈ Ni because both i and j get a payoff out of their encounter.
In summary, calling Gt the population graph at time t, where each node is labeled with
its present strategy s(t) ∈ {α, β} and Gt = (V,E) where V is fixed but E = E(t) evolves, the
resulting stochastic process {G0, G1, . . .} is a Markov chain since the probability of state Gt only
depends on the previous step: P (Gt|Gt−1, Gt−2, . . .) = P (Gt|Gt−1).
At this point, we should mention that Skyrms and coworkers [109, 111] have proposed a
representation of agents’ interaction based on evolvable interaction probabilities which is con-
ceptually similar to ours, but the context is very different. Populations are small (ten players)
and the network structure is never made explicit as the authors prefer to think in terms of
probabilistic “encounters” instead of using the link concept. This approach allows Skyrms and
coworkers to establish quantitative models based on stochastic processes for the simplest cases
but it does not lead to an explicit description of the actual evolving networks. In addition, when
players update their strategies, they have global knowledge of the strategy distribution of the
whole population, while in our model this knowledge is strictly local.
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G.4 Simulation Results for Pure Coordination Games
G.4.1 Simulation Settings
The constant size of the network during the simulations is N = 1000. The initial graph G′0 is
generated randomly with a mean degree k¯ = 6. The companion oriented graph G0 is trivially
built from G′0 and forces between any pair of neighboring players are initialized at 0.5.
The non-zero diagonal payoff a has been varied in the range [0.5, 1] in steps of 0.05 with
b = 1− a; the range [0, 0.5] is symmetrically equivalent. Each value in the phase space reported
in the following figures is the average of 50 independent runs and each run has been performed
on a fresh realization of the corresponding initial random graph.
To detect steady states of the dynamics 2, i.e. those states with little or no fluctuation over
extended periods of time, we first let the system evolve for a transient period of 5000×N times
steps (= 5 × 106 time steps when N = 1000). After a quasi-equilibrium state is reached past
the transient, averages are calculated during 500×N additional time steps. A steady state has
always been reached in all simulations performed within the prescribed amount of time, for most
of them well before the limit.
We have experimented with different proportions of uniformly randomly distributed initial
strategies α belonging to the set {0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}.
G.4.2 Discussion of Results
Figure G.2 reports the amount of α-strategists in the population when a quasi-equilibrium
state has been reached as a function of the rewiring frequency q. The upper light part of the
plots indicate the region of the parameters space where the α-strategists are able to completely
take over the population. This can happen because α strategy offers the best payoff since
a − b is positive, therefore β-strategists are prone to adapt in order to improve their wealth.
Figure G.2(a) shows the case where both α and β strategies are present in the same ratio at the
beginning of the simulation. The darker region indicates the situations where diversity is able
to resist. This clearly happens when the payoff difference a−b is zero. In this case both α and β
are winning strategies and the players tends to organize in two big clusters to minimize the links
with the opposing faction. More surprisingly, even when one of the two strategies has a payoff
advantage, the evolution of the topology of the interaction allows the less favorable strategy to
resist. The faster the network evolution is (larger q), the greater the payoff difference that can
be tolerated by the agents.
In figures G.2(b) the case when α represent only 25% of the initial population is presented.
When no noise is present the stronger strategy needs an increased payoff advantage to take over
the population. When a−b < 0.3 the payoff-inferior strategy β is able to maintain the majority.
To confirm the stochastic stability of the evolution process we did a series of simulations
2With the above simulated process one cannot properly speak of true equilibrium states in the strict mathe-
matical sense.
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Figure G.2: Fraction of α-strategists in the population as a function of the relinking probability
q when the quasi-equilibrium has been reached. (a) shows the case where the initial fraction of
α is 0.5 and noise is not present. In (b) and (c) the initial fraction of α is 0.25. (b) shows the
noiseless case and (c) the case where noise is 0.01. Results are averages over 50 independent
runs.
using a noisy version of the strategy evolution rule [51]. The amount of noise used is 0.01, which
means that an agent will pick the wrong strategy once every 100 updates on average. This
quantity is rather small and does not change the results obtained when the two populations are
equally represented in the initial network, the graphic representation is almost the same of the
one in fig. G.2(a) with respect to stochastic fluctuations. However, when the initial share is not
the same, the presence of noise allows a considerable increase in the performance of the Pareto-
superior strategy when this strategy is less represented in the beginning. Figure G.2(c) shows
the case when the initial ratio of α-strategists is 25% of the population. We can clearly see that
the strategy that offers the higher payoff (α in this case but the results for β would obviously
be symmetrical) can recover a considerable amount of the parameters space even when it starts
from an unfavorable situation. The coexistence of stochastic errors and network plasticity allows
the more advantageous strategy to improve its share. In this case, when q > 0.4 the situation is
almost the same as when the initial shares are the same. The same phenomenons happen when
the initial ratio of α is smaller. The case of an initial ratio of 5% has been verified but is not
shown here.
For visualization purposes, figures G.3 and G.4 show one typical instance of the evolution
of the network G
′
and of the strategy distribution from the initial state in which strategies are
distributed uniformly at random to a final quasi-equilibrium steady state for a smaller N = 100
network. in spite of the relatively small size, the phenomena are qualitatively the same for
N = 100 and N = 1000, the major difference is just the time to convergence which is much
shorter for N = 100.
These results have been obtained for a symmetric payoff of the strategies a = b and for
an equal initial fraction of α-strategists and β-strategists. It is visually clear that the system
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure G.3: (a) The simulation starts from a random network with N = 100 and 50 players for
each type. (b) In the first short part of the simulation (∼ 500 time steps) the strategies reach
an equilibrium, the network however is still unorganized. (c) The community structure starts
then to emerge, many small clusters with nearly uniform strategy appears.
goes from a random state of both the network and the strategy distribution to a final one in
which the network is no longer completely random and, even more important, the strategies
are distributed in a completely polarized way. In other words, the system evolves toward an
equilibrium where individuals following the same convention are clustered together. Since both
norms are equivalent in the sense that their respective payoffs are the same, agents tend to pair-
up with other agents playing the same strategy since playing the opposite one is a dominated
strategy. The process of polarization and, in some cases, even the splitting of the graph into two
distinct connected components of different colors, is facilitated by the possibility of breaking and
forming links when an interaction is judged unsatisfactory by an agent. Even with a relatively
small rewiring frequency of q = 0.15 as for the case represented in the figures, polarization
is reached relatively quickly. In fact, since our graphs G and G
′
are purely relational entities
devoid of any metric structure, breaking a link and forming another one may also be interpreted
as “moving away”, which is what would physically happen in certain social contexts. If, on the
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other hand, the environment is say, belonging to one of two forums on the Internet, then link
rewiring would not represent any physical reconfiguration of the agents, just a different web
connection. Although our model is an abstract one and does not claim any social realism, still
one could imagine how conceptually similar phenomena may take place in society. For example,
the two norms might represent two different dress codes. People dressing in a certain way, if
they go to a public place, say a bar or a concert in which individuals dress in the other way
in the majority, will tend to change place in order to feel more adapted to their surroundings.
Of course, one can find many other examples that would fit this description. An early model
capable of qualitatively represent this kind of phenomena was Schelling’s segregation cellular
automaton [106] which was based on a simple majority rule. However, Schelling’s model, being
based on a two-dimensional grid, is not realistic as a social network. Furthermore, the game
theory approach allows to adjust the payoffs for a given strategy and is analytically solvable for
homogeneous or regular graphs.
The above qualitative observations can be rendered more statistically rigorous by using the
concept of communities. Communities or clusters in networks can be loosely defined as being
groups of nodes that are strongly connected between them and poorly connected with the rest
of the graph. These structures are extremely important in social networks and may determine
to a large extent the properties of dynamical processes such as diffusion, search, and rumor
spreading among others. Several methods have been proposed to uncover the clusters present in
a network (for a recent review see, for instance, [28]). To detect communities, here we have used
the divisive method of Girvan and Newman [79] which is based on iteratively removing edges
with a high value of edge betweennes. A commonly used statistical indicator of the presence of
a recognizable community structure is the modularity Q. According to Newman [77] modularity
is proportional to the number of edges falling within clusters minus the expected number in an
equivalent network with edges placed at random. In general, networks with strong community
structure tend to have values of Q in the range 0.4−0.7. In the case of our simulations Q = 0.19
for the initial random networks with N = 100 like the one shown in fig. G.3(a). Q progressively
increases and reaches Q = 0.29 for fig. G.3(c) and Q = 0.45 for the final polarized network of
fig. G.4. In the case of the larger networks with N = 1000 the modularity is slightly higher
during the evolution, Q ∼ 0.3 at the beginning of the simulation and Q ∼ 0.5 when the network
has reached a polarized state. This is due to the more sparse structure of these networks.
To confirm the stability of this topological evolution we performed several simulation using
the noisy strategy update rule. Even in this situation the network will attain a polarized state
but due to the stochastic strategy fluctuations the two main clusters almost never reach a
completely disconnected state and the modularity remains slightly lower (∼ 0.4) compared to
the noiseless case.
As a second kind of numerical experiment, we asked how the population would react when,
in a polarized social situation, a few connected players of one of the clusters suddenly switch to
the opposite strategy. The results of a particular but typical simulation are shown in Figs. G.5.
Starting from the clusters obtained as a result of the co-evolution of strategies and network
leading to Fig. G.4, a number of “red” individuals replace some “yellow” ones in the corre-
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Figure G.4: In the last phase the network is entirely polarized in two homogeneous clusters. If
the simulation is long enough all the links between the two poles will disappear.
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure G.5: (a) A consistent amount of mutant is inserted in one of the two clusters. (b) This
invasion perturbs the structure of the population that starts to reorganize. (c) With enough
evolution time the topology reaches a new polarized quasi-equilibrium.
sponding cluster. The evolution is very interesting: after some time the two-cluster structure
disappears and is replaced by a different network in which several clusters with a majority of
one or the other strategies coexist. However, these intermediate structures are unstable and, at
steady state one recovers essentially a situation close to the initial one, in which the two poles
form again but with small differences with respect to the original one. Clearly the size of the
clusters is different from that of before the invasion. Even in this case, if the evolution time is
long enough, the two components can become disconnected at the end. This means that, once
formed, polar structures are rather stable, except for noise and stochastic errors. Moreover,
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we observed that at the beginning the invasion process the modularity drops slightly due to
the strong reorganization of the network but then it increases again and often reaches a higher
value with respect to the previous state. In the case shown here, the final modularity is 0.56.
The same happens in the larger networks where, after the invasion process Q reaches values of
Q ∼ 0.55.
G.5 Results for General Coordination Games
In this section we show the numerical results for the Stag Hunt class of coordination games. We
recall that, unlike pure coordination games, in Stag Hunt games there is risk in coordinating
on the Pareto-efficient strategy and thus agents may wish to reduce their aspirations by playing
the socially inferior strategy for fear of being “betrayed” (see Sect. G.2.1).
The simulation parameters are the same as for coordination games, see Sect. G.4.1, except
that now the game parameter space is more complex. For the Stag Hunt the ordering of payoffs
is a > d > b > c, and we have studied the portion of the parameters’ space defined by c ∈ [−1, 0]
and d ∈ [0, 1], a = 1, and b = 0, as is customarily done [96]. The c− d plane has been sampled
with a grid step of 0.05.
In order to find out whether a change in the strategy update dynamics would make a differ-
ence in the results, we have used, besides the already described best response dynamics, another
update rule which is related to replicator dynamics [122, 30]. Instead of considering a mixing
population, the version of replicator dynamics used here is modified to take into account the local
nature of interaction networks as proposed by [41]. It assumes that the probability of switching
strategy is a monotonic increasing function φ of the payoff difference; here φ is a linear function.
First, a player i is randomly chosen from the population to be updated with uniform probabil-
ity and with replacement. To update its strategy another player j is next drawn uniformly at
random from i’s neighborhood Ni. Then, strategy si is replaced by sj with probability
pi = φ(Πj −Πi), (G.1)
in which
Πi(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
piij(t)
is the accumulated payoff collected by player i at time step t after having played with all
his neighbors Ni. The major difference with standard replicator dynamics is that two-person
encounters between players are only possible among neighbors, instead of being drawn from the
whole population.
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G.5.1 Strategy Distribution at Steady State
The following Figures G.6 and G.7 show the average fraction of strategy α (light color) and β
(darker color) respectively at steady state for best response dynamics and replicator dynamics,
and for three values of the rewiring frequency q increasing from left to right. Initially there is
an equal amount of α and β players randomly distributed in the network nodes. The first thing
to notice is that the trend is the same, i.e. higher frequencies of link rewiring favor the Pareto-
efficient result for both dynamics, although this happens to a lesser extent for best response.
The reason is that best response confirms the players in what they are doing: the best response
to α is α and to β it is β but, on the whole, the possibility of link rewiring allows unsatisfied
α-strategists to cut a link with a β-strategist and to search for another α in the next to first
neighborhood. Since the data plotted in the figures are average values, it is also important
to point out that, actually, in all runs the final steady state is constituted by a monomorphic
population, i.e. only one strategy is present. This is coherent with standard results on Stag
Hunt games which show that polymorphic populations are unstable and that the dynamics
should converge to one of the pure states [30, 51, 26, 95].
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Figure G.6: Average strategy proportions over 50 independent runs in the game’s phase space
at steady state. Initially α and β are equally represented. Update rule is best response and
rewiring frequency q increases from left to right.
The update rules used are both noiseless, in the sense that, apart from the implicit probabil-
ities used in the dynamics, no exogenous noise simulating strategic errors or trembles has been
added. When a small amount of error probability of 0.01 is added in the best response case the
results change very little and are not shown.
One might also ask what happens when initially the strategies are not present in equal
amounts and, in particular, whether network and rewiring effects may help the socially efficient
strategy α to proliferate when it starts in the minority. Figures G.8 and G.9 are the same as
Figs. G.6 and G.7 but this time strategy α is only 1/4 of the total initially. It is apparent
that, even when α-strategists are the minority, they can occupy a sizeable region of the phase
space thanks to rewiring effects. Indeed, by increasing the rewiring frequency the size of the α
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Figure G.7: Average strategy proportions over 50 independent runs in the game’s phase space
at steady state. Initially α and β are equally represented. Update rule is replicator dynamics
and rewiring frequency q increases from left to right.
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Figure G.8: Average strategy proportions over 50 independent runs in the game’s phase space at
steady state. Initially α players are 25% of the total. Update rule is best response and rewiring
frequency q increases from left to right.
region increases as well. The effects are present for both dynamics but they are more marked
in the best response case (Fig. G.8). As a further probe, we have also simulated the evolution
of populations with only 5% α initially and the results, not shown here, are that the α strategy
proliferates in a non-negligible region of the parameter space and the more so the higher the
relinking frequency.
G.5.2 Network Features
In this section we present a statistical analysis of some of the global and local properties of the
networks that emerge when the pseudo-equilibrium states of the dynamics are attained. We
do not strive for a complete analysis: this would take too much space; just a few topological
features should be already useful to get a clearer picture. The graphs used for the analysis are
the undirected, unweighted versions G
′
. An important global network statistics is the average
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Figure G.9: Average strategy proportions over 50 independent runs in the game’s phase space
at steady state. Initially α players are 25% of the total. Update rule is replicator dynamics and
rewiring frequency q increases from left to right.
clustering coefficient C. The clustering coefficient Ci of a node i is defined as Ci = 2Ei/ki(ki−1),
where Ei is the number of edges in the neighborhood of i and ki is i’s degree. Thus Ci measures
the amount of “cliquishness” of the neighborhood of node i and it characterizes the extent to
which nodes adjacent to node i are connected to each other. The clustering coefficient of the
graph is simply the average over all nodes: C = 1N
∑N
i=1Ci [75]. In Figure G.10 we report for
each grid point the average value of C over 50 realizations of G
′
. The figure shows that in general
C increases with increasing q which is reasonable, as higher q values mean more rewiring and
thus more transitive closure of triangles in the neighborhood. In particular, we have remarked
that C is especially high in the proximity of the transition zone between β and α regions. We
also note that the clustering of α-strategists networks are higher than those of β-strategists.
Indeed, in the relinking process, α−α links tends to be stable as both players get the maximum
payoff. On the other hand, α − β links will be unstable since the α end will try to dismiss the
link, while the β end tries to keep it. As for the β − β links, they also tend to be unstable for
both agents will in the average try to chase for an α. When αs become rearer in the population
the links are more difficult to stabilize and local structure does not emerge.
To give a qualitative idea of the network self-organization, we compare C values in the α
and β regions with the values expected for the initial random graph. Random graphs are locally
homogeneous and for them C is simply equal to the probability of having an edge between any
pair of nodes independently. In contrast, real networks have local structures and thus higher
values of C. For example, with q = 0.5, C can be as high as 0.3 in the α region close to the
transition, and as low as C = 0.009 in the β region. It is thus apparent that the networks
self-organize and acquire local structure for α networks as C is much higher than that of the
random graph with the same number of nodes and edges, which is k¯/N = 6/1000 = 0.006. In
the β region there is barely more clustering than for a random graph. Given that the model
favors rewiring a link toward a neighbor’s neighbor, it is obvious that the clustering coefficient
will tend to increase and thus the effect was expected. Nevertheless, this transitive closure is a
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Figure G.10: Average clustering coefficients of steady-state networks; relinking frequency q
increases from left to right. Equal initial proportions of α and β strategies and strategy update
is by best response.
well known social phenomenon and the model successfully simulates it.
Another important quantity is the degree distribution function. The degree distribution
function p(k) of a graph represents the probability that a randomly chosen node has degree
k [75]. Random graphs are characterized by distributions of Poisson form p(k) = k¯ke−k¯/k!, while
social and technological real networks often show long tails to the right, i.e. there are nodes
that have an unusually large number of neighbors [75]. In some extreme cases the distribution
has a power-law form p(k) ∝ k−γ ; the tail is particularly extended and there is no characteristic
degree.
In our simulations the population graph G
′
always starts random, i.e. G
′
0 has a Poisson
degree distribution. It would be interesting to see whether the graphs remain random after
the co-evolutionary process stabilizes in a steady state, or whether they acquire some more
structure. Fig. G.11 shows the degree distribution functions sampled at two points in the c− d
plane. One point is in the α-stable region and the other is in the β-stable one. The third dotted
curve is shown for comparison and corresponds to the initial random graph which has a Poisson
p(k) with k¯ = 6. Both curves at steady state deviate from the random graph distribution but,
while the degree distribution of the network of β players is still rather close to Poisson, the
α network (thick curve) shows a distribution that has a longer tail to the right, i.e. there is
a non-negligible quantity of nodes that have more connections. Together with the increase of
the clustering coefficient seen above, this shows that α networks have acquired more structure
than β networks during the co-evolutionary process. It appears that α strategists use the
relinking possibility in such a way that more α clusters are created, thus protecting them from
β “exploiters”. The curves shown are for q = 0.8; for lower values of q the effect is the same but
less marked as q → 0.
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Figure G.11: Average empirical degree distribution functions for the initial random graphs
(dotted line), steady-state graphs in the α-dominant region of the parameters’ space (thick
curve), and in the β-dominant region (dashed line) All distributions are discrete, continuous
curves are just a guide for the eye.
G.6 Conclusions
In this paper we propose and simulate numerically a model in which a population of agents
interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other.
The agents can update their game strategy according to their payoff and the payoff of their
neighbors by using simple rules such as best response and replicator dynamics. In addition, the
links between agents have a strength that changes dynamically and independently as a function
of the relative satisfaction of the two end points when playing with their immediate neighbors in
the network. A player may wish to break and redirect a tie to a neighbor if it is unsatisfied. As a
result, there is co-evolution of strategies in the population and also of the graph that represents
the network of contacts.
We have applied the above model to the class of coordination games, which are important
paradigms for collaboration and social efficiency. For pure coordination games, the networks
co-evolve towards the polarization and, in some cases, even the splitting of the graph into two
distinct connected components of different strategies. Even with a relatively small rewiring
frequency polarization is reached relatively quickly. This metaphorically represents the segrega-
tion of norm-following subpopulations in larger populations. In the case of general coordination
games the issue is whether the socially efficient strategy, i.e the Pareto-dominant one, may es-
tablish in the population. While results in well-mixed and static networked populations tend to
favor the risk-dominant, and thus socially inefficient outcome, our simulation results show that
the possibility of refusing neighbors and choosing different partners increases the success rate of
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Although the model is extremely simplified, the possibility of
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link redirection is a real one in society and thus these results mean that some plasticity in the
network contacts may have positive global social effects.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Only Robinson Crusoe had everything done by
Friday.
Author Unknown
This work has been conducted in the last five years. It’s a quite long time span and although
some of the ideas developed here where already planned, some developments have been decided
on the way.
In the following, we shall try to point out which are the main results and conclusions reached
in this work in the light of the motivations and objectives that we set for ourselves in Chapter 1.
On update rules
From a statistical point if view, update rules and timing of events have only limited effect on
the amount of cooperation in a structured population. When we look at the mean values, the
transition from cooperation to defection may happen for slightly different values of the payoff
matrix but in general the global picture seen at the equilibrium is only slightly affected by timing
and update rule (see figures A.1 and A.2).
The numbers of time steps needed to reach an equilibrium are however strongly dependent
on the update rule. For example, when using a deterministic rule like “Imitate the best” the
evolution is much quicker.
On the other hand, when we look more closely at the behavior of the agents on a single
population instead of analyzing the average behavior of many populations, the update rule can
have a greater influence on the stable states and on the behavior of agents. With little or no
stochastic noise, i.e with deterministic update rules like the “Imitate the best”, the outcome can
be drastically different even for the same parameters. For the same payoff values, the population
can converge to either full cooperation or full defection, i.e. in these cases we observe bistability
in the dynamic as a population starting from the same situation can reach two different stable
states (for an example see figure A.3(a)). In this case the specific network topology and a
particular initial distribution of the different strategies on the network are the reason for this
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bistable behavior: even small differences in connections or initial strategies can thus have an
influence on the final state.
Conversely, when the decisions of the agents are based on a stochastic rule like “Replicator
dynamics” , the evolution can reach a steady state even when the population still include agents
playing different strategies. These stable situation are not however completely frozen as small
fluctuations like those that can be seen in figure A.3(b) may continue to be observed in these
populations. This happens when agents use stochastic rules because their decisions, even if
statistically good, are dictated by probabilities and in some cases leads to errors. These behaviors
are not apparent when we look at the mere average cooperation levels.
On utility calculation
The method used to calculate the individual’s payoff can have a great impact on the cooperation
level in a population, in particular when coupled with an heterogeneous network. When the
payoff of the encounters is accumulated, a highly connected agent has a strong influence on his
neighborhood and on the dynamics of the population. On the other hand, when the payoff is
divided by the number of links, i.e. when the average payoff is considered, the influence of the
heterogeneity is almost nullified. This is an important consideration in our opinion, as many
works use accumulated payoff without taking into account link maintaining costs. In real life
this is a significant issue as, even considering that different agents can have different skills, the
involvement needed to maintain a relationship is such that a great difference in the quantity of
links should imply a slight degradation in the effort to maintain these relationships healthy.
Moreover, if accumulated payoff is coupled with replicator dynamics, an affine transformation
of the payoff matrix can change completely the fixed points of the dynamics. To obviate this
situation we proposed a modified version of the replicator dynamics to maintain the advantage
of heterogeneous degree and restore the invariance of replicator dynamics [61].
On network structure
As expected, the structure of the population plays an important role on the quasi-stable states
of the simulations. In general, degree heterogeneous networks such as scale-free and social
networks allow cooperative behavior to emerge in a wider area of the parameter space than
more homogeneous networks such as rings, grids, and random networks with Poisson degree
distribution. The conclusions explained here are based on the assumption that the payoff is
calculated in an accumulated way, as average payoff does not take advantage from the degree
heterogeneity of the structured population.
In the case of Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks the evolution of cooperation essentially
depends on the colonization of highly connected nodes by cooperators [101]. Clustering and
community structure plays only a little role for these kinds of structure as these features are
almost absent. When we look at the initial progression of cooperators in a scale-free network,
shown in figure A.3(c), we can see how the initial number of cooperators drops quickly and then
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eventually starts a slower recovery. This drop is proportional to the value of the temptation
to defect compared to the reward for cooperate, the black lines in the left images of figure 5.1
shows this initial drop for two different values of T . In this first phase of the evolution, isolated
cooperators are absorbed by the defectors as their payoff is considerably lower, moreover, isolated
defectors are able to exploit the cooperators and diffuse their strategy. This initial fluctuation
is due to the initial random distribution of the agents, because cooperators are only able to
survive by sticking together and only when they manage to achieve a tight cluster they are able
to resist to defectors.
When this first initial drop does not lead to cooperator’s extinction, the clustered cooperators
are able to slowly expand and eventually regain a majority position. This happens for two main
reasons: cooperators are able to obtain high payoff when clustered together and they became
even stronger when they successfully transmit their strategy; on the other hand, defectors are
stronger when isolated between cooperators, but by diffusing their strategy they weaken their
position as they cannot get the same benefit from a defector than from a cooperator. Of course
these phenomenon can have a greater of smaller amplitude depending on the payoff values.
In the diffusion of the cooperative strategy, the highly connected hubs of the network play
a crucial role: when cooperators are able to cluster and maintain the control of at least one
hub, the cooperator hub will achieve an higher benefit. On the other hand, a defector hub, is
only able to gather a relatively small benefit. In this situation, the defector hub will have a
high probability to imitate the strategy of a cooperator hub or even of another well connected
cooperator. When this imitation happens the payoff of this new cooperator hub is increased by
the neighboring cooperators and the neighboring defectors will now slowly imitate the strategy
of the hub. The more a cooperator hub is able to diffuse his strategy and the less he will tend
to imitate a defector agent.
This phenomenon can be observed in the upper panel of figure C.10, here we can see the
number of cooperators in the neighborhood of a defector hub. As mentioned before, the initial
ratio of cooperators decreases, this lowers the payoff of the hub. When the hub changes to coop-
eration, his payoff increases, and thus he is able to diffuse his strategy to some of his defectors
neighbors. This effect is amplified by the correlation between the hubs. Especially in structures
like the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks, the construction of the network introduces corre-
lation between high connected nodes that may amplify the diffusion of cooperation by allowing
cooperator hubs to spread their strategy directly to defector hubs. The inverse phenomenon is
in general not possible because of the higher benefit obtained by cooperator hubs. Indeed when
the correlationless configuration model is used [101], the global amount of cooperation is lower.
In social networks individuals with very high degree are almost inexistent. However these
structures are still able to boost cooperation, even if not to a level as high as in scale-free
networks. The phenomenon is however very important as real social structures are different
from scale-free network but they are still capable of sustaining cooperation.
In social network the diffusion of cooperation has to rely on other features of the topology, and
we identified these properties in the higher presence of clustering, but also on the organization
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of the population in communities. As can be seen in Article B and in Article F, the presence
of a community structure in the network strongly influences the diffusion of the strategies.
These two properties allow cooperators to reorganize and stick together during the initial phase,
when defectors are able to expand. When the initial regression is contained, the cooperators
may exploit their cohesion to expand their strategy. In these networks highly connected hubs
are absent and cooperators cannot exploit this preferential channel to diffuse their strategy.
However, the lack of defector hubs is in this case even profitable for cooperators, combined with
the higher clustering of cooperators, well connected cooperators have an high benefit and are
easily imitated by low and high connected defectors.
When we look closely at mixed stable populations, i.e. populations where both strategies
are still present when the stable state has been reached, we see that the clusters of the networks
are often monomorphic, or at least with one of the strategies more strongly represented as the
low connectivity between different clusters allows an high degree of diversity to exist in what
can be interpreted as different social groups. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the
case of coordination games.
To sum up, the presence of communities and high clustering coefficient is a key factor for
sustaining an high level of cooperation, and an heterogeneous degree is the channel that allows
cooperators to expand their influence in the population, especially when combined with some
assortativity, i.e. highly connected nodes have more connection to other highly connection nodes
than with weakly connected nodes.
On conformity
Conformity, i.e. complying to the action of the majority, also has consequences that depend on
the network structure of the population. However, in general, the effect of conformity coupled
with replicator dynamics produce an acceleration of the evolution towards the steady state, and
a reduction of the occurrence of the situations with stable mixed populations.
For the Prisoner’s Dilemma there is also a sizable reduction of cooperation especially on
scale-free networks which are otherwise the more favorable structure for cooperators.
This phenomenon happens because of the dynamical evolution of the strategies in a popula-
tion. If we look at figure C.9 and at figure 5.1 we can clearly see that at the very beginning of the
evolution, defectors are able to increase their share of diffusion in the populations; this is caused
by the fact that the initial random distribution of the agents does not favor the cooperators,
that need to be together to succeed. After the initial phase, when cooperators tend to cluster
together, they may be able to expand their influence because by clustering together they are
able to greatly increase their payoff.
When we add conformity to the picture, isolated defectors, that are stronger than cooperators
when the only rule is payoff-based, they became vulnerable to adopt the cooperative strategy
because of their isolated position between cooperators. This phenomenon leads, especially in
regular networks like rings but also on other networks, to a situation where the two strategies
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Figure 5.1: First time steps of the evolution of a single population of agents interacting according
to the rules of the Prisoner’s Dilemma on Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks (left image) and
1D lattices(right image). The four lines in each image represent the cases without conformity
(in black) and with 30% of conformity (in gray), for two different values of the temptation value
T (the solid lines are for T = 1.2 and the dotted lines for T = 1.5). The used networks have
N = 2000 agents and an average degree k¯ = 8.
are clustered together. Conformity is good for cooperators in this initial situation as it allows
the suppression of isolated defectors; because of this the initial drop of cooperation is smaller
than in cases without conformity. In figure 5.1 the gray lines drop slower at the beginning than
the black lines.
Especially in the case of scale-free networks, the initial increase in the number of defectors
can trigger the “majority rule” implied by conformity. Even if the initial drop in cooperation
is slower than when only replicator dynamics is used, the frequency of cooperators drops to a
value so low than the effect of the hubs is not enough to recover. It’s also important to take into
account that a cooperator hub, with few cooperator neighbors and many defector neighbors can
spread his strategy because of his higher accumulate payoff, but he can be easily mutated into
a defector under the effect of conformity. That’s why by increasing the amount of conformity
the success of cooperators on scale-free network is reduced.
On the other hand, on regular networks like lattices, the initial phenomenon that reduces the
devastating effects of initial isolated defectors is able to produce a situation where cooperators
can succeed. Once the initial situation stabilizes and the population reaches a state where only
big homogeneous clusters exist, due to the regular degree of the network imitation by conformity
becomes almost impossible. In this case the clusters of cooperators are bigger when conformity
is higher because isolated defectors disappear quickly. When these clusters are formed, if the
temptation to defect is low enough, there will be more defectors that may imitate an efficient
cooperator than the contrary, as can be seen in figure 5.2. The cause of the growth in cooperation
when the ratio α of conformity is higher is exactly this faster absorption of defectors invaders.
When invaders are eliminated and cooperative population is not fragmented anymore, the task
for defectors is harder, and they will slowly adopt the cooperative strategy.
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Figure 5.2: The border region between two population in a lattice. No one will change strategy
because of conformity, because in this situation each agent has more neighbors like himself then
of the other strategy, this because he counts himself too in the distribution share. When we
look at the payoff based imitation only cooperators c1 has a possibility to imitate a defector, d1.
On the defector side however, both d1 and d2 can imitate a cooperator, the former may imitate
c2 and the latter c1. The numerical values inside the nodes represent their accumulated payoff,
this is for the case where T = 1.2, R = 1, and P = S = 0; the degree of the nodes is k = 4.
On dynamic networks
To try to further extend the understanding of the relationship between structure and strategy
evolution we introduced a supplementary degree of freedom consisting in allowing links to be
cut and formed, as well as the update of player strategies. The co-evolution of the network
topology, starting from a random network, showed that in a dynamic population, the network
of the interactions between the agents evolves towards a more complex structure and allows
different strategies to coexist inside different clusters that can became disconnected to protect
their diversity in the case of pure coordination games.
Of course our implementation of dynamic networks is biased and represents an important
factor that leads to an increased success for the cooperative strategies. By changing these
mechanisms the direction of evolution of the dynamical system can be completely different,
e.g. by using random rewire instead of our trust–based rewire, the formation of clusters is not
promoted in the population, thus cooperators are not able to cultivate one of the key factory
that allows cooperation to be sustained in a population.
We believe that we have only scratched the surface in the issue of network/strategy co-
evolution and our feelings are that this field will rapidly expand in the close future.
Future developments
Among the possible future developments, one is the investigation of the influence of weighted
links in the dynamic. The reason is very simple: in a society, some links are more important
than others, by using weighted edges this aspect would be included in the model. Of course, the
weight should be first taken as constants of the system and then, in a second step, allowed to
evolve. We already include weighted links in our co-evolutionary models but there is still more
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to be investigated.
A second development is the introduction of more complex games such as games with more
than two strategies or repeated games, where players have a memory of past encounters.
Another likely extension is the inclusion of more sophisticated forms of learning that should
allow the agents to adapt over time and to take more efficient decisions.
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